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Probate Funding: A Useful Option for So Many (Part 3 of 4)

Probate Funding: A Useful Option for So Many (Part 3 of 4)

The following is Part 3 of our 4-Part series on Probate Funding by Steven D. Schroeder, Esq., General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. You can find Parts 1 & 2 here and here. Probate Assignments are Adequately Regulated in California In California, it is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Probate Court to determine entitlement for distribution, Cal. Probate Code §§11700-11705. Probate Courts may also apply equitable principles in fashioning remedies and granting relief in proceedings otherwise within its jurisdiction. Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal. App 4th 103, 114, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 760, 768. Thus, even without a specific statute addressing assignments, Probate Courts in California, as well as other jurisdictions, have conducted oversight over the propriety of Assignments in Probate.  See In Re: Michels’s Estate 63 P. 2d 333, 334 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936). For decades, the California Legislature has also regulated Assignments or Transfers by a beneficiary of an estate, see Cal. Probate Code §11604 (formerly Cal. Probate Code §1021.1). The validity of those statutes was well established. Estate of Boyd (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3d 125, 159 Cal. Rptr. 298, and the Courts have recognized the Probate Judge is empowered to give much stricter scrutiny to the fairness of consideration than would be the case under ordinary contract principals. Estate of Freeman (1965) 238 Cal. App., 2d 486, 488-89; 48 Cal. Rptr. 1. The initial purpose of Probate Code Section 1021.1(followed by 11604), was to provide for judicial supervision of proportional assignments given by beneficiaries to so called “heir hunters” (Estate of Wright (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 228; Estate of Lund (1944) 65 Cal. App. 2d 151; 110 Cal Rptr. 183.  However, courts have since interpreted that these sections are not limited to that class and can also be applied to Assignees and Transferees generally. Estate of Peterson (1968) 259 Cal. App. 2d. 492, 506; 66 Cal Rptr. 629. Despite the broad interpretation, California adopted additional legislation specifically directed to Probate Advance Companies. In 2006, the California Legislature enacted Probate Code Section 11604.5,[1] to regulate companies (Probate Advance Companies) who are in the business of making cash advances in consideration of a partial Assignment of the heir’s interest. With the enactment of Section 11605.4, the California Legislature also made it abundantly clear that the transactions under this section are not those made in conformity with the California Finance Lenders Law. Cal. Probate Code Section 11604.5 (a) This section applies when distribution from a decedent’s estate is made to a transferee for value who acquires any interest of a beneficiary in exchange for cash or other consideration. (b) For purposes of this section, a transferee for value is a person who satisfies both of the following criteria: (1) He or she purchases the interest from a beneficiary for consideration pursuant to a written agreement. (2) He or she, directly or indirectly, regularly engages in the purchase of beneficial interests in estates for consideration. (c) This section does not apply to any of the following: (1) A transferee who is a beneficiary of the estate or a person who has a claim to distribution from the estate under another instrument or by intestate succession. (2) A transferee who is either the registered domestic partner of the beneficiary, or is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to the beneficiary or the decedent. (3) A transaction made in conformity with the California Finance Lenders Law (Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) of the Financial Code) and subject to regulation by the Department of Business Oversight. (4) A transferee who is engaged in the business of locating missing or unknown heirs and who acquires an interest from a beneficiary solely in exchange for providing information or services associated with locating the heir or beneficiary(emphasis added). Although it is not specifically required under Probate Code Section 11604, the Legislature also imposed an affirmative obligation on Probate Assignees to promptly file and serve their Assignments, to ensure full disclosure to the representatives, the Courts and/or other interested parties.[2] Also, the legislature made it clear that unlike loans, Probate Assignments are non-recourse, meaning that the beneficiary faces no further obligation to the Assignee, absent fraud. As stated in 11604.5: (f)“…(4) A provision permitting the transferee for value to have recourse against the beneficiary if the distribution from the estate in satisfaction of the beneficial interest is less than the beneficial interest assigned to the transferee for value, other than recourse for any expense or damage arising out of the material breach of the agreement or fraud by the beneficiary…” …(*emphasis added). Moreover, in enacting PC 11604.5, the legislature specifically gave the Probate Court wide latitude in fashioning relief, when reviewing probate Assignments. “… (g) The court on its own motion, or on the motion of the personal representative or other interested person, may inquire into the