Portfolio Theory in the Context of Litigation Finance (pt. 1 of 2)

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’ 

Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance. 

Executive Summary

  • Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) – a mathematical framework based on the “mean-variance” analysis – argues that it’s possible to construct an “efficient frontier” of optimal portfolios offering the maximum possible expected return for a given level of risk
  • MPT states that assets (such as stocks) face both “systematic risks” – market risks such as interest rates – as well as “unsystematic risks” – mostly uncorrelated exposures that are characteristic to each asset, including management changes or poor sales resulting from unforeseen events
  • Post-modern Portfolio Theory (PMPT) adds a layer of refinement to the definition of risk
  • Diversification of a portfolio can mitigate the impact of unsystematic risks on portfolio performance – although, it depends on its composition of assets
  • Behavioural Finance (BF) introduces a suggestion that psychological influences and biases affect the financial behaviors of investors and financial practitioners, also applicable to litigation finance

Slingshot Insights:

  • Portfolio theory is important to the commercial litigation finance asset class due to its inherently high level of unsystematic risks
  • Slingshot’s Rule of Thumb: a portfolio should contain no less than 20 investments in order to provide the benefits associated with portfolio theory
  • Diversification is critical for every fund manager
  • Specialty fund managers may play a positive role in a comprehensive litigation finance investing strategy by assisting with meeting a particular performance objective when defined in the context of acceptable “mean-variance” targets
  • Diversification provides optionality for an under-performing manager to ‘live to fight another day’ if their first fund achieved sub-par performance
  • Portfolio theory is applicable to consumer litigation finance

For those new to the commercial litigation finance sector, one aspect worth discovering from an investment perspective is the existence of unique risks attributable to this asset class.  For investment managers looking to get started in the industry, it is critical to understand the implications of the risks inherent in the asset class, especially for those with a limited track record in litigation finance.  Accordingly, significant attention should be paid to portfolio construction and diversification, in particular during the early stages of the life cycle of an industry where investments possess both idiosyncratic and binary risk, and where there is much less empirical data to guide investment decisions.  Portfolio risk is generally influenced by three main factors: volatility of results, correlation (of outcomes within a given portfolio) and the size of the portfolio.  For the purposes of this article, I have assumed that correlation within a portfolio is non-existent, as each case stands on its own and is not influenced by others in the portfolio. However, to the extent correlation does exist, it can have a significant impact on the value of portfolio theory. 

As the industry evolves so too will its data requirements

When the litigation finance industry first originated, the concept of portfolio theory was less important, given the recognition within the industry of a requisite level of experimentation (i.e. risk) to be assumed in order for a conclusion to be drawn about the attractiveness of the asset class. Therefore, the industry attracted the appropriate level of risk capital correlating to the risk/reward promise of litigation finance.  As the asset class matures and managers prove out the return profile, the early risk money is being supplemented with institutional capital, which is less inclined to assume the same level of risk as that of high net worth and family office investors.  Accordingly, in order to attract such capital, an element of data and analysis will need to be captured and compiled to assist the investor in understanding the dynamics inherent in the industry (returns, duration, volatility, correlation, etc.), which is partly why I believe the concepts in this article will grow increasingly significant in the near future.

Portfolio Theory Concepts

Before we discuss the applicability of portfolio theory to litigation finance, let’s dig into some portfolio theory concepts.

While an in-depth study into portfolio theory is beyond the scope of this article, the following will provide readers with some theoretical concepts that have been developed and refined over the last 70 years.  Multitudes of research studies and articles have been published over the years and are publicly available.

  1. Modern Portfolio Theory (“MPT”)

Modern Portfolio Theory was developed by Harry Markowitz and published under the title “Portfolio Selection” in the journal of Finance in 1952, and remains one of the most important and influential economic theories dealing with finance and investment.  In essence, the theory suggests that investors can reduce risk through diversification.  Risk, in the context of modern portfolio theory, is the concept of the standard deviation of return as compared to the average return for the markets.  The theory states that the risk for individual stock returns has two components:

Systematic Risk – These are market risks that cannot be diversified away. Interest rates, recessions and wars are examples of systematic risks in the context of public equities.

Unsystematic Risk – Also known as “specific risk,” this risk is specific to individual stocks, such as a change in management or a decline in operations. This kind of risk can be diversified away as one increase the number of stocks in one’s portfolio. It represents the component of a stock’s return that is not correlated with general market moves.

One of the limitations of MPT is the fact that it assumes a normal distribution of outcomes in the shape of a ‘normal bell curve’, which may be applicable for markets where there is perfect information, but not applicable to many private market investments where there is a meaningful information asymmetry among market participants (thereby resulting in skewed performance distributions and potentially heavy tails).  Essentially, MPT is limited by measures of risk and return that do not always represent the realities of the investment market. Nonetheless, it laid the foundation for additional theories which have served to refine the original, underlying one.

  1. Post-modern Portfolio Theory (“PMPT”)

The term ‘post-modern portfolio theory’ has its roots in research undertaken at the Pension Research Institute at San Francisco University in 1983, and was created in 1991 by software entrepreneurs Brian M. Rom and Kathleen Ferguson, in order to differentiate the portfolio-construction software developed by their company from those provided by traditional MPT.  The PMPT theory uses the standard deviation of negative returns as the measure of risk, while MPT uses the standard deviation of all returns as a measure of risk. The authors determined that the normal distribution curve which represents the basis for MPT does not accurately reflect all markets and is merely a subset of PMPT. Essentially, different than MPT which tends to focus on risk in the context of derivation from mean market returns, PMPT focuses on risk and reward relative to an expected Internal Rate of Return (“IRR”) required for a given set of risks, which is more of a risk-adjusted return philosophy.  However, a key limitation of both MPT and PMPT is that they are both premised on the assumption of efficient markets, being the theory that all participants in a market have the same access to information. Enter Behavioural Finance…

  1. Behaviour Finance (“BF”)

I think we can all agree that most financial markets are anything but rational, which means there must be something else influencing their behaviour and, hence, their performance.  Behavioural Finance is a conceptual framework to study the influence of psychology on the behavior of investors and financial analysts. It also recognizes the subsequent effects on markets. BF focuses on the fact that investors are not always rational, have limits to their self-control, and are influenced by their own biases.  BF believes that investors are subject to a variety of judgment errors or biases, which are broadly defined as Self-Deception (you think you know more than you do), Heuristic Simplification (information processing errors), Social Influence (how our decisions are influenced by others) and Emotion (your mood’s impact on rational thinking at the time of investment).  The applicability of BF cannot be overstated in the context of litigation as there is the potential for many biases to enter the decision-making process, especially by litigators who’s own experience may be impacting their decisions.

While many theories exist to explain market behaviour and how investors should position their portfolios to address risk, I have focused on the three above as they are among the most prominent.  While they serve as a guide to address risk in the context of portfolio construction, they also serve to highlight an investor’s inherent limitations, and give rise to questions litigation finance managers should be asking themselves: are my biases working their way into my portfolio construction?  Of course, much of the research on which these theories are predicated relate to the public equities marketplace, which simplifies analysis via transparency and quantum of data.  In the context of litigation finance, we have a private market which is not large and not very transparent.  In addition, it is a market that is very inefficient due to the confidential nature of litigation – because it is a private market – and due to its relative nascency.  This is, in part, one of the reasons that I am presently pursuing the Slingshot Data Project (more to come in future articles) through a “Give to Get” model, where value (in the form of analytics) will be provided to a variety of participating constituents.

Application to Commercial Litigation Finance

Before we can discuss the application of portfolio theory to commercial litigation finance, it is important to determine the risks that are inherent in the asset class.

The litigation finance asset class exhibits a significant number of unique risks, some of which are Systematic and others Unsystematic, and some which fall into both categories.  As an example of a dual risk, collectability risk is inherent in any piece of litigation where one party is suing another (i.e. a Systematic Risk). In addition, there is the specific collection risk associated with a given defendant (are they more likely to settle and pay quickly, or delay, appeal and negotiate a settlement over a protracted period of time), which may be higher or lower than the overall risk inherent in litigation (i.e. an Unsystematic Risk)).

Generally, I find the level of Unsystematic risks to be high in litigation finance given that the outcome of each case is idiosyncratic to the aspects of the case (case merits, credibility of the witnesses, the credibility of professional witnesses, the litigious nature of the defendant, legal counsel effectiveness, defense counsel effectiveness, judiciary effectiveness, jurisdiction and collectability – to name some of the more significant risks).  However, litigation finance also has a number of Systematic exposures (binary outcomes, duration, liquidity, counter-party, collectability, case precedent, regulatory, legislative, etc.) which may not be fully addressable through the application of portfolio theory.

With respect to the influence of binary risk, I would add that while each case possesses binary risk at the outset, very few cases in fact are determined by a judicial decision (as with most litigation, the vast majority of cases are settled out of court). So, while binary risk (a Systematic risk) is endemic to the asset class, its application – in particular in the context of a portfolio – should not be overstated, because it rarely influences the performance directly – unless there is a series of highly correlated cases embedded in a portfolio (although the threat of a judicial outcome is a significant factor in any settlement).  In addition, certain case types have a higher propensity to be settled via a judicial decision (e.g. International Arbitrations) as opposed to others (e.g. Breach of Contract). Having said that, if one is only looking at the tail end of a portfolio, binary risk can be disproportionately higher, as those cases within the tail likely have a higher probability of being decided by a judiciary simply because they have had longer case durations which may indicate that neither side is willing to negotiate a settlement, or that the case is heading toward a trial decision. This proves that correlations – and thereby a degree of diversification – are not constant across a spectrum of case distributions.

In the second part of this article, which can be found here, I apply the portfolio theories outlined above to the commercial litigation finance marketplace and offer some perspectives on responsible portfolio construction.

Slingshot Insights

Investing in a nascent asset class like litigation finance is mainly about investing in people.  Most managers simply don’t have the track record of a fully realized portfolio on which investors can base their investment decision.  Accordingly, much time and attention is spent on understanding how managers think about building their business and in particular their first portfolio.  In addition to the underwriting process, one of the most important considerations for investors to understand is how managers think about portfolio construction and diversification. Portfolio theory plays an integral role in terms of how managers should be thinking about constructing their portfolios from the perspective of the number of cases in the portfolio, but managers should also ensure their own personal bias is not entering into the portfolio and that they have thought about all of the systematic risks that can affect like cases. My general rule of thumb is that most first time managers should be targeting a portfolio of at least 20 equal sized commitments, appreciating that it is almost impossible to achieve equal sized deployments due to deployment risk. It is also not in the manager’s best long-term interest to take a short-cut on diversification for expediency sake (i.e. to raise the next larger fund) and to do so may be interpreted as poor judgment from an investor’s perspective!

As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article.

Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.

Commercial

View All
Community Spotlights

Community Spotlight: Dr. Detlef A. Huber, Managing Director, AURIGON LRC

By John Freund |

Detlef is a German attorney, former executive of a Swiss reinsurance company and as head of former Carpentum Capital Ltd. one of the pioneers of litigation funding in Latin America. Through his activities as executive in the insurance claims area and litigation funder he gained a wealth of experience in arbitrations/litigations in various businesses. He is certified arbitrator of ARIAS US and ARIAS UK (AIDA Reinsurance and Insurance Arbitration Society) and listed on the arbitrators panel of DIS (German Arbitration Institute).

He studied law in Germany and Spain, obtained a Master in European Law (Autónoma Madrid) and doctorate in insurance law (University of Hamburg).

Detlef speaks German, Spanish, English fluently and some Portuguese.

Company Name and Description:  AURIGON LRC (Litigation Risk Consulting) is at home in two worlds: dispute funding and insurance. They set up the first European litigation fund dedicated to Latin America many years ago and operate as consultants in the re/insurance sector since over a decade.

Both worlds are increasingly overlapping with insurers offering ever more litigation risk transfer products and funders recurring to insurance in order to hedge their risks. Complexity is increasing for what is already a complex product.

Aurigon acts as intermediary in the dispute finance sector and offers consultancy on relevant insurance matters.

Company Website: www.aurigon-lrc.ch

Year Founded: 2011, since 2024 offering litigation risk consulting  

Headquarters: Alte Steinhauserstr. 1, 6330 Cham/Zug Switzerland

Area of Focus:  Litigation funding related to Latin America and re/insurance disputes

Member Quote: “It´s the economy, stupid. Not my words but fits our business well. Dont focus on merits, focus on maths.”

Read More

Manolete Partners Releases Half-Year Results for the Six Months Ended 30 September 2024

By Harry Moran |

Manolete (AIM:MANO), the leading UK-listed insolvency litigation financing company, today announces its unaudited results for the six months ended 30 September 2024. 

Steven Cooklin, Chief Executive Officer, commented: 

“These are a strong set of results, particularly in terms of organic cash generation. In this six-month period, gross cash collected rose 63% to a new record at £14.3m. That strong organic cash generation comfortably covered all cash operating costs, as well as all cash costs of financing the ongoing portfolio of 413 live cases, enabling Manolete to reduce net debt by £1.25m to £11.9m as at 30 September 2024. 

As a consequence of Manolete completing a record number of 137 case completions, realised revenues rose by 60% to a further record high of £15m. That is a strong indicator of further, and similarly high levels, of near-term future cash generation. A record pipeline of 437 new case investment opportunities were received in this latest six month trading period, underpinning the further strong growth prospects for the business. 

The record £14.3.m gross cash was collected from 253 separate completed cases, highlighting the highly granular and diversified profile of Manolete’s income stream. 

Manolete has generated a Compound Average Growth Rate of 39% in gross cash receipts over the last five H1 trading periods: from H1 FY20 up to and including the current H1 FY25. The resilience of the Manolete business model, even after the extraordinary pressures presented by the extended Covid period, is now clear to see. 

This generated net cash income of £7.6m in H1 FY25 (after payment of all legal costs and all payments made to the numerous insolvent estates on those completed cases), an increase of 66% over the comparative six-month period for the prior year. Net cash income not only exceeded by £4.5m all the cash overheads required to run the Company, it also exceeded all the costs of running Manolete’s ongoing 413 cases, including the 126 new case investments made in H1 FY25. 

The Company recorded its highest ever realised revenues for H1 FY25 of £15.0m, exceeding H1 FY24 by 60%. On average, Manolete receives all the cash owed to it by the defendants of completed cases within approximately 12 months of the cases being legally completed. This impressive 60% rise in realised revenues therefore provides good near-term visibility for a continuation of Manolete’s strong, and well-established, track record of organic, operational cash generation. 

New case investment opportunities arise daily from our wide-ranging, proprietary, UK referral network of insolvency practitioner firms and specialist insolvency and restructuring solicitor practices. We are delighted to report that the referrals for H1 FY25 reached a new H1 company record of 437. A 27% higher volume than in H1 FY24, which was itself a new record for the Company this time last year. That points to a very healthy pipeline as we move forward into the second half of the trading year.” 

Financial highlights: 

  • Total revenues increased by 28% to £14.4m from H1 FY24 (£11.2m) as a result of the outstanding delivery of realised revenues generated in the six months to 30th September 2024.
    • Realised revenues achieved a record level of £15.0m in H1 FY25, a notable increase of 60% on H1 FY24 (£9.4m). This provides good visibility of near-term further strong cash generation, as on average Manolete collects all cash on settled cases within approximately 12 months of the legal settlement of those cases
    • Unrealised revenue in H1 FY25 was £(633k) compared to £1.8m for the comparative H1 FY24. This was due to: (1) the record number of 137 case completions in H1 FY25, which resulted in a beneficial movement from Unrealised revenues to Realised revenues; and (2) the current lower average fair value of new case investments made relative to the higher fair value of the completed cases. The latter point also explains the main reason for the marginally lower gross profit reported of £4.4m in this period, H1 FY25, compared to £5.0m in H1 FY24. 
  • EBIT for H1 FY25 was £0.7m compared to H1 FY24 of £1.6m. As well as the reduced Gross profit contribution explained above, staff costs increased by £165k to £2.3m and based on the standard formula used by the Company to calculate Expected Credit Losses, (“ECL”), generated a charge of £140k (H1 3 FY24: £nil) due to trade debtors rising to £26.8m as at 30 September 2024, compared to £21.7m as at 30 September 2023. The trade debtor increase was driven by the outstanding record level of £15.0m Realised revenues achieved in H1 FY25.
  • Loss Before Tax was (£0.2m) compared to a Profit Before Tax of £0.9m in H1 FY24, due to the above factors together with a lower corporation tax charge being largely offset by higher interest costs. 
  • Basic earnings per share (0.5) pence (H1 FY24: 1.4 pence).
  • Gross cash generated from completed cases increased 63% to £14.3m in the 6 months to 30 September 2024 (H1 FY24: £8.7m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 39%.
  • Cash income from completed cases after payments of all legal costs and payments to Insolvent Estates rose by 66% to £7.6m (H1 FY24: £4.6m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 46%.
  • Net cashflow after all operating costs but before new case investments rose by 193% to £4.5m (H1 FY24: £1.5m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 126%.
  • Net assets as at 30 September 2024 were £40.5m (H1 FY24: £39.8m). Net debt was reduced to £11.9m and comprises borrowings of £12.5m, offset by cash balances of £0.6m. (Net debt as 31 March 2024 was £12.3m.)
  • £5m of the £17.5m HSBC Revolving Credit Facility remains available for use, as at 30 September 2024. That figure does not take into account the Company’s available cash balances referred to above.

