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The 6th Anniversary of the Peter Thiel / Hulk Hogan / Gawker Case: What Have We Learned?

The 6th Anniversary of the Peter Thiel / Hulk Hogan / Gawker Case: What Have We Learned?

This week marks the sixth anniversary of Terry Bollea (AKA professional wrestler Hulk Hogan) suing Gawker media for publishing a sex tape of him with a married woman. The suit made national news not just for its salacious nature—but because of the questions it raised regarding privacy versus journalistic freedom. Once news emerged that billionaire and PayPal co-founder Peter Thiel was funding Hogan’s claim, the case became even more sensational. In this piece, we’ll take a look at exactly what happened in the case, and how it impacted (or hasn’t impacted) Litigation Finance. The Facts of the Case In 2007, Gawker, a website known for celebrity scandals and salacious content, published a piece with the headline: “Peter Thiel is totally gay, people.” Was this newsworthy? Did the piece have journalistic integrity? Reasonable people can disagree. Peter Thiel is in fact gay, which means the truth of the article protected Gawker from a libel suit. In 2009, an outed Thiel gave an interview in which he called Gawker ‘destructive,’ even as he acknowledged that the site wasn’t focused on ruining him personally. Thiel also speculated that Gawker maintained a disdainful attitude toward Big Tech, and may be focusing on punishing industry leaders as a result. Fast forward to 2012, when Gawker published a lewd video featuring wrestler Hulk Hogan (AKA Terry Bollea) having sex with Heather Clem—wife of radio personality “Bubba the Love Sponge.” This led to Bollea suing the media outlet for infringement of rights of publicity, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Bollea was represented by famed Los Angeles attorney Charles Harder. The published video, which Bollea claims was recorded without his knowledge or consent, contained a 2-minute section of a 30+ minute video—ten seconds of which included explicit sex acts. In 2016, Forbes magazine revealed that it was indeed Peter Thiel who was bankrolling Bollea’s case against Gawker. Speculation soared over what was viewed by many as Thiel’s revenge against Gawker for outing him. Did he want to ruin the media company, or purchase it, or simply malign the company that caused him personal and professional anguish? Thiel maintained that his involvement was philanthropic at heart, and meant to protect people from being bullied by unscrupulous media outlets. If anything, the lawsuit was meant to deter Gawker from intentionally releasing damaging content that lacked legitimate news value. Gawker founder Nick Denton, who was named personally in Bollea’s claim, made a statement about Thiel’s involvement in the case: “Just because Peter Thiel is a Silicon Valley Billionaire, his opinion does not trump our millions of readers who know us for routinely driving big news stories.” Also in 2016, a jury awarded Bollea compensatory damages of $115 million, plus punitive damages of $25 million—finding Gawker liable. A few months later, Gawker filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and began looking for a buyer. Several media outlets owned by Gawker were sold. By November 2016, Gawker and Bollea reached a settlement of $31 million. Today, Gawker’s flagship gossip site is still active. Gawker media sold off several of its prominent sites including Gizmodo, Jezebel, Deadspin, and io9. The LF Connection The case itself was of particular interest in and around the Litigation Finance community. Opponents of third-party legal funding asserted that Thiel’s actions in the case laid out an effective blueprint for the very wealthy to bankroll frivolous, but eye-catching cases. Billionaires could, some posited, use their wealth and legal connections to target specific companies, forcing them into bankruptcy. This speculation took place alongside the typical accusations that third-party litigation funding could clog court dockets with meritless actions meant to be quick paydays for funders and their clients. For example, Peter Sheer, a First Amendment expert, suggested that Thiel and others might abuse the power of third-party legal funding to intimidate media outlets. According to Sheer: “Winning is the ultimate chilling effect, but if you can’t win the case, you at least want the editors to think twice before writing another critical story about you.” To the keen-eyed observer though, it’s clear that Peter Thiel neither incited this case, nor had any real control over its outcome. Bollea initiated the case before Thiel’s involvement. At the time the case was decided, the jury was unaware that Bollea had a benefactor. And since the jury ruled in favor of Bollea, not Gawker, it’s clear that the case had merit. Thiel was always adamant that funding Bollea’s case (to the tune of $10 million) was about deterrence, not revenge. He explains that he wanted to “fight back” against Gawker’s practice of damaging reputations and bullying those with no means to pursue a claim to conclusion. As Thiel explains, “…even someone like Terry Bollea, who is a millionaire and famous and a successful person didn’t quite have the resources to do this alone.” While one could view Thiel’s actions as being contradictory to the principles of free speech—he disagrees. In fact, Thiel has donated to free speech defenders like the Committee to Protect Journalists. Thiel maintains that there is a profound difference between journalism in the public interest, and the type of media Gawker traffics in. That’s why he decided to take action. Thiel told the New York Times, “It’s less about revenge and more about specific deterrence. I saw Gawker pioneer a unique and incredibly damaging way of getting attention by bullying people even when there was no connection with the public interest.” Now, six years after the case has concluded—what have we learned? We haven’t seen a rash of billionaires funding cases, frivolous or not, with the intention of bringing down specific companies. That’s not to say billionaires aren’t financing claims the way Thiel did, only that they aren’t doing so publicly. Unlike traditional litigation funders, Thiel did not stand to make any money from Bollea’s lawsuit. Technically, Thiel should still be considered the litigation funder, though his term sheet wouldn’t be one most funders would want to imitate. The Gawker case has not led to a slew of frivolous, funded claim. Among other reasons, it simply doesn’t make financial sense to invest in a case lacking in merit. Bollea’s accusations against Gawker were affirmed by the jury, which resulted in a large award. So this claim was meritorious, even if Thiel’s motivation for funding the claim were not ROI-based. Media outlets are not cowering en masse over fears of punitive lawsuits from billionaires. That was much ado about nothing. Holding media outlets accountable for what they print (and occasionally, their motivations for doing so) is a vital and essential part of the free press. Free speech is not freedom to print anything—even something as personal as a sex tape—merely as an attention-getting device. Final Takeaways Can a lawsuit fall under the purview of Free Speech? Thiel believes so, and many others agree. This case addressed questions of privacy, free speech, and litigation funding. The end results demonstrated that we are all entitled to some element of privacy—even the celebrities among us. The Gawker case also affirmed that litigation funding still serves the interests of justice by enhancing the ability of claimants to bring lawsuits when they are wronged. The takeaway here should be that Peter Thiel afforded Hulk Hogan access to justice. Of course, when a billionaire backs a professional wrestler against a media company, sometimes the moral of the story can get lost beneath the headlines.
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Burford’s Law-Firm Investment Plan Draws Fire

