The UK Supreme Court has declined to hear Apple’s appeal in Apple Inc and others v Gutmann, leaving intact a Court of Appeal decision that significantly strengthens the position of litigation funders in collective proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT).

An article in Law Gazette reports that the Supreme Court refused Apple’s petition on the grounds that it did not raise an arguable point of law, effectively endorsing the lower court’s April 2025 decision. That ruling affirmed that litigation funders can be paid directly from damages recovered in a class action before distributions are made to class members. The decision resolved longstanding ambiguity surrounding Sections 47C(3) and (6) of the Competition Act 1998 and Rule 93 of the CAT Rules 2015.

The Court of Appeal held that the CAT has wide discretionary authority to order payments to class representatives for costs, fees, and disbursements, provided such allocations are deemed fair and reasonable under the tribunal’s supervisory jurisdiction. This was a pivotal victory for claimant-side funders, who have long warned that being last in line for recovery—after damages are disbursed—posed unacceptable risk in UK opt-out cases.

Law firm Charles Lyndon, counsel for class representative Justin Gutmann, welcomed the Supreme Court’s decision not to revisit the matter, stating that it brings “welcome certainty” to the evolving collective proceedings regime and affirms the CAT’s broad discretion in addressing complex, end-of-case allocation scenarios.

This decision is expected to have a profound impact on the UK’s competition class action landscape. Funders now have greater confidence in the recoverability of their investments, potentially spurring more funding activity in CAT proceedings. The ruling may also prompt defendants to reconsider their settlement calculus, knowing that funders now enjoy a more secure repayment pathway.

Elite U.S. universities embroiled in a high-stakes antitrust class action are now targeting the use of third‑party litigation funding by plaintiffs’ counsel in a bid to derail class certification. At issue is whether a lead firm’s reliance on external financing renders it “inadequate” under class action rules — a novel approach that raises fresh procedural and policy questions.

An article in Reuters notes the the suit alleges that Cornell, Penn, MIT, Georgetown, Notre Dame and others favored wealthy applicants over students needing financial aid, plaintiffs’ counsel (led by Gilbert Litigators & Counselors, or GLC) is facing attacks over transparency and risk allocation. The universities contend that GLC mischaracterized its financial exposure by not fully disclosing its funding arrangements. GLC responds that it only uses outside funding for a portion of its fees (covering 40% of its own, and under 16% of the aggregate) and that no court has previously held that use of funding makes class counsel inadequate. A judge has already found the funding documents “potentially relevant” to the certification motion, underscoring the stakes.

Legal commentators call this a new twist in class litigation — rather than questioning the merits or fairness of funding, defendants are now probing its procedural footprint. The case also dovetails with a broader trend: litigation funders are becoming more visible and controversial, particularly when their support is used by class‑action counsel. Reuters Meanwhile, in adjacent news, law firms are consolidating and AI‑driven tools for plaintiffs’ practices are attracting investor capital — further reshaping the economics of litigation.

This challenge could force courts nationwide to reinterpret adequacy standards in class actions, potentially chilling the use of external funding. It may also provoke funders, defense firms, and plaintiffs to recalibrate disclosure rules and risk-sharing norms across major litigation.