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The Fundamental Distinction Policymakers Cannot Ignore

By Eric Schuller |

The Fundamental Distinction Policymakers Cannot Ignore

The following was contributed by Eric K. Schuller, President, The Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC).


If policymakers want to understand consumer legal funding, they should start with insurance, not lending. At first glance, insurance and consumer legal funding may appear unrelated. One protects against risk. The other provides funds to plaintiffs in pending lawsuits to help pay for their day-to-day expenses. But structurally, they share a defining characteristic: risk is assumed by the capital provider, not imposed on the consumer. That single feature separates consumer legal funding from loans and aligns it more closely with underwriting.

Public policy depends on accurate classification. When a product is mischaracterized, regulation can miss its mark. Consumer legal funding is frequently labeled a “loan,” yet its mechanics contradict that description. A loan creates a guaranteed repayment obligation. Consumer legal funding does not. To regulate wisely, lawmakers must understand that distinction.

Insurance is built on underwriting risk. An insurance company evaluates probabilities. It examines health risks, property risks, liability exposure, accident frequency. It prices policies accordingly. The insurer does not lend money to the policyholder. Instead, it assumes risk in exchange for compensation. If the insured event occurs, the insurer pays. If the event does not occur, the insurer retains the premium. In either case, the insurer’s business model depends on accepting uncertainty. Insurance is not debt. It is risk transfer.

Now consider consumer legal funding. A funding company evaluates a legal claim. It assesses liability, damages, collectability, procedural posture, and likely duration. It underwrites the case. Instead of collecting premiums, it provides monies to the plaintiff. Its return depends entirely on a defined event: recovery in the lawsuit. If recovery occurs, the provider receives its agreed return from the proceeds. If recovery does not occur, the provider receives nothing. The funding company has effectively underwritten litigation risk. That is not lending. That is risk assumption.

The central question in distinguishing loans from contingent capital is simple: Who bears the risk of failure? In a loan, the borrower bears the risk. Repayment is mandatory regardless of outcome. In insurance, the insurer bears the risk. Payment depends on whether a covered event occurs. In consumer legal funding, the funding company bears the risk. Repayment depends on whether the case succeeds. If a plaintiff loses their case, they owe nothing. There is no collection action, no wage garnishment, no deficiency balance. The capital provider absorbs the loss. That structure is fundamentally inconsistent with debt.

To see the contrast clearly, consider the defining characteristics of a traditional loan: an unconditional obligation to repay, repayment regardless of performance or outcome, interest accrual over time, recourse against income or assets, and credit-based underwriting. If you borrow money to open a business and the business fails, you still owe the bank. If you lose your job after taking out a personal loan, you still owe the lender. If you use a credit card and experience hardship, the balance remains. Debt survives failure. Consumer legal funding does not. If there is no recovery in the legal claim, there is no repayment obligation. That single fact removes the defining feature of a loan.

Insurance companies price risk across portfolios. Some claims will generate losses. Others will generate gains. Sustainability depends on aggregate performance. Consumer legal funding companies operate similarly. Some cases succeed. Others fail. Pricing reflects probability of recovery, expected timeline, and litigation risk. Like insurers, funding providers must absorb unsuccessful outcomes as part of their business model. If policymakers were to impose lending-style interest caps on insurance premiums, the insurance market would collapse. Premiums are not structured like loan interest because repayment is not guaranteed. Similarly, consumer legal funding cannot be evaluated as if repayment were certain. The risk of total loss is real. When regulation ignores that risk allocation, it misunderstands the economics.

Labeling consumer legal funding as a loan may appear harmless, but it has significant policy consequences. Lending regulations are built around products where repayment is guaranteed and borrowers bear default risk. Those regulations assume predictable interest accrual and enforceable repayment obligations. Consumer legal funding lacks those features. If policymakers apply lending frameworks to non-recourse, outcome-dependent arrangements, they risk imposing regulatory structures that do not fit the product, distorting pricing models built around risk of total loss, reducing availability of funding for injured consumers, and eliminating a non-recourse option that differs fundamentally from debt. Regulation should reflect economic reality, not rhetorical convenience.

For injured plaintiffs, litigation is rarely quick. Cases may take months or years to resolve. During that time, medical bills accumulate. Rent is due. Utilities must be paid. Families rely on a steady income that may no longer exist. Traditional loans require fixed repayment regardless of outcome. Insurance does not. Consumer legal funding does not. That distinction explains why some consumers choose it. They are not borrowing against wages or income. They are accessing funds tied to a potential asset — their legal claim. If that asset produces value, repayment occurs from that value. If it does not, there is no personal debt. That is not debt stacking. It is risk sharing.

The core issue is risk transfer. Debt transfers risk to the borrower. Insurance transfers risk to the insurer. Consumer legal funding transfers litigation outcome risk to the funding company. The defining feature of a loan is an unconditional promise to repay. Without that promise, the structure changes entirely. If there is no recovery and the consumer owes nothing, the essential element of debt is absent. Policy debates should begin with that structural truth.

None of this suggests that consumer legal funding should operate without oversight. Transparent contracts, disclosure requirements, and consumer protections are appropriate in any financial arrangement. But regulation must match mechanics. Insurance is regulated as insurance because it is risk underwriting. Debt is regulated as lending because repayment is guaranteed. Consumer legal funding is non-recourse and outcome-dependent. It should be evaluated through that lens. When lawmakers start from the wrong definition, unintended consequences follow.

Consumer legal funding is non-recourse, payable only from legal proceeds, transfers outcome risk to the capital provider, and creates no unconditional repayment obligation. It shares structural similarities with insurance underwriting and other contingent compensation arrangements where payment depends on performance. The defining feature of a loan is guaranteed repayment. Consumer legal funding has no such guarantee. Before regulating it as debt, policymakers should ask a simple question: If the case fails and the consumer owes nothing, where is the loan? Sound public policy begins with structural accuracy.

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Eric Schuller

Eric Schuller

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Nonprofit Milestone Foundation Forms Advisory Council to Champion ‘Simple Interest’ Litigation Funding

By John Freund |

The Milestone Foundation, a western New York nonprofit that bills itself as the country's only organization dedicated to litigation funding for plaintiffs, has assembled a new advisory council to advance its mission and promote a funding model built on simple, non-compounding interest rates. The move marks an effort to position nonprofit funding as an alternative to the high-cost consumer products that have drawn regulatory scrutiny.

As reported by Law.com, the Buffalo-based foundation unveiled a multi-disciplinary council spanning the full litigation ecosystem, drawing together professionals from across the plaintiff, finance, and legal services landscape to guide its work and broaden its reach.

Founded in 2016 by John and Amy Bair, the Milestone Foundation operates as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit and offers pre-settlement funding at 15% simple interest and post-settlement funding at 10% simple interest, with interest that never compounds. Like commercial consumer legal funding, its advances are non-recourse, meaning plaintiffs owe nothing if their case is unsuccessful. The foundation says it has provided more than $6 million in funding to over 900 plaintiffs in partnership with more than 320 law firms nationwide.

The council's formation comes amid intensifying debate over how consumer legal funding should be priced and regulated, exemplified by recent state legislation such as the Kansas Transparency in Consumer Legal Funding Act. By emphasizing transparent, simple-interest terms, the foundation is staking out a distinct position in a market often criticized for opaque and compounding charges, offering a model that supporters argue better aligns funding costs with plaintiffs' interests.

Illinois Moves to Restrict Private Equity and Hedge Fund Control of Law Firms

By John Freund |

Illinois has joined a growing list of states moving to rein in non-lawyer ownership and control of law firms, advancing legislation that restricts the influence of private equity, hedge funds, and outside investors over legal practice. The measure reflects mounting concern that capital-driven ownership structures, closely related to litigation finance, could compromise attorney independence.

As reported by Crain's Chicago Business, House Bill 5487 places new limits on alternative business structures (ABS) and management services organizations (MSOs). The bill prohibits non-lawyers and outside investors from interfering with attorneys' professional judgment, accessing client records, hiring or firing lawyers, or charging fees tied to a firm's revenues or profits. Firms must also disclose any MSO or ABS arrangement to their clients.

Rather than banning the structures outright, the legislation significantly curtails non-lawyer involvement in firm operations and decision-making. The bill drew an unusual coalition, with both the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association and Illinois Defense Counsel backing it, alongside State Rep. Jay Hoffman and House Speaker Emanuel "Chris" Welch.

Supporters framed the measure as a response to rising private equity and venture capital involvement in civil litigation, drawing explicit parallels to third-party litigation funding arrangements that finance cases in exchange for a share of recoveries. Illinois follows California and Colorado in tightening ABS rules, amid criticism that Arizona's permissive regime has allowed non-lawyer-owned firms to manage mass tort caseloads while funded through attorney-fee percentages. The trend signals growing legislative resistance to investor control of the litigation process.

The Case for Nonlawyer-Owned Firms: Filling Consumer Justice Gaps Left by Big Law

By John Freund |

As states such as Illinois move to restrict non-lawyer ownership of law firms, defenders of alternative business structures are pushing back, arguing that ABS models expand access to justice for consumers and small businesses that traditional firms have little economic incentive to serve. The debate goes to the heart of how technology and outside capital should reshape the delivery of legal services.

As reported by Bloomberg Law, Matt Freund, co-founder and chief executive of Arizona ABS-licensed firm ClaimsHero, contends that conventional firms lack the incentive to handle consumer protection and wage-theft claims where clients cannot afford hourly billing. ABS firms, he argues, combine legal expertise with technology to operate on contingency at scale, serving more than 100,000 clients at no cost to consumers through automated onboarding, eligibility screening, and client communication.

Freund counters concerns that non-lawyer ownership weakens oversight, asserting that ABS firms face stricter regulation than traditional practices. Entity-level licensing, he notes, creates firm-wide accountability, with semi-annual audits, biennial renewals, compliance-attorney requirements, and the risk of firm-wide suspension for ethics violations. He cites a 2025 Stanford Law School study finding that 85% of Arizona ABS firms target individual consumers and that there was "de minimis evidence of consumer harm."

To address skeptics, Freund recommends entity-level regulation, feedback mechanisms, ownership transparency, and governance safeguards for attorney independence as a template for other states. The argument offers a direct counterpoint to the restrictive measures gaining traction in statehouses across the country.