circumstances surrounding the execution of, and the consideration for, the written agreement to determine that the requirements of this section have been satisfied. (h) The court may refuse to order distribution under the written agreement, or may order distribution on any terms that the court considers equitable, if the court finds that the transferee for value did not substantially comply with the requirements of this section, or if the court finds that any of the following conditions existed at the time of transfer: (1) The fees, charges, or consideration paid or agreed to be paid by the beneficiary were grossly unreasonable. (2) The transfer of the beneficial interest was obtained by duress, fraud, or undue influence. (i) In addition to any remedy specified in this section, for any willful violation of the requirements of this section found to be committed in bad faith, the court may require the transferee for value to pay to the beneficiary up to twice the value paid for the assignment. An Assignment under 11604.5 is Best Reviewed by the Local Probate Court At present, it does not appear that there has been a reported case interpreting an Assignment under Probate Section 11604.5, including whether the consideration paid was grossly unreasonable. However, there have been a long list of cases interpreting precisely that under Probate Code Section 11604 and Probate Code Section 1021.1) See Estate of Boyd, supra, 159 Cal. Rptr. 301-302; Molino v. Boldt (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 913, 81 Cal Rptr 3d. 512. At the same time, it should be noted that there are distinct differences between Assignments given to Heir-Finders and those to Probate Advance Companies. One critical distinction is Probate Advance Companies, such as IFC, provide the Assignor with cash in consideration of a partial Assignment. On the other hand, Heir-Finders, take back a percentage of the Heir’s interest (typically 15% to 40%). Thus, the amount of fees incurred by the Assignee could vary widely depending on the amount the heir recovers. In most instances, the Assignment far exceeds the consideration given to a Probate Advance Company. Moreover, Heir-Finders often receive assignments from multiple heirs in one estate administration even though much of the work would be duplicated. On the other hand, Probate Funding Companies outlay cash consideration for every Assignment they receive. Thus, Probate Funding Companies take on an increased financial risk with every transaction. Also, as in any industry, there are also significant distinctions among the practices of individual Probate Funding Companies including the disclosures they make to the Assignor/Heir. For example, IFC’s contracts, are limited to less than three (3) pages with no hidden fees or other costs tacked on the Assignment post-funding.[3]  The Assignee simply agrees to assign a fixed portion of his/her inheritance for a fixed sum of money.  In other words, a simple $X for $Y purchase.  Thus, it would be a fatal mistake to make a broad-based analysis based on the assumption that one size fits all when it comes to Probate Funding Companies. [4] Moreover, under Probate Code Section 11604.5, the Legislature has placed an affirmative burden on the Transferee (Probate Funding Companies) to file and serve their Assignments shortly after their execution. Hence, the terms are open reviewable by the Courts, Personal Representatives, Attorneys, other interested parties and/or to the public in general. Therefore, there is more than adequate opportunity for objections to be filed or for the Court to question the consideration given for an Assignment, sua sponte. In short, the Legislature left the determination of what amount of fees, charges and other consideration would be deemed “grossly unreasonable” up to the particular Court where administration is ongoing, and to do so on a case by case basis if deemed necessary.   In fact, it is in the best interest for all concerned for the local Court to conduct inquiry if legitimate objections are raised, or on the Court’s own motion. In fact, on many occasions, IFC has responded to questions raised by various courts with regard to the Assignments it has filed and served.[5] Stay tuned for Part 4 of our 4-Part series, where we discuss the risks inherent in Probate Funding, and how those risks should inform the court’s assessment on the validation of an Assignment.  Steven D. Schroeder has been General Counsel/Sr. Vice President at Inheritance Funding Company, Inc. since 2004. Active Attorney in good standing, licensed to practice before all Courts in the State of California since 1985 and a Registered Attorney with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  —- [1] IFC provided substantial input, counsel and proposed legislative language in response to California Senate Bill 390 which was enacted into law as Probate Code Section 11604.5 on January 1, 2006 regulating the Probate Funding industry in California. SB 390.Section 1 2015, Ch. 190 (AB 1517) Section 71 [2] Probate Code 11604 does not have a time limitation filing period reflected. [3] Some Probate Advance Companies have charged interest or other fees post-funding. [4] See Probate Lending, supra, page 130, in which the author makes questionable statistical findings from one county during a limited period of time, with the assumption that each Probate Advance Company has the same terms and business practices. [5] IFC has responded to multiple orders to show cause in California.

