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Portfolio Theory in the Context of Litigation Finance (pt. 2 of 2)

Portfolio Theory in the Context of Litigation Finance (pt. 2 of 2)

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  In part one of this two part series, which can be found here, I explored a variety of portfolio theories and applied them to the litigation finance asset class. This second article continues the application to commercial litigation finance and discusses implications for portfolio construction. Executive Summary
  • Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) – a mathematical framework based on the “mean-variance” analysis – argues that it’s possible to construct an “efficient frontier” of optimal portfolios offering the maximum possible expected return for a given level of risk
  • MPT states that assets (such as stocks) face both “systematic risks” – market risks such as interest rates – as well as “unsystematic risks” – mostly uncorrelated exposures that are characteristic to each asset, including management changes or poor sales resulting from unforeseen events
  • Post-modern Portfolio Theory (PMPT) adds a layer of refinement to the definition of risk
  • Diversification of a portfolio can mitigate the impact of unsystematic risks on portfolio performance – although, it depends on its composition of assets
  • Behavioural Finance (BF) introduces a suggestion that psychological influences and biases affect the financial behaviors of investors and financial practitioners, also applicable to litigation finance
Slingshot Insights:
  • Portfolio theory is important to the commercial litigation finance asset class due to its inherently high level of unsystematic risks
  • Slingshot’s Rule of Thumb: a portfolio should contain no less than 20 investments in order to provide the benefits associated with portfolio theory
  • Diversification is critical for every fund manager
  • Specialty fund managers may play a positive role in a comprehensive litigation finance investing strategy by assisting with meeting a particular performance objective when defined in the context of acceptable “mean-variance” targets
  • Diversification provides optionality for an under-performing manager to ‘live to fight another day’ if their first fund achieved sub-par performance
  • Portfolio theory is applicable to consumer litigation finance
How Big is Big Enough? There are many theories about how large a portfolio should be to meaningfully benefit from the application of portfolio theory, with analysts suggesting anywhere from 20 to over 100 investments (typically in relation to public equities).  While I have yet to conduct a study to determine a more finite range applicable to litigation finance, I will say that there are a few elements that are critical to consider, which are specific to litigation finance. First, litigation finance is by its very nature uncertain in terms of the amount of commitment the fund manager will ultimately deploy in relation to its financial commitment to a single case (i.e. while a manager may commit $5 million to a case, the legal team may only deploy $2MM by the time the case settles). Capital deployment (both quantum and timing) is an uncontrollable variable that makes portfolio theory difficult to apply, because portfolio theory assumes the dollars deployed in each investment are (i) known and (ii) of equal size (although weightings can be assigned).  Accordingly, in order to ensure that the portfolio is diversified on a dollars deployed basis, the portfolio needs to be sufficiently large to ensure that on a committed basis it is not skewed by a few cases which have deployed 100% or more of their initial commitment relative to those cases that have deployed less than 100%.  It is also not uncommon for managers to deploy nil or very little against their commitment as a result of an early settlement (perhaps brought on by the existence of litigation finance itself, or by virtue of the investment being in the form of adverse costs indemnity protection), which adds another element of complexity as relates to the application of portfolio theory. Second, diversification in the context of litigation finance is not only a mathematical exercise of ensuring no one case represents a disproportionate amount of the fund, it also covers the types and extent of case exposures in the portfolio.  If one is investing only in a single manager, one wouldn’t necessarily want a fund that invests solely in Intellectual Property cases, as an example, because a Systematic risk that effects that sector (for example, litigation reform such as Inter Partes Reviews in patent litigation, or an important case precedent with broad implications) will likely effect all cases in the portfolio and hence diversification will not aid at all in terms of addressing the Systematic risk. Case types, defendants, jurisdictions, judges, plaintiff counsel, defense counsel, case inter-dependencies (where the outcome of one case has a direct impact on the likely outcome of another case in the same portfolio) are all important variables that a manager should consider when creating their portfolio. Third, litigation finance portfolio financings (the concept of a funder investing in a portfolio of law firm or corporate cases) are, by their very nature, benefitting from the application of portfolio theory. Therefore, in constructing one’s portfolio, one should consider whether the committed capital is being invested in single case portfolios, cross-collateralized portfolio financings or a combination thereof, each of which having different risk-reward profiles. When we take all of the above into consideration, especially the uncertainty inherent in capital deployment, my general rule of thumb is for managers to target a minimum of 20 equally sized litigation finance case commitments within a portfolio. From there, I adjust based on a variety of factors including case types, financing sizes, jurisdictions, currencies, etc.  Other investors may have a different perspective.  Of course, the portfolio will never be comprised of 20 equally-sized cases due to deployment uncertainty, so I view this as a baseline. If the portfolio is made up of cases with a higher inherent volatility (class actions, intellectual property, international arbitration or large cases), then a larger portfolio would be more appropriate, such that the higher loss ratio in the portfolio – which is inherent in higher risk portfolios – will not disproportionately contribute to the portfolio’s overall performance. Applicability to Consumer Litigation Finance Portfolio theory suggests that diversification is exceptionally good at reducing Unsystematic risk; hence, it comes as no surprise that MPT should be more frequently applicable to the commercial litigation finance asset class given the high level of idiosyncratic case risk.  The consumer litigation finance market also exhibits similar idiosyncratic case risk, but I believe it has more Systematic risks related to defendants (usually, insurance companies with a common approach), regulation, and established case precedent where the damages are much more prescribed.  Accordingly, while portfolio theory may not be as critical in this segment of litigation finance, as an investor in the asset class I believe it remains an important value driver for the consumer litigation finance market, especially since the return profile of a single piece of consumer litigation finance is generally not as strong as those inherent in commercial litigation finance due to risk and regulatory differences. Fund Managers’ Perspective As an investor experienced with managing capital, deploying capital and portfolio construction, I offer a few observations for consideration. First, don’t fall in love with your investments (i.e. don’t get caught with personal biases working into your portfolio construction).  