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SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS IN AUSTRALIA: UNCERTAINTY FOR THE FUTURE OF MARKET-BASED CAUSATION

SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS IN AUSTRALIA: UNCERTAINTY FOR THE FUTURE OF MARKET-BASED CAUSATION

The following article was contributed by Nikki Stever and Madison Smith of Australia-based commercial law firm, Piper Alderman. In the third decision delivered in a shareholder class action in Australia,[1] Iluka Resources Limited (ASX: ILU), (Iluka) succeeded in its defence of a lawsuit[2] which failed to prove that the shareholders’ direct reliance on Iluka’s conduct caused their losses. However, the decision in favour of Iluka notably lacked any significant consideration of the second causation argument typically pleaded in shareholder class actions – market-based causation. Background of the matter Iluka is a large mining company and global supplier of mineral sand products. On 9 July 2012, Iluka revised its sales guidance for its products, resulting in a 25% drop in share price. The shareholders alleged that Iluka’s sales guidance leading up to its announcement:
  1. was misleading or deceptive; and
  2. breached their continuous disclosure obligations.
The lead applicant purported that reliance on the sales guidance impacted their decision to purchase shares in the company (direct reliance).  It is not clear to the authors if the lead applicant or shareholders pleaded that the market as a whole was impacted by the sales guidance (market-based causation). The Federal Court of Australia (FCA) rejected both claims on the basis that the representations alleged were not actually made, and were merely statements/guidance about Iluka’s expectations and were not guarantees or predictions/forecasts of future performance. The FCA also found that the lead applicant relied on various external stock reports rather than statements made by Iluka, causing the direct reliance case to fail. Direct reliance and market-based causation Direct reliance in a shareholder class action requires the claimant to prove they actually relied on the contravening conduct (i.e. statements) when deciding to acquire shares in the defendant company, and that the subsequent decrease in share price was directly related to the contravening conduct, resulting in loss to the shareholder. Market-based causation is based on establishing that the price that the defendant’s shares traded on the market was inflated by the contravening conduct, such that the claimant prima facie suffered loss by paying an increased price for the shares. The Court has accepted this proposition,[3] however, also suggested that it may still be necessary for individual shareholders to give evidence that, but for the contravention by an entity, they would not have purchased the shares (or not at the price paid) in order to establish loss.[4] Causation and loss in Iluka Because the Court found that no representations were made (and therefore they were not capable of being relied upon, either directly or by the market), the judgment was relatively quiet in relation to causation. While there is reference to the failed direct reliance case, in so far as it was held that the lead applicant did not rely on the sales guidance issued by Iluka when deciding to purchase the shares, unusually the judgment is completely silent on market-based causation. In previous cases where market-based causation has been alleged by the plaintiff, the but for test has been discussed by the FCA in the context of considering misleading or deceptive conduct claims.  For example, the alleged contraventions in Myer and Re HIH were assessed by considering whether the alleged loss would not have occurred but for the contraventions.[5] The High Court in Australia has offered an alternative approach in cases of proving factual causation of misleading and deceptive conduct generally – the ‘a factor’ test.[6] The a factor test is satisfied if the misleading or deceptive conduct was a factor in the occurrence of the plaintiff’s loss, or in other words materially contributed to the plaintiff’s loss. In Iluka, this test for market-based causation would be satisfied if the alleged contraventions materially contributed to the shareholders’ loss, rather than the more stringent test of whether the contraventions were necessary for the loss. The a factor test, if adopted, arguably offers a more appropriate test for market-based causation in cases of misleading or deceptive conduct. Firstly, it is more reliable and intuitive.[7] For example, the but for test requires counterfactual speculation as to how a market would have responded but for a particular event. This can be a difficult exercise for a plaintiff to speculate and quantify the loss. The a factor test shifts the requirements from necessity to contribution and is not as easily defeated by a claim that it was not the only factor relevant to the plaintiff’s loss. Secondly, the test also avoids duplicative causation, as market-based causation often involves multiple factors that could have affected share prices.[8] The court does not need to assess each separate factor and consider its relative relevance to the causal loss overall, as is required when assessing the causal conduct following the but for test. Finally, the a factor test promotes the deterrence of all misleading or deceptive conduct by providing a broad opportunity for the conduct to be considered misleading or deceptive, regardless of whether it was necessary for the loss.[9] Conclusion By failing to address market-based causation, the Iluka decision has created uncertainty around what causal test the court would be willing to accept for shareholders to succeed with a market-based causation claim. It is only a matter of time before there is a substantial decision on this point, however, until this occurs, the law on market-based causation remains unsettled. About the Authors Nikki Stever, Special Counsel  — Nikki specialises in complex litigation and disputes, with an emphasis on class actions and disputes involving corporations, competition and consumer legislation and disputes concerning breaches of trust and fiduciary duties. Nikki frequently works with litigation funders and is experienced in the structuring and conduct of funded litigation, across all Australian jurisdictions. Madison Smith, Lawyer  — Madison is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Madison is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia. For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Kat Gieras, Litigation Group Project Coordinator | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  kgieras@piperalderman.com.au — [1] Following Crowley v Worley Limited [2020] FCA 1522 and TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747. [2] Bonham v Iluka Resources Ltd [2022] FCA 71. [3] In the matter of HIH Insurance Limited (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 482; TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747. [4] TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747, [1671]. [5] In the matter of HIH Insurance Limited (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 482; TPT Patrol Pty Ltd as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund v Myer Holdings Ltd [2019] FCA 1747. [6] Henville v Walker [2001] HCA 52, [61] and [106]. [7] Henry Cooney, Factual causation in cases of market-based causation (2021) 27 Torts Law Journal 51. [8] Ibid. [9] Ibid.
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Omni Bridgeway Secures EU Victory as Commission Declines Regulation

By John Freund |

Litigation funders scored a major win in Europe this week as the European Commission confirmed it will not pursue new regulations targeting third-party funding. In a decision delivered at the final session of the Commission's High-Level Forum on Justice for Growth, Commissioner Michael McGrath announced that the EU executive will instead focus its efforts on implementing the recently adopted Representative Actions Directive (RAD), which governs collective redress actions brought by consumers and investors.