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New York Consumer Litigation Funding Act Called a First Step in Combatting Predatory Lending

By John Freund |

New York's Consumer Litigation Funding Act, set to take effect June 17, represents a significant regulatory intervention in an industry that has operated largely without oversight — but advocates say it does not go far enough.

As reported by Bloomberg Law, Rachel McCarthy and Tabitha Woodruff of the Milestone Foundation argue that while the new law establishes important baseline protections, it leaves critical gaps that could continue to harm vulnerable plaintiffs. The authors point to annual percentage rates in the consumer legal funding industry ranging from 30 to 124 percent, substantially higher than typical credit card rates. In one illustrative scenario, a family borrowing $10,000 at 50 percent monthly compounded interest could owe approximately $43,475 after three years.

The law caps a litigation funder's recovery at 25 percent of the gross settlement or judgment, requires plain-language contracts, mandates a 10-day rescission period, establishes state registration requirements, and prohibits interference with settlement decisions and misleading advertising.

However, the authors note that the legislation does not cap the interest rates funders can charge, nor does it impose rules or restrictions on the types of fees that may be assessed. They argue that these omissions leave room for the most predatory practices to continue even under the new regulatory framework.

The piece frames the New York law as an important first step while calling for additional reforms targeting interest rate caps and fee structures to fully protect consumers who turn to litigation funding while awaiting resolution of their cases.

Equal Justice Requires Equal Staying Power: Why Consumer Legal Funding Helps Fulfill the Promise of the American Legal System

By Eric Schuller |

The following was contributed by Eric K. Schuller, President, The Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC).

“Equal justice under law is not merely a caption on the facade of the Supreme Court building, it is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our society.”

— Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Few phrases better capture the promise of the American legal system than “Equal Justice Under Law.” Carved into the stone above the entrance to the United States Supreme Court, those words symbolize the belief that every person, regardless of wealth, status, or background, stands equal before the law.

But as Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. observed, those words must represent more than an inscription on a building. They must be an operational principle, a reality experienced by everyday people who rely on the legal system to resolve disputes and obtain justice.

In practice, however, the ideal of equal justice often collides with an uncomfortable truth. Litigation takes time. Legal claims, particularly personal injury claims, can take months or years to resolve. During that time, the injured person frequently faces mounting financial pressure. Medical bills accumulate. Income may be lost due to the injury. Rent, utilities, and everyday expenses continue regardless of the progress of a legal case.

Meanwhile, the opposing party is often backed by a large insurance company or corporate defendant with deep financial resources and the ability to delay litigation for extended periods.

This imbalance creates a fundamental tension in the civil justice system. If one side can afford to wait and the other cannot, the outcome of a case may be influenced not by the merits of the claim, but by financial pressure. Consumer legal funding emerged as a practical solution to this problem.

At its core, consumer legal funding helps preserve the promise behind Justice Powell’s words by helping injured individuals maintain financial stability while their legal claims proceed.

The Economic Reality of Litigation

Civil litigation is rarely quick. Personal injury claims often require extensive investigation, medical treatment, negotiation with insurance companies, and in some cases trial preparation.

For injured plaintiffs, this process can be financially devastating. Many individuals involved in serious accidents cannot return to work immediately. Others face large medical expenses that accumulate before a settlement or judgment is reached.

Even individuals who previously had stable financial lives may suddenly find themselves struggling to pay for basic necessities.

Insurance companies and large defendants, by contrast, face no such pressures. Insurers are structured to manage litigation risk over long periods of time. They have legal departments, litigation budgets, and the ability to delay or extend negotiations.