It is easy for a fund manager to be attracted to certain cases thinking the particular case is a ‘no brainer’ (perhaps due to personal experience and/or comfort with the merits of the case) and allocate a disproportionate amount of the portfolio to finance that case. However, in the context of an asset class with binary and idiosyncratic risk, the portfolio manager would be taking on a disproportionate amount of risk in doing so.  Once a manager has determined that the case meets their rigid underwriting criteria, her or she must change their mindset to one of portfolio allocator and take a dispassionate view of the case to ensure the portfolio is optimized.  In fact, I would suggest splitting the functional role of underwriting and portfolio construction to ensure the underwriting doesn’t influence portfolio allocation decisions! Second, do not insist on exceptions to concentration limits.  I have seen a number of fund documents where the manager has carved out exceptions to concentration limits (many of which are not appropriate for this asset class (10%, 15%, 20%) and have been derived from other PE asset classes with completely different risk profiles). By doing so, the manager is adding a lot of risk (and bias) to the portfolio that is both unnecessary and risky to the longevity of the fund, not to mention investor returns.  In my mind, the equation is quite simple: if one creates a diversified set of investments of relatively equal size, and one maintains a sound underwriting methodology, industry data suggests that one’s investment thesis should work. So why jeopardize a sound strategy? Third, fund managers will live and die by their portfolio results, so why take unnecessary risk in haphazardly allocating capital? To illustrate the second and third points, let’s consider four potential portfolio outcomes: (i) non-diversified portfolio with poor performance, (ii) non-diversified portfolio with exceptional performance, (iii) diversified portfolio with good performance and (iv) diversified portfolio with poor performance. As an investor, I would look at situations (i) and (ii) and say “as a fund manager you are ‘dead in the water’”. Why? Situation (i) is self-explanatory: poor underwriting which impacts fund performance, and is buttressed by the fact that the fund manager isn’t astute enough to diversify the portfolio. Situation (ii) communicates the exact same thing, but in a different way. It tells an investor that the fund manager was ultimately successful, but in a way that was risky (in other words, the manager ‘got lucky’) and not likely repeatable (because fund performance was dependent on too few outcomes), which is not what attracts most investors who are looking for a measure of conservatism and persistence in their managers’ return profiles. I contend that this asset class should exhibit a return profile closer to that of growth or leveraged buy-out private equity (strong returns across the portfolio with a few losers for an overall strong return profile) and not venture capital (mostly losers with some exceptionally strong performers which contribute disproportionately to the overall portfolio return, which may be positive or negative).  Recent shifts toward portfolio financings by Burford and other private fund managers, suggest that there is a consensus as to the benefit of diversification on the volatility of portfolio returns. On the other hand, situation (iii) is an ideal one, where the manager was prudent and the results illustrate underwriting and portfolio construction acumen, with portfolio returns not being disproportionately impacted by a few cases. Situation (iv) is interesting because it is a scenario where a manager can potentially ‘live to fight another day,’ since he or she was prudent with capital allocation, but perhaps something went awry with underwriting, or the portfolio was negatively impacted by a Systematic risk which was beyond the manager’s control. Every fund manager should ask themselves, “why take the risk” in creating a non-diversified portfolio, because it is a lose-lose scenario?  Diversification will always provide the optionality of raising a subsequent fund, even if returns are sub-par. As we live in a dynamic world with a myriad of financial innovations being developed daily, managers should remain aware of new approaches to reducing risk in their portfolio (i.e. insurance, co-investing, risk-sharing with law firms), which may allow them to invest a smaller amount without taking on undue case concentration risk.  Of course, any instrument that reduces risk incurs a cost, and so one will need to assess the overall risk-reward equation to determine whether it is appropriate for both the manager and the investor. Diversification is in the eye of the Investor Managers should also keep in mind that each investor is different.  A manager may have one investor that has decided to maintain a single exposure to litigation finance through the manager, in which case the investor is likely counting on that manager to ensure application of portfolio theory.  On the other hand, an investor may be looking for specific exposures to complement his or her numerous allocations within the litigation finance sector, and so the investor is expected to apply portfolio theory to the various allocations within their portfolio and are less reliant on the fund manager for doing so in their specific fund. What is critical for managers is that they deploy capital in a responsible manner and not acquiesce to the demands of a given investor with respect to their perspective on portfolio construction and portfolio theory. We are all here to create sustainable long-term businesses, and a given investor may have different objectives that could derail the manager’s own goals. Slingshot Insights Investing in a nascent asset class like litigation finance is mainly about investing in people.  Most managers simply don’t have the track record of a fully realized portfolio on which investors can base their investment decision.  Accordingly, much time and attention is spent on understanding how managers think about building their business and in particular their first portfolio.  In addition to the underwriting process, one of the most important considerations for investors to understand is how managers think about portfolio construction and diversification. Portfolio theory plays an integral role in terms of how managers should be thinking about constructing their portfolios from the perspective of the number of cases in the portfolio, but managers should also ensure their own personal bias is not entering into the portfolio and that they have thought about all of the systematic risks that can affect like cases. My general rule of thumb is that most first time managers should be targeting a portfolio of at least 20 equal sized commitments, appreciating that it is almost impossible to achieve equal sized deployments due to deployment risk. It is also not in the manager’s best long-term interest to take a short-cut on diversification for expediency sake (i.e. to raise the next larger fund) and to do so may be interpreted as poor judgment from an investor’s perspective! As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article. Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.