An article in Law.com notes that the move is being hailed as a significant victory by litigation funders, particularly Omni Bridgeway. Kees de Visser, the firm's Chair of the EMEA Investment Committee, described the decision as a clear endorsement of the litigation funding model and a green light for continued expansion across European jurisdictions. Funders had grown increasingly concerned over the past year that the EU might impose strict rules or licensing requirements, following persistent lobbying by industry critics and certain member states.

Supporters of the Commission’s stance, including the International Legal Finance Association, argue that additional regulation would have harmed access to justice. They contend that third-party funding helps balance the playing field, especially in complex or high-cost litigation, by enabling smaller claimants to pursue valid claims that would otherwise be financially out of reach.

Although concerns around transparency and influence remain part of the wider policy debate, the EU’s current position sends a strong signal that existing legal tools and the RAD framework are sufficient to safeguard the public interest. For funders like Omni Bridgeway, this regulatory reprieve opens the door to deeper engagement in consumer and mass claims across the bloc.

Daily Caller Slams Third Party Funding as Funders Face Mounting Media Attacks

By John Freund |

In a harsh opinion piecd, the conservative outlet The Daily Caller blasts third party litigation funding (TPLF), casting the practice as a “scam” that feeds frivolous lawsuits, burdens the economy, and unfairly enriches hidden investors at the expense of all Americans.

The op-ed, penned by Stephen Moore, draws a dire picture: trial lawyers allegedly “suck blood out of the economy” through class action suits that generate millions for attorneys but little for the plaintiffs. The piece points to numbers — a projected $500 billion hit annually to the U.S. economy, and tort cost growth more than double the inflation rate — to argue that the scale of litigation has outpaced any legitimate quest for justice.

Where TPLF comes in, according to Moore, is as the lubrication for what he sees as a booming lawsuit industry. He claims that unknown investors donate capital to lawsuits in exchange for outsized shares of any settlement, not the injured party. These hidden financial interests, he argues, distort the incentives for litigation, encouraging suits where there is no “real” corporate villain, a concern especially pointed at class action and litigation targeting major media or tech firms.

Moore cites roughly $2 billion in new financing arranged in 2024 and a fund pool of $16.1 billion total assets as evidence TPLF is growing rapidly. He endorses the Litigation Transparency Act, legislation introduced by Darrell Issa, which would require disclosure of such funding arrangements in federal civil cases. In Moore’s view, transparency would strip the “cloak of secrecy” from investors and curb what he describes as “jackpot justice,” lawsuits driven less by justice than by profit.

But the tone is unmistakably critical. Moore frames the practice as a parasitic industry that drains capital, discourages investment, and suppresses wages. He cites recent reforms in states like Florida under Ron DeSantis as evidence that limiting litigation can lead to lower insurance premiums and greater economic growth.

For legal funders, this op-ed and others like it underscore a growing media trend: skepticism not just of frivolous lawsuits but of the very model of third party funding. To preserve reputation and legitimacy, funders may need to do more than quietly finance cases. They may need to publicly engage, explain their business model, and advocate for regulatory standards that ensure transparency while preserving access to justice.

Global Litigation Funding Thrives, Yet Regulation Still Looms

By John Freund |

The global litigation funding market is experiencing strong growth, yet lingering regulatory uncertainties continue to shadow its trajectory. According to the Chambers Global Practice Guide, the market was valued at approximately US $17.5 billion (AUD $26.9 billion) in March 2025 and is projected to surge to US $67.2 billion (AUD $103 billion) by 2037.

An article in LSJ states that major drivers of this expansion include rising legal costs, complex cross-border commercial litigation, and increased demand from small and mid-sized law firms seeking external funding to build out specialist teams. While funders embrace the growth opportunity, critics raise concerns around transparency, claimant autonomy, and potential conflicts of interest.

In Australia, a notable development occurred on 6 August 2025 when the High Court of Australia in Kain v R&B Investments Pty Ltd clarified that federal courts may make common fund or funding equalisation orders for the benefit of third-party funders (but not for solicitors) in class actions—except in Victoria, which still allows contingency fees. This decision is seen as a win for litigation funders, providing greater clarity across most Australian jurisdictions. Australia also saw regulatory reform in December 2022 when the Corporations Amendment (Litigation Funding) Regulations came into force, exempting litigation funding schemes from the MIS/AFSL regime under specific conditions and emphasising the mitigation of conflicts of interest as a compliance feature.

On the regulatory front, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is considering extending relief instruments that exempt certain litigation funding arrangements from the National Credit Code and financial services licensing until March 2030. Meanwhile in the UK, the proposed Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill 2024 seeks to remove the classification of third-party funding agreements as “damages-based agreements” under the Courts & Legal Services Act – a move which proponents say will enable greater access to justice and clear the path for global funders.