Trending Now

SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS IN AUSTRALIA: UNCERTAINTY FOR THE FUTURE OF MARKET-BASED CAUSATION

The following article was contributed by Nikki Stever and Madison Smith of Australia-based commercial law firm, Piper Alderman.

In the third decision delivered in a shareholder class action in Australia,[1] Iluka Resources Limited (ASX: ILU), (Iluka) succeeded in its defence of a lawsuit[2] which failed to prove that the shareholders’ direct reliance on Iluka’s conduct caused their losses. However, the decision in favour of Iluka notably lacked any significant consideration of the second causation argument typically pleaded in shareholder class actions – market-based causation.

Background of the matter

Iluka is a large mining company and global supplier of mineral sand products. On 9 July 2012, Iluka revised its sales guidance for its products, resulting in a 25% drop in share price. The shareholders alleged that Iluka’s sales guidance leading up to its announcement:

  1. was misleading or deceptive; and
  2. breached their continuous disclosure obligations.

The lead applicant purported that reliance on the sales guidance impacted their decision to purchase shares in the company (direct reliance).  It is not clear to the authors if the lead applicant or shareholders pleaded that the market as a whole was impacted by the sales guidance (market-based causation).

The Federal Court of Australia (FCA) rejected both claims on the basis that the representations alleged were not actually made, and were merely statements/guidance about Iluka’s expectations and were not guarantees or predictions/forecasts of future performance.

The FCA also found that the lead applicant relied on various external stock reports rather than statements made by Iluka, causing the direct reliance case to fail.

Direct reliance and market-based causation

Direct reliance in a shareholder class action requires the claimant to prove they actually relied on the contravening conduct (i.e. statements) when deciding to acquire shares in the defendant company, and that the subsequent decrease in share price was directly related to the contravening conduct, resulting in loss to the shareholder.

Market-based causation is based on establishing that the price that the defendant’s shares traded on the market was inflated by the contravening conduct, such that the claimant prima facie suffered loss by paying an increased price for the shares.

The Court has accepted this proposition,[3] however, also suggested that it may still be necessary for individual shareholders to give evidence that, but for the contravention by an entity, they would not have purchased the shares (or not at the price paid) in order to establish loss.[4]

Causation and loss in Iluka

Because the Court found that no representations were made (and therefore they were not capable of being relied upon, either directly or by the market), the judgment was relatively quiet in relation to causation. While there is reference to the failed direct reliance case, in so far as it was held that the lead applicant did not rely on the sales guidance issued by Iluka when deciding to purchase the shares, unusually the judgment is completely silent on market-based causation. In previous cases where market-based causation has been alleged by the plaintiff, the but for test has been discussed by the FCA in the context of considering misleading or deceptive conduct claims.  For example, the alleged contraventions in Myer and Re HIH were assessed by considering whether the alleged loss would not have occurred but for the contraventions.[5]

The High Court in Australia has offered an alternative approach in cases of proving factual causation of misleading and deceptive conduct generally – the ‘a factor’ test.[6] The a factor test is satisfied if the misleading or deceptive conduct was a factor in the occurrence of the plaintiff’s loss, or in other words materially contributed to the plaintiff’s loss.

In Iluka, this test for market-based causation would be satisfied if the alleged contraventions materially contributed to the shareholders’ loss, rather than the more stringent test of whether the contraventions were necessary for the loss.

The a factor test, if adopted, arguably offers a more appropriate test for market-based causation in cases of misleading or deceptive conduct. Firstly, it is more reliable and intuitive.[7] For example, the but for test requires counterfactual speculation as to how a market would have responded but for a particular event. This can be a difficult exercise for a plaintiff to speculate and quantify the loss. The a factor test shifts the requirements from necessity to contribution and is not as easily defeated by a claim that it was not the only factor relevant to the plaintiff’s loss.

Secondly, the test also avoids duplicative causation, as market-based causation often involves multiple factors that could have affected share prices.[8] The court does not need to assess each separate factor and consider its relative relevance to the causal loss overall, as is required when assessing the causal conduct following the but for test.

Finally, the a factor test promotes the deterrence of all misleading or deceptive conduct by providing a broad opportunity for the conduct to be considered misleading or deceptive, regardless of whether it was necessary for the loss.[9]

Conclusion

By failing to address market-based causation, the Iluka decision has created uncertainty around what causal test the court would be willing to accept for shareholders to succeed with a market-based causation claim. It is only a matter of time before there is a substantial decision on this point, however, until this occurs, the law on market-based causation remains unsettled.

About the Authors

Nikki Stever, Special Counsel  — Nikki specialises in complex litigation and disputes, with an emphasis on class actions and disputes involving corporations, competition and consumer legislation and disputes concerning breaches of trust and fiduciary duties. Nikki frequently works with litigation funders and is experienced in the structuring and conduct of funded litigation, across all Australian jurisdictions.

Madison Smith, Lawyer  — Madison is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Madison is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia.

For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Kat Gieras, Litigation Group Project Coordinator | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  kgieras@piperalderman.com.au

[1] Following Crowley v Worley Limited [2020] FCA 1522 and TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747.

[2] Bonham v Iluka Resources Ltd [2022] FCA 71.