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Getting Work Done: The Simpler, Smarter Way to Grow Your Firm

By Kris Altiere |

The following article was contributed by Kris Altiere, US Head of Marketing for Moneypenny.

Law firms are busier than ever. With new systems, dashboards, and automation tools launched in the name of efficiency, you’d think productivity would be soaring. Yet for many, the opposite is true. Complexity creeps in, admin increases, and clients still end up waiting for answers.

At Moneypenny, we’ve learned that true progress doesn’t come from doing more, it comes from doing what matters. Our philosophy is simple: Get work done, don’t just perform, don’t just present. Instead deliver, clearly, quickly, and with care.

Whether it’s a client seeking reassurance, a paralegal managing a mounting caseload, or a partner steering firm strategy through change, the goal should always be the same: solve the problem and move forward.

Efficiency might be driven by data, but in law, trust and momentum are still powered by people.

The Trust Factor

Clients don’t just want results; they want to know their matter is in good hands. The best partnerships, whether between a legal firm and its clients or between colleagues, are built on accountability and trust.

Getting work done isn’t about checking boxes or sending updates for the sake of optics. It’s about ownership. Doing what you say you’ll do, every single time. Following through with integrity. In short: treat people how you’d like to be treated. That’s how client confidence is built and why trust remains a competitive differentiator for firms now and in the future.

Focus on What Only You Can Do

Law firms today face growing operational pressures: administrative backlogs, client onboarding delays, endless meetings. Many assume the answer is to do more in-house, hire more people but the most successful firms know when to outsource to a trusted partner.

That doesn’t mean losing control, however. It means surrounding your firm with trusted partners who amplify your capabilities and free your team to do what only they can do, advise clients and win cases. When done right, it creates focus.