This difference in financial endurance can shape the dynamics of settlement negotiations.

When an injured person faces the possibility of eviction, unpaid medical bills, or an inability to provide for their family, the pressure to settle quickly increases dramatically. The settlement decision may become less about fairness and more about survival.

This is where consumer legal funding plays a crucial role.

Consumer Legal Funding: Supporting Plaintiffs During Litigation

Consumer legal funding provides monies to plaintiffs with pending legal claims, typically personal injury cases. These funds are designed to help cover everyday living expenses while a case is ongoing.

Importantly, consumer legal funding is structured as non-recourse funding. Repayment occurs only if the plaintiff successfully resolves the case through settlement or judgment. If the case is unsuccessful, the consumer does not owe repayment.

This structure reflects the reality that the funding company is accepting risk tied to the outcome of the legal claim.

The purpose of the funding is not to finance litigation strategy or influence legal decisions. Rather, it helps injured individuals pay for basic necessities such as housing, food, transportation, and medical needs while the legal process unfolds.

In this way, consumer legal funding functions as a financial stabilizer during one of the most vulnerable periods in a plaintiff’s life.

Restoring Balance in Settlement Negotiations

The civil justice system assumes that parties negotiate settlements based on the merits of the case, the strength of the evidence, and the applicable law. In reality, financial pressure can significantly influence settlement behavior.

When plaintiffs face immediate financial hardship, they may feel compelled to accept settlements that do not fully reflect the value of their claims.

Insurance companies understand this dynamic. The longer a case continues, the greater the financial strain on many injured plaintiffs.

Consumer legal funding helps address this imbalance by giving plaintiffs the ability to withstand financial pressure during the litigation process.

By helping consumers remain financially stable, consumer legal funding allows settlement decisions to be based more on the actual merits of the case rather than immediate economic desperation.

In essence, it helps ensure that the legal process functions as intended.

The Role of Consumer Legal Funding in Access to Justice

Access to justice is often discussed in terms of legal representation. Ensuring that individuals have access to attorneys is unquestionably important. Contingency fee arrangements have long helped individuals pursue claims they might otherwise be unable to afford.

However, legal representation alone does not solve the financial challenges that plaintiffs face during litigation.

Even when attorneys represent clients on contingency, plaintiffs must still manage everyday living expenses while their cases proceed. Medical treatment may prevent them from working. Insurance disputes may delay compensation.

Without financial support, many plaintiffs find themselves in impossible situations.

Consumer legal funding addresses this gap. It supports the plaintiff personally, rather than the litigation itself.

This distinction is important. The funds are not intended to create lawsuits or encourage unnecessary litigation. Instead, they allow individuals with legitimate claims to endure the legal process required to resolve those claims fairly.

This support can make the difference between a plaintiff pursuing justice and abandoning a claim prematurely due to financial hardship.

Consumer Legal Funding and the American Tradition of Risk Sharing

The structure of consumer legal funding aligns with other widely accepted financial arrangements that involve risk sharing.

For example, insurance companies accept risk every day when they issue policies. If an insured event occurs, the insurer pays the claim. If it does not, the insurer retains the premiums.

Similarly, venture capital investors accept risk when they fund startup companies. If the company succeeds, the investor benefits. If it fails, the investor absorbs the loss.

Consumer legal funding operates on a similar principle. The funding company provides monies with the understanding that repayment depends on the success of the legal claim.

This risk-based structure distinguishes consumer legal funding from traditional lending, where repayment is required regardless of outcome.

The contingent nature of repayment reflects the uncertain nature of litigation itself.

Protecting the Integrity of the Civil Justice System

Critics sometimes argue that consumer legal funding interferes with litigation or encourages lawsuits. In reality, the opposite is often true.

Consumer legal funding does not determine whether a lawsuit is filed. That decision is made by the plaintiff and their attorney based on the merits of the case.

Funding companies review cases carefully before providing funds. The evaluation process often includes reviewing case documentation, attorney involvement, and the likelihood of a successful resolution.

This evaluation process means that funding companies generally support claims that already have legal merit and professional representation.

Rather than encouraging frivolous litigation, consumer legal funding tends to operate within the existing framework of legitimate claims.

Its primary impact is helping plaintiffs remain financially stable while the legal system runs its course.

Preserving the Meaning of “Equal Justice Under Law”

Justice Powell’s words remind us that the promise of the legal system extends beyond formal procedures. Equal justice requires more than access to a courtroom. It requires that individuals have a realistic ability to pursue their claims without being forced into premature settlement by financial hardship.

In many cases, the difference between a fair settlement and an inadequate one is time.

Insurance companies can afford time. Corporations can afford time.

Injured individuals often cannot.

Consumer legal funding helps bridge this gap. By providing financial support during the litigation process, it allows plaintiffs to remain engaged in their cases and pursue outcomes that reflect the true value of their claims.

This role aligns directly with the broader principles of fairness and equality embedded in the American legal tradition.

Funding Lives, Not Litigation

Consumer Legal Funding: Funding Lives, Not Litigation.

This phrase captures the essence of the product. The purpose of consumer legal funding is not to finance lawsuits or drive litigation strategy. It is to help real people navigate the difficult period between injury and resolution.

Behind every legal claim is a person whose life has been disrupted. There are families dealing with lost income, individuals recovering from serious injuries, and households struggling to meet everyday expenses.

Consumer legal funding recognizes these realities.

It provides a practical tool that helps injured consumers maintain stability while the legal system works toward a resolution.

Conclusion

Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. reminded us that “Equal Justice Under Law” must represent more than an inscription on a courthouse wall. It must be a living principle that guides how the legal system operates.

For many injured plaintiffs, the greatest obstacle to justice is not the law itself, but the financial pressure that arises while a case is pending.

Consumer legal funding helps address this challenge. By providing financial stability during litigation, it allows plaintiffs to remain in the process long enough for their claims to be evaluated fairly.

In doing so, it supports the very principle Justice Powell described.

Equal justice cannot exist if only those who can afford to wait are able to pursue it. Consumer legal funding helps ensure that justice is determined by the facts and the law, not by who runs out of money first.

And in that sense, it plays a meaningful role in turning one of America’s most inspiring ideals into a practical reality.

The Fundamental Distinction Policymakers Cannot Ignore

By Eric Schuller |

The following was contributed by Eric K. Schuller, President, The Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC).


If policymakers want to understand consumer legal funding, they should start with insurance, not lending. At first glance, insurance and consumer legal funding may appear unrelated. One protects against risk. The other provides funds to plaintiffs in pending lawsuits to help pay for their day-to-day expenses. But structurally, they share a defining characteristic: risk is assumed by the capital provider, not imposed on the consumer. That single feature separates consumer legal funding from loans and aligns it more closely with underwriting.

Public policy depends on accurate classification. When a product is mischaracterized, regulation can miss its mark. Consumer legal funding is frequently labeled a "loan," yet its mechanics contradict that description. A loan creates a guaranteed repayment obligation. Consumer legal funding does not. To regulate wisely, lawmakers must understand that distinction.

Insurance is built on underwriting risk. An insurance company evaluates probabilities. It examines health risks, property risks, liability exposure, accident frequency. It prices policies accordingly. The insurer does not lend money to the policyholder. Instead, it assumes risk in exchange for compensation. If the insured event occurs, the insurer pays. If the event does not occur, the insurer retains the premium. In either case, the insurer's business model depends on accepting uncertainty. Insurance is not debt. It is risk transfer.

Now consider consumer legal funding. A funding company evaluates a legal claim. It assesses liability, damages, collectability, procedural posture, and likely duration. It underwrites the case. Instead of collecting premiums, it provides monies to the plaintiff. Its return depends entirely on a defined event: recovery in the lawsuit. If recovery occurs, the provider receives its agreed return from the proceeds. If recovery does not occur, the provider receives nothing. The funding company has effectively underwritten litigation risk. That is not lending. That is risk assumption.