By John Freund |

Burford Capital’s new push to take minority stakes in U.S. law firms is already meeting resistance from tort-reform advocates and insurer-aligned groups, who argue the structure could blur loyalties inside the attorney-client relationship. The plan, described by Burford’s chief development officer Travis Lenkner as “strategic minority investments” to help firms scale, would rely on managed service organizations (MSOs) that house back-office assets while leaving legal work to a lawyer-owned entity. Supporters cast it as a lawyer-friendly alternative to private equity; skeptics see a back-door end-run around state bars’ bans on non-lawyer ownership.

An article in Insurance Journal reports that critics, including the Florida Justice Reform Institute’s William Large, warn MSO-style deals could tilt decision-making toward investors focused on “big verdicts,” threatening firm independence and client interests. Only Arizona permits direct non-lawyer ownership today, and while Utah and Washington, D.C., have loosened rules at the margins, most states still enforce bright-line prohibitions.

The debate has sharpened as disclosure and licensing regimes proliferate: at least 16 states now require some level of third-party funding transparency. The Insurance Journal piece also notes a recent Texas Bar ethics opinion that green-lights MSOs for law-firm services under narrow conditions, though it doesn’t answer the broader question of outside investors’ influence. For its part, Burford says it understands the ethical guardrails and intends to be a passive investor focused on firm growth and operational support.

For the legal finance industry, the MSO path signals a pivotal test. If bars and courts accept these structures, capital could flow directly into firm operations—potentially accelerating portfolio origination, technology spend, and fee-earner leverage. If regulators balk, expect renewed calls for explicit rulemaking on ownership, disclosure, and control—alongside creative alternatives (credit facilities, revenue shares, and hybrid portfolios) to replicate MSO-like benefits without the governance controversy.

BHP Presses Gramercy–Pogust on Control of £36bn Claim

By John Freund |

A high-stakes governance fight is spilling into the UK’s largest group action. BHP has demanded clarity over hedge fund Gramercy Funds Management’s role at Pogust Goodhead, the claimant firm fronting a £36 billion suit tied to Brazil’s 2015 Mariana dam disaster. The miner’s counsel at Slaughter and May points to recent leadership turmoil at the firm and questions whether a non-lawyer financier can exert de facto control over litigation strategy—an issue that cuts to the heart of legal ethics and England & Wales’ restrictions on who can direct claims.

Financial Times reports that Gramercy, which finances Pogust, has just extended $65 million more to the firm after the removal of CEO-cofounder Tom Goodhead. BHP wants answers on independence and management oversight as the case nears a pivotal High Court ruling. For its part, Pogust says it remains independent and committed to its clients, while Gramercy rejects any suggestion it owns or manages the firm. The backdrop is familiar to funders: courts’ increasing scrutiny of who calls the shots when capital underwrites complex, bet-the-company litigation. Prior settlement overtures from BHP and Vale—reported at $1.4 billion—were rebuffed as insufficient relative to the claim’s scale and alleged harm.

Beyond this case, the episode underscores a larger question: how far can financing arrangements go before they collide with the long-standing principle that lawyers—and only lawyers—control litigation? The answer matters well beyond Mariana. If courts or legislators tighten the definition of control, expect deal terms, governance covenants, and disclosure norms in UK funding to evolve quickly. For cross-border mass-harm claims, the line between support and steer is narrowing—and being tested in real time.

ALF-Member Backs Amazon UK Pricing Class Action

By John Freund |

A new opt-out competition claim aims squarely at Amazon, alleging price-parity tactics inflated costs for more than 45 million UK consumers. The Association of Consumer Support Organisations has filed for certification in the Competition Appeal Tribunal, instructing Stephenson Harwood with counsel from Monckton Chambers. The claim asserts Amazon’s marketplace policies restricted third-party sellers from offering better prices elsewhere—costs that, ACSO says, consumers ultimately bore.

The Global Legal Post notes a third-party litigation funder—confirmed as a member of the Association of Litigation Funders—is bankrolling the action, with identity to be revealed at certification. That disclosure posture aligns with the CAT’s funder-transparency expectations post-PACCAR while preserving competitive sensitivity during the early phase. On the defense side, Amazon labeled the case “without merit,” and emphasized consumer benefits and seller support on its platform. For claimant-side practitioners, the case illustrates how funders continue to underwrite large opt-out competition claims notwithstanding shifting case law on damages-based LFAs; structures are adjusting, not retreating.

If certified, the case will test funder appetite for big-ticket consumer competition matters amid the UK government’s newly announced review of the collective actions regime. It could also influence how funders structure returns (percentage vs. multiple, hybrids) to thread the needle between tribunal oversight and commercial viability. Watch for whether the CAT’s scrutiny of fees and “just and reasonable” outcomes further standardizes funding terms across UK opt-out claims.