[3] In the matter of HIH Insurance Limited (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 482; TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747.

[4] TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747, [1671].

[5] In the matter of HIH Insurance Limited (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 482; TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747.

[6] Henville v Walker [2001] HCA 52, [61] and [106].

[7] Henry Cooney, Factual causation in cases of market-based causation (2021) 27 Torts Law Journal 51.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

Commercial

View All

Burford Capital CEO: Government Inaction on PACCAR is Harming London Market

By Harry Moran |

As we approach the beginning of summer, the litigation funding industry is growing impatient in waiting for the outcome of the Civil Justice Council’s (CJC) review of litigation funding, with funders anxious to see the government provide a solution to the uncertainty created by the Supreme Court’s ruling in PACCAR.

An article in The Law Society Gazette provides an overview of an interview with Christopher Bogart, CEO of Burford Capital; who spoke at length about the ongoing impact of the UK government’s failure to introduce legislation to solve issues created by the PACCAR ruling. Bogart highlighted the key correlation between funders’ reluctance to allocate more capital to the London legal market and “the government non-response” to find a quick and effective solution to PACCAR.

Comparing the similarities in effect of the government inaction over funding legislation to the Trump administration’s tariff policy, Bogart said simply, “markets and businesses don’t like such uncertainty.” He went on to describe the London market as “not as healthy as you would like it to be”, pointing to statistics showing a decrease in capital allocation and the examples of major funders like Therium making job cuts.

One particular pain point that Bogart pointed to was Burford’s newfound hesitancy to name London as an arbitral seat and choose English law for international contracts, saying that the company has moved those contracts to jurisdictions including Singapore, Paris or New York. Bogart said that it was “unfortunate because this is one of the major global centres for litigation and arbitration”, but argued that the strategic jurisdictional shift was a result of having “a less predictable dynamic here in this market”.

As for what Bogart would like to see from the upcoming CJC’s review of litigation funding, the Burford CEO emphasised the longstanding view of the funding industry that there is “no need for a big regulatory apparatus here.” Instead, Bogart suggested that an ideal outcome would be for the CJC to encourage Westminster “to restore a degree of predictability and stability into the market.”

Insurance CEO Ceases Trading with Firms Linked to Litigation Finance

By Harry Moran |

The tensions between the insurance industry and litigation finance are well established, with insurance industry groups often at the forefront of lobbying efforts calling for tighter regulations of third-party funding. In one of the most significant examples of this tension, the CEO of a speciality insurance company has declared that his company will cease doing business with any firm that is linked to litigation funding activity.

An article in Insurance Business highlights recent comments made by Andrew Robinson, chairman and CEO of Skyward Specialty Insurance Group, where he said that the company would no longer do business with companies who have any ties to litigation finance. Citing the uptick in the use of third-party funding as one of the primary contributors to social inflation, increasing product costs and reduced availability; Robinson declared that Skyward are “not going to trade with anybody who's involved in this”.

According to the article, Robinson’s decision was triggered by the company’s discovery that an asset manager it worked with was involved in litigation funding. Skyward then “shut off” its business relationship with the asset manager and is in the process of redeeming any remaining assets with the firm. Robinson said that the idea of Skyward having ties to firms involved with litigation finance “is wrong at all levels”, saying that he told his executive leadership team that “we can’t have that anywhere near us”.

Aside from the asset manager, Skyward was trading with a company involved in contingent insurance whose work included litigation finance, but Robinson stated that the unnamed company is reducing its already minor presence in the funding space.

Despite targeting his ire primarily at litigation funding, Robinson suggested that the wider issue stems from a “broken” tort system and that “you have to get to the root cause and toward reform”.  

Bell Gully Report: New Zealand Courts are “Enablers of Litigation Funding”

By Harry Moran |

Following a 2022 report from New Zealand’s Law Commission, there has been a distinct lack of action by successive governments to introduce a Class Actions Act or any forms of oversight for the use of third-party funding in large group claims.

A new report released by Bell Gully looks at the current state of class actions in New Zealand, examining the rise of large group claims  and the role of litigation funding as a key driver. In ‘The Big Picture: Class Actions’, Bell Gully says that “in the past five years class actions have moved from being a threat on the horizon to a regular feature in New Zealand’s courts”. 

The introduction to the report appears to paint litigation funders as the prime moving force behind this trend, saying that the swell in class actions is “being driven by the availability of third-party litigation funding rather than a groundswell of consumer action.” Identifying the most prominent funders at work in New Zealand, Bell Gully points to LPF Group as the dominant local funder, Omni Bridgeway for its strong market reach from Australia, and Harbour for its global strength across litigation and arbitration funding. 

Without any legislative measures regulating funding and with no established industry association like Australia’s AALF, Bell Gully highlights the courts as the main mechanism of control over funding activity. The report goes further and suggests that “funder-friendly court decisions have contributed to the growing influence of litigation funders in New Zealand”, noting the admission of opt-out class actions and courts’ willingness to make common fund orders.

In its review of the need for a Class Actions Act in New Zealand, Bell Gully argues that the current lack of oversight on funding has led to a situation where the courts are acting as “enablers of litigation funding” rather than regulators of the practice.

The full report can be accessed here.