The central question in distinguishing loans from contingent capital is simple: Who bears the risk of failure? In a loan, the borrower bears the risk. Repayment is mandatory regardless of outcome. In insurance, the insurer bears the risk. Payment depends on whether a covered event occurs. In consumer legal funding, the funding company bears the risk. Repayment depends on whether the case succeeds. If a plaintiff loses their case, they owe nothing. There is no collection action, no wage garnishment, no deficiency balance. The capital provider absorbs the loss. That structure is fundamentally inconsistent with debt.

To see the contrast clearly, consider the defining characteristics of a traditional loan: an unconditional obligation to repay, repayment regardless of performance or outcome, interest accrual over time, recourse against income or assets, and credit-based underwriting. If you borrow money to open a business and the business fails, you still owe the bank. If you lose your job after taking out a personal loan, you still owe the lender. If you use a credit card and experience hardship, the balance remains. Debt survives failure. Consumer legal funding does not. If there is no recovery in the legal claim, there is no repayment obligation. That single fact removes the defining feature of a loan.

Insurance companies price risk across portfolios. Some claims will generate losses. Others will generate gains. Sustainability depends on aggregate performance. Consumer legal funding companies operate similarly. Some cases succeed. Others fail. Pricing reflects probability of recovery, expected timeline, and litigation risk. Like insurers, funding providers must absorb unsuccessful outcomes as part of their business model. If policymakers were to impose lending-style interest caps on insurance premiums, the insurance market would collapse. Premiums are not structured like loan interest because repayment is not guaranteed. Similarly, consumer legal funding cannot be evaluated as if repayment were certain. The risk of total loss is real. When regulation ignores that risk allocation, it misunderstands the economics.

Labeling consumer legal funding as a loan may appear harmless, but it has significant policy consequences. Lending regulations are built around products where repayment is guaranteed and borrowers bear default risk. Those regulations assume predictable interest accrual and enforceable repayment obligations. Consumer legal funding lacks those features. If policymakers apply lending frameworks to non-recourse, outcome-dependent arrangements, they risk imposing regulatory structures that do not fit the product, distorting pricing models built around risk of total loss, reducing availability of funding for injured consumers, and eliminating a non-recourse option that differs fundamentally from debt. Regulation should reflect economic reality, not rhetorical convenience.

For injured plaintiffs, litigation is rarely quick. Cases may take months or years to resolve. During that time, medical bills accumulate. Rent is due. Utilities must be paid. Families rely on a steady income that may no longer exist. Traditional loans require fixed repayment regardless of outcome. Insurance does not. Consumer legal funding does not. That distinction explains why some consumers choose it. They are not borrowing against wages or income. They are accessing funds tied to a potential asset — their legal claim. If that asset produces value, repayment occurs from that value. If it does not, there is no personal debt. That is not debt stacking. It is risk sharing.

The core issue is risk transfer. Debt transfers risk to the borrower. Insurance transfers risk to the insurer. Consumer legal funding transfers litigation outcome risk to the funding company. The defining feature of a loan is an unconditional promise to repay. Without that promise, the structure changes entirely. If there is no recovery and the consumer owes nothing, the essential element of debt is absent. Policy debates should begin with that structural truth.

None of this suggests that consumer legal funding should operate without oversight. Transparent contracts, disclosure requirements, and consumer protections are appropriate in any financial arrangement. But regulation must match mechanics. Insurance is regulated as insurance because it is risk underwriting. Debt is regulated as lending because repayment is guaranteed. Consumer legal funding is non-recourse and outcome-dependent. It should be evaluated through that lens. When lawmakers start from the wrong definition, unintended consequences follow.

Consumer legal funding is non-recourse, payable only from legal proceeds, transfers outcome risk to the capital provider, and creates no unconditional repayment obligation. It shares structural similarities with insurance underwriting and other contingent compensation arrangements where payment depends on performance. The defining feature of a loan is guaranteed repayment. Consumer legal funding has no such guarantee. Before regulating it as debt, policymakers should ask a simple question: If the case fails and the consumer owes nothing, where is the loan? Sound public policy begins with structural accuracy.