At Moneypenny, we see this daily. We handle client calls, live chats, and digital communications for thousands of businesses in the legal industry. We take care of the admin that slows teams down so they can accelerate the work that matters most: serving clients and growing their firm. It’s partnership in its purest form: freeing their people to deliver their best.

Pragmatism Over Perfection

Grand digital transformation projects often sound impressive, but the real progress comes from consistent, pragmatic improvement. The best firms are selective about innovation. They adopt technology not for the headlines, but for the results.

These are the firms that deliver, time and again, because they know progress isn’t about chasing every new idea, it’s about using the right ones well.

They ask simple, powerful questions:
• What’s the work that needs to be done?
• Who’s best to do it?
• How can we do it well?

It’s a balanced approach, blending smart innovation with everyday pragmatism and one that turns productivity from a KPI into a true competitive advantage.

Tech That Enables, Not Overcomplicates

Technology has enormous potential to streamline legal operations but only when used intentionally. Too often, new systems add friction instead of removing it.

The smartest firms blend automation with human oversight, letting technology enable people rather than replace them. For example, at Moneypenny, our AI Receptionist handles routine client inquiries with speed and accuracy. But when a conversation requires empathy, nuance, or reassurance, one of our experienced receptionists steps in seamlessly. 

The result is humans and AI together, each doing what they do best. Because in the end, emotional intelligence, the ability to listen, reassure, and build trust, remains a uniquely human strength, even as AI continues to evolve at a rapid rate.

Four Rules for Getting Work Done

This philosophy isn’t about going backwards or simplifying for the sake of it. It’s about cutting through the noise, building with intention, and putting resources where they’ll have the most impact.

It’s about following four simple objectives:

  1. Focus on what only you can do.
    Concentrate on the work that truly requires your expertise.
  2. Outsource with trust.
    Partner with people who treat your clients as their own.
  3. Use technology to enable, not to replace.
    Automation is a tool — not a solution in itself.
  4. Measure outcomes, not optics.
    Progress is about results, not noise.

Clarity Over Complexity

Getting work done isn’t flashy but it is how great firms grow. One resolved issue, one clear decision, one satisfied client at a time.

Because when brilliant legal teams are supported by smart technology and the distractions fall away, exceptional things happen. Clients feel the difference, teams perform at their best, and the firm builds a reputation for service and sustained excellence. 

For law firms navigating the fast-changing landscape, success will come from what matters most. Clarity over complexity. Trust over busyness. Action over appearance. And that is how law firms will truly move forward and stay ahead of the crowd.

Pogust Goodhead Defeats BHP Bid To Block Deposition Of Former Renova Chief

The High Court has rejected mining giant BHP’s application for an anti-suit injunction (ASI) that sought to prevent Pogust Goodhead from pursuing lawful evidence-gathering measures in the United States against the former president of the Brazilian redress scheme foundation set up after the Mariana dam collapse.

The Court found no basis to characterise Pogust Goodhead’s use of Section 1782 to seek a deposition of Mr André de Freitas, former CEO of the Renova Foundation[i] as vexatious, oppressive, or unconscionable, as argued by BHP.

In November 2024, Pogust Goodhead filed the §1782 application in the District Court of Arkansas seeking limited testimony from Mr de Freitas in relation to Pogust Goodhead’s claim arguing that BHP unlawfully interfered with Pogust Goodhead’s retainer rights and the compensation due to its Brazilian clients.  The U.S. court granted the subpoenas in January 2025.

Since then, BHP has sought to block the deposition by filing motions to quash the subpoenas in April 2025 and seeking an ASI in the High Court. A ruling from the Arkansas court is pending.

In Wednesday’s judgment, Mr Justice Waksman rejected BHP’s request for an injunction that would have halted the U.S. evidence-gathering process, finding no basis to prevent Pogust Goodhead from continuing with its §1782 discovery efforts.

Justice Waksman wrote in his decision: “I agree with PG that the depositions serve a distinct and legitimate purpose, being to better understand Renova’s role in relation to the various settlements and their form.”

Alicia Alinia, CEO at Pogust Goodhead commented: “We welcome the Court’s clear judgment. BHP has repeatedly attempted to obstruct legitimate investigations into its conduct. Mr de Freitas’s testimony is central to understanding how our clients’ rights may have been undermined. It is essential that he gives evidence. Only by hearing directly from those involved can our clients’ rights be properly safeguarded and the full truth established.”

Key Findings

  • The court held that English courts do not control how parties lawