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SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS IN AUSTRALIA: UNCERTAINTY FOR THE FUTURE OF MARKET-BASED CAUSATION

SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS IN AUSTRALIA: UNCERTAINTY FOR THE FUTURE OF MARKET-BASED CAUSATION

The following article was contributed by Nikki Stever and Madison Smith of Australia-based commercial law firm, Piper Alderman. In the third decision delivered in a shareholder class action in Australia,[1] Iluka Resources Limited (ASX: ILU), (Iluka) succeeded in its defence of a lawsuit[2] which failed to prove that the shareholders’ direct reliance on Iluka’s conduct caused their losses. However, the decision in favour of Iluka notably lacked any significant consideration of the second causation argument typically pleaded in shareholder class actions – market-based causation. Background of the matter Iluka is a large mining company and global supplier of mineral sand products. On 9 July 2012, Iluka revised its sales guidance for its products, resulting in a 25% drop in share price. The shareholders alleged that Iluka’s sales guidance leading up to its announcement:
  1. was misleading or deceptive; and
  2. breached their continuous disclosure obligations.
The lead applicant purported that reliance on the sales guidance impacted their decision to purchase shares in the company (direct reliance).  It is not clear to the authors if the lead applicant or shareholders pleaded that the market as a whole was impacted by the sales guidance (market-based causation). The Federal Court of Australia (FCA) rejected both claims on the basis that the representations alleged were not actually made, and were merely statements/guidance about Iluka’s expectations and were not guarantees or predictions/forecasts of future performance. The FCA also found that the lead applicant relied on various external stock reports rather than statements made by Iluka, causing the direct reliance case to fail. Direct reliance and market-based causation Direct reliance in a shareholder class action requires the claimant to prove they actually relied on the contravening conduct (i.e. statements) when deciding to acquire shares in the defendant company, and that the subsequent decrease in share price was directly related to the contravening conduct, resulting in loss to the shareholder. Market-based causation is based on establishing that the price that the defendant’s shares traded on the market was inflated by the contravening conduct, such that the claimant prima facie suffered loss by paying an increased price for the shares. The Court has accepted this proposition,[3] however, also suggested that it may still be necessary for individual shareholders to give evidence that, but for the contravention by an entity, they would not have purchased the shares (or not at the price paid) in order to establish loss.[4] Causation and loss in Iluka Because the Court found that no representations were made (and therefore they were not capable of being relied upon, either directly or by the market), the judgment was relatively quiet in relation to causation. While there is reference to the failed direct reliance case, in so far as it was held that the lead applicant did not rely on the sales guidance issued by Iluka when deciding to purchase the shares, unusually the judgment is completely silent on market-based causation. In previous cases where market-based causation has been alleged by the plaintiff, the but for test has been discussed by the FCA in the context of considering misleading or deceptive conduct claims.  For example, the alleged contraventions in Myer and Re HIH were assessed by considering whether the alleged loss would not have occurred but for the contraventions.[5] The High Court in Australia has offered an alternative approach in cases of proving factual causation of misleading and deceptive conduct generally – the ‘a factor’ test.[6] The a factor test is satisfied if the misleading or deceptive conduct was a factor in the occurrence of the plaintiff’s loss, or in other words materially contributed to the plaintiff’s loss. In Iluka, this test for market-based causation would be satisfied if the alleged contraventions materially contributed to the shareholders’ loss, rather than the more stringent test of whether the contraventions were necessary for the loss. The a factor test, if adopted, arguably offers a more appropriate test for market-based causation in cases of misleading or deceptive conduct. Firstly, it is more reliable and intuitive.[7] For example, the but for test requires counterfactual speculation as to how a market would have responded but for a particular event. This can be a difficult exercise for a plaintiff to speculate and quantify the loss. The a factor test shifts the requirements from necessity to contribution and is not as easily defeated by a claim that it was not the only factor relevant to the plaintiff’s loss. Secondly, the test also avoids duplicative causation, as market-based causation often involves multiple factors that could have affected share prices.[8] The court does not need to assess each separate factor and consider its relative relevance to the causal loss overall, as is required when assessing the causal conduct following the but for test. Finally, the a factor test promotes the deterrence of all misleading or deceptive conduct by providing a broad opportunity for the conduct to be considered misleading or deceptive, regardless of whether it was necessary for the loss.[9] Conclusion By failing to address market-based causation, the Iluka decision has created uncertainty around what causal test the court would be willing to accept for shareholders to succeed with a market-based causation claim. It is only a matter of time before there is a substantial decision on this point, however, until this occurs, the law on market-based causation remains unsettled. About the Authors Nikki Stever, Special Counsel  — Nikki specialises in complex litigation and disputes, with an emphasis on class actions and disputes involving corporations, competition and consumer legislation and disputes concerning breaches of trust and fiduciary duties. Nikki frequently works with litigation funders and is experienced in the structuring and conduct of funded litigation, across all Australian jurisdictions. Madison Smith, Lawyer  — Madison is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Madison is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia. For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Kat Gieras, Litigation Group Project Coordinator | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  kgieras@piperalderman.com.au — [1] Following Crowley v Worley Limited [2020] FCA 1522 and TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747. [2] Bonham v Iluka Resources Ltd [2022] FCA 71. [3] In the matter of HIH Insurance Limited (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 482; TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747. [4] TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747, [1671]. [5] In the matter of HIH Insurance Limited (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 482; TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747. [6] Henville v Walker [2001] HCA 52, [61] and [106]. [7] Henry Cooney, Factual causation in cases of market-based causation (2021) 27 Torts Law Journal 51. [8] Ibid. [9] Ibid.

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Life After PACCAR: What’s Next for Litigation Funding?

By John Freund |

In the wake of the UK Supreme Court’s landmark R (on the application of PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal decision, which held that many common litigation funding agreements (LFAs) constituted damages-based agreements (DBAs) and were therefore unenforceable without complying with the Damages-Based Agreements Regulations, the litigation funding market has been in flux.

The ruling upended traditional third-party funding models in England & Wales and sparked a wide range of responses from funders, lawyers and policymakers addressing the uncertainty it created for access to justice and commercial claims. This Life After PACCAR piece brings together leading partners from around the industry to reflect on what has changed and where the market is headed.

An article in Law.com highlights how practitioners are navigating this “post-PACCAR” landscape. Contributors emphasise the significant disruption that followed the decision’s classification of LFAs as DBAs — disruption that forced funders and claimants to rethink pricing structures and contractual frameworks. They also explore recent case law that has begun to restore some stability, including appellate decisions affirming alternative fee structures that avoid the DBA label (such as multiple-of-investment returns) and the ongoing uncertainty pending legislative reform.

Discussion also centres on the UK government’s response: following the Civil Justice Council’s 2025 Final Report, momentum has built behind proposals to reverse the PACCAR effect through legislation and to adopt a light-touch regulatory regime for third-party funders.

Litigation Funding Founder Reflects on Building a New Platform

By John Freund |

A new interview offers a candid look at how litigation funding startups are being shaped by founders with deep experience inside the legal system. Speaking from the perspective of a former practicing litigator, Lauren Harrison, founder of Signal Peak Partners, describes how time spent in BigLaw provided a practical foundation for launching and operating a litigation finance business.

An article in Above the Law explains that Harrison views litigation funding as a natural extension of legal advocacy, rather than a purely financial exercise. Having worked closely with clients and trial teams, she argues that understanding litigation pressure points, timelines, and decision making dynamics is critical when evaluating cases for investment. This background allows funders to assess risk more realistically and communicate more effectively with law firms and claimholders.

The interview also touches on the operational realities of starting a litigation funding company from the ground up. Harrison discusses early challenges such as building trust in a competitive market, educating lawyers about non-recourse funding structures, and developing underwriting processes that balance speed with diligence. Transparency around pricing and alignment of incentives emerge as recurring themes, with Harrison emphasizing that long-term relationships matter more than short-term returns.

Another key takeaway is the importance of team composition. While legal expertise is essential, Harrison notes that successful platforms also require strong financial, operational, and compliance capabilities. Blending these skill sets, particularly at an early stage, is presented as one of the more difficult but necessary steps in scaling a sustainable funding business.

Australian High Court Limits Recovery of Litigation Funding Costs

By John Freund |

The High Court of Australia has delivered a significant decision clarifying the limits of recoverable damages in funded litigation, confirming that claimants cannot recover litigation funding commissions or fees as compensable loss, even where those costs materially reduce the net recovery.

Ashurst reports that the High Court rejected arguments that litigation funding costs should be treated as damages flowing from a defendant’s wrongdoing. The ruling arose from a shareholder class action in which claimants sought to recover the funding commission deducted from their settlement proceeds, contending that the costs were a foreseeable consequence of the underlying misconduct. The court disagreed, holding that litigation funding expenses are properly characterised as the price paid to pursue litigation, rather than loss caused by the defendant.

In reaching its decision, the High Court emphasised the distinction between harm suffered as a result of wrongful conduct and the commercial arrangements a claimant enters into to enforce their rights. While acknowledging that litigation funding is now a common and often necessary feature of large-scale litigation, the court concluded that this reality does not convert funding costs into recoverable damages. Allowing such recovery, the court reasoned, would represent an expansion of damages principles beyond established limits.

The decision provides welcome clarity for defendants facing funded claims, while reinforcing long-standing principles of Australian damages law. At the same time, it confirms that litigation funding costs remain a matter to be borne out of recoveries, subject to court approval regimes and regulatory oversight rather than being shifted onto defendants through damages awards.