Operational highlights:

  • Ongoing delivery of record realised returns: 137 case completions in H1 FY25 representing a 18% increase (116 case realisations in H1 FY24), generating gross settlement proceeds receivable of £13.9m for H1 FY25, which is 51% higher than the H1 FY24 figure of £9.2m. This very strong increase in case settlements provides visibility for further high levels of cash income, as it takes the Company, on average, around 12 months to collect in all cash from previously completed cases.
  • The average realised revenue per completed case (“ARRCC”) for H1 FY25 was £109k, compared to the ARRCC of £81k for H1 FY24. That 35% increase in ARRCC is an important and an encouraging Key Performance Indicator for the Company. Before the onset and impact of the Covid pandemic in 2020, the Company was achieving an ARRCC of approximately £200k. Progress back to that ARRCC level, together with the Company maintaining its recent high case acquisition and case completion volumes, would lead to a material transformation of Company profitability.
  • The 137 cases completed in H1 FY25 had an average case duration of 15.7 months. This was higher than the average case duration of 11.5 months for the 118 cases completed in H1 FY24, because in H1 FY25 Manolete was able to complete a relatively higher number of older cases, as evidenced by the Vintages Table below.
  • Average case duration across Manolete’s full lifetime portfolio of 1,064 completed cases, as at 30 September 2024 was 13.3 months (H1 FY24: 12.7 months).
  • Excluding the Barclays Bounce Back Loan (“BBL”) pilot cases, new case investments remained at historically elevated levels of 126 for H1 FY25 (H1 FY24: 146 new case investments).
  • New case enquiries (again excluding just two Barclays BBL pilot cases from the H1 FY24 figure) achieved another new Company record of 437 in H1 FY25, 27% higher than the H1 FY24 figure of 343. This excellent KPI is a strong indicator of future business performance and activity levels.
  • Stable portfolio of live cases: 413 in progress as at 30 September 2024 (417 as at 30 September 2023) which includes 35 live BBLs.
  • Excluding the Truck Cartel cases, all vintages up to and including the 2019 vintage have now been fully, and legally completed. Only one case remains ongoing in the 2020 vintage. 72% of the Company’s live cases have been signed in the last 18 months.
  • The Truck Cartel cases continue to progress well. As previously reported, settlement discussions, to varying degrees of progress, continue with a number of Defendant manufacturers. Further updates will be provided as concrete outcomes emerge.
  • The Company awaits the appointment of the new Labour Government’s Covid Corruption Commissioner and hopes that appointment will set the clear direction of any further potential material involvement for Manolete in the Government’s BBL recovery programme.
  • The Board proposes no interim dividend for H1 FY25 (H1 FY24: £nil).

The full report of Manolete’s half-year results can be read here.

Read More

LegalPay’s CIO Highlights the Opportunities and Challenges for Defense-Side Funding

By Harry Moran |

As the legal funding industry has matured and become a mainstream feature of many jurisdictions’ legal systems, funders are increasingly looking at ways to diversify their activities.

In an article for Insolvency Tracker, Tanya Prasad, CIO of LegalPay, addresses the niche topic of defense-side funding and examines whether there is potential for this type of legal funding to grow in the same way that plaintiff funding has over recent years. Prasad notes that in an environment where “the demand for risk management tools in litigation grows”, large corporations may look to third-party funders to help supplement legal budgets “while potentially achieving favourable outcomes”.

Prasad acknowledges that compared to traditional plaintiff-side funding, defense-side funding “comes with unique challenges”. Whilst claimants may seek to maximise their financial returns in the form of damages and compensation, a defendant will “generally focus on minimizing loss exposure.” As a result of this difference in goals, Prasad suggests that funders would need to not only “employ creative pricing structures”, but would also need to find new metrics to define success.

The latter point is one that Prasad argues is key to creating a viable defense-side funding ecosystem, noting that “establishing a clear definition of success” may have different parameters for different defendants. Examples of this could include structuring funding agreements to incorporate “avoided loss” measures, which would define success based on “achieving a favorable settlement or dismissal at a lower financial cost than anticipated.”

If these difficulties that Prasad highlights can be overcome, she suggests that “defense-side litigation funding has the potential to redefine legal finance, supporting fair representation for both plaintiffs and defendants and expanding access to justice across the board.” Additionally, Prasad points to a handful of examples where defense-side funding has been successfully employed, such as the Gillette v. ShaveLogic case, where Burford Capital provided funding for the defendant to successfully oppose Gillette’s claims of trades secret misappropriation and unfair competition.