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The McLaren case – A Step Forward, or a Step Backward for the UK Class Action?

The McLaren case – A Step Forward, or a Step Backward for the UK Class Action?

The following article was contributed by Mikolaj Burzec, a litigation finance advisor and broker. He is also a content writer for Sentry Funding. The Competition Appeal Tribunal, London’s specialist competition court, has confirmed that a special purpose company led by Mark McLaren, formerly of The Consumers’ Association, will act as the Class Representation. McLaren represents millions of motorists and businesses who bought or leased a new car between October 2006 and September 2015 against five shipping companies that imported cars into Europe. The European Commission has already found that the car carriers fixed prices, manipulated bids, and divided the market for roll-on roll-off transport by sea. According to the Commission, the carriers had agreed to maintain the status quo in the market and to respect each other’s ongoing business on certain routes, or with certain customers by offering artificially high prices or not bidding at all in tenders for vehicle manufacturers. The class action follows the EC decision. It is one of the first actions of its kind in the UK and damages for car buyers are estimated at around £150 million. The class representative Mark McLaren has set up a non-for-profit company – Mark McLaren Class Representative Limited – specifically to bring this claim. Mark is the sole director and only member of the company and therefore has full control over it. In a collective action, the class representative is responsible for conducting the action on behalf of the class. His duties include:
  • instructing specialist lawyers and experts
  • deciding whether to proceed with the claim and, in particular, deciding whether to refer an offer of settlement to the Competition Appeal Tribunal for approval
  • communicating with the class and issuing formal notices to class members by various means, including posting notices on this website.
An independent advisory committee will be appointed to assist in the decision-making process. The claim From 2006 to 2012, five major shipping companies were involved in a cartel that affected prices for the sea transport of new motor vehicles, including cars and vans. During the period of the cartel, the shipping companies exchanged confidential information, manipulated tenders and prices, and reduced overall capacity in the market for the carriage of cars and vans. The cartel resulted in car manufacturers paying too much to transport new vehicles from their factories around the world to the UK and Europe. Customers who bought a new car or van between 18 October 2006 and 6 September 2015 probably also paid too much for the delivery. This is because when a manufacturer sets the price of its new cars or vans, it takes into account the total cost of delivery, including shipping costs. For simplicity, car manufacturers usually divide their total delivery costs equally among all the cars and/or vans they sell. When a customer buys a new car or van, he pays for “delivery”, either separately or as part of the on-road price. Although the car manufacturers themselves have done nothing wrong, customers who bought a new car or van between 18 October 2006 and 6 September 2015 are likely to have paid an increased delivery charge. The European Commission has already decided to impose fines of several hundred million euros on the shipping companies. The lawsuit seeks to recover these extra costs from the shipping companies who were involved in the cartel. The Competition Appeal Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal has authorised the claims to proceed as a class action. This means that millions of motorists and businesses could be entitled to compensation and these individuals and companies will now automatically be represented in court unless they choose to leave (opt-out) the claim. McLaren is the first Collective Proceeding Order judgment in which the Tribunal has explicitly considered the position of larger corporates within an opt-out class with the defendants having argued that big businesses should be removed and treated on an opt-in basis. The Tribunal’s refusal to treat larger businesses in the class differently to smaller corporates and consumers is noteworthy, and these aspects of the judgment will no doubt be of interest for the future proposed collective actions which feature businesses. McLaren further explored the appropriate legal test applied to the methodology in order to establish a class-wide loss at the certification stage. The Tribunal denied the defendants’ strike out request, which was based on purported inadequacies in the claimant’s methodology. The Tribunal concluded that its job at the certification stage is not to analyse the expert methodology’s merits and robustness; rather, the Tribunal will determine whether the methodology provides a “realistic chance of evaluating loss on a class-wide basis.” It further stressed that this does not imply that the Tribunal must be convinced that the approach will work, or that the methodology must be proven to work. The Tribunal emphasized the critical role of third-party funding in collective actions, as well as confirmed that the potential take-up rate by the class is not the only measure of benefit derived from the proceedings, with another benefit being the role of collective claims in deterring wrongful conduct. Despite the fact that the sums involved per class member may be little, the Tribunal focused on the fact that the total claim value is significant and that the majority of class members would be able to retrieve information about vehicle purchases. In the end, the Tribunal managed two issues that have been discussed in earlier decisions: inclusion of deceased consumers in the class and compound interest. Corresponding to the previous, McLaren was not allowed to change his case to incorporate potential class individuals who had died before procedures being given, because of the expiry of the limitation period. Regarding the latter, in contrast to the judgment in Merricks last year, the Tribunal was ready to certify compound interest as a standard issue even though it is common just to a part of the class who had bought vehicles using finance agreements. The Tribunal’s decision is conditional upon McLaren making adjustments to his methodology to account for the ruling on these points, and any determination as to the need for sub-classes. Case name and number: 1339/7/7/20 Mark McLaren Class Representative Limited v MOL (Europe Africa) Ltd and Others The whole judgment is available here: https://www.catribunal.org.uk/judgments/13397720-mark-mclaren-class-representative-limited-v-mol-europe-africa-ltd-and-others

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Litigation Financiers Organize on Capitol Hill

By John Freund |

The litigation finance industry is mobilizing its defenses after nearly facing extinction through federal legislation last year. In response to Senator Thom Tillis's surprise attempt to impose a 41% tax on litigation finance profits, two attorneys have launched the American Civil Accountability Alliance—a lobbying group dedicated to fighting back against efforts to restrict third-party funding of lawsuits.

As reported in Bloomberg Law, co-founder Erick Robinson, a Houston patent lawyer, described the industry's collective shock when the Tillis measure came within striking distance of passing as part of a major tax and spending package. The proposal ultimately failed, but the close call exposed the $16 billion industry's vulnerability to legislative ambush tactics. Robinson noted that the measure appeared with only five weeks before the final vote, giving stakeholders little time to respond before the Senate parliamentarian ultimately removed it on procedural grounds.

The new alliance represents a shift toward grassroots advocacy, focusing on bringing forward voices of individuals and small parties whose cases would have been impossible without funding. Robinson emphasized that state-level legislation now poses the greater threat, as these bills receive less media scrutiny than federal proposals while establishing precedents that can spread rapidly across jurisdictions.

The group is still forming its board and hiring lobbyists, but its founders are clear about their mission: ensuring that litigation finance isn't quietly regulated out of existence through misleading rhetoric about foreign influence or frivolous litigation—claims Robinson dismisses as disconnected from how funders actually evaluate cases for investment.

ISO’s ‘Litigation Funding Mutual Disclosure’ May Be Unenforceable

By John Freund |

The insurance industry has introduced a new policy condition entitled "Litigation Funding Mutual Disclosure" (ISO Form CG 99 11 01 26) that may be included in liability policies starting this month. The condition allows either party to demand mutual disclosure of third-party litigation funding agreements when disputes arise over whether a claim or suit is covered by the policy. However, the condition faces significant enforceability challenges that make it largely unworkable in practice.

As reported in Omni Bridgeway, the condition is unenforceable for several key reasons. First, when an insurer denies coverage and the policyholder commences coverage litigation, the denial likely relieves the policyholder of compliance with policy conditions. Courts typically hold that insurers must demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice from a policyholder's failure to perform a condition, which would be difficult to establish when coverage has already been denied.

Additionally, the condition's requirement for policyholders to disclose funding agreements would force them to breach confidentiality provisions in those agreements, amounting to intentional interference with contractual relations. The condition is also overly broad, extending to funding agreements between attorneys and funders where the insurer has no privity. Most problematically, the "mutual" disclosure requirement lacks true mutuality since insurers rarely use litigation funding except for subrogation claims, creating a one-sided obligation that borders on bad faith.

The condition appears designed to give insurers a litigation advantage by accessing policyholders' private financial information, despite overwhelming judicial precedent that litigation finance is rarely relevant to case claims and defenses. Policyholders should reject this provision during policy renewals whenever possible.

Valve Faces Certified UK Class Action Despite Funding Scrutiny

By John Freund |

The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has delivered a closely watched judgment certifying an opt-out collective proceedings order (CPO) against Valve Corporation, clearing the way for a landmark competition claim to proceed on behalf of millions of UK consumers. The decision marks another important moment in the evolution of collective actions—and their funding—in the UK.

In its judgment, the CAT approved the application brought by Vicki Shotbolt as class representative, alleging that Valve abused a dominant position in the PC video games market through its operation of the Steam platform. The claim contends that Valve imposed restrictive pricing and distribution practices that inflated prices paid by UK consumers. Valve opposed certification on multiple grounds, including challenges to the suitability of the class representative, the methodology for assessing aggregate damages, and the adequacy of the litigation funding arrangements supporting the claim.

The Tribunal rejected Valve’s objections, finding that the proposed methodology for estimating class-wide loss met the “realistic prospect” threshold required at the certification stage. While Valve criticised the expert evidence as overly theoretical and insufficiently grounded in data, the CAT reiterated that a CPO hearing is not a mini-trial, and that disputes over economic modelling are better resolved at a later merits stage.

Of particular interest to the legal funding market, the CAT also examined the funding structure underpinning the claim. Valve argued that the arrangements raised concerns around control, proportionality, and potential conflicts. The Tribunal disagreed, concluding that the funding terms were sufficiently transparent and that appropriate safeguards were in place to ensure the independence of the class representative and legal team. In doing so, the CAT reaffirmed its now-familiar approach of scrutinising funding without treating third-party finance as inherently problematic.

With certification granted, the case will now proceed as one of the largest opt-out competition claims yet to advance in the UK. For litigation funders, the ruling underscores the CAT’s continued willingness to accommodate complex funding structures in large consumer actions—while signalling that challenges to funding are unlikely to succeed absent clear evidence of abuse or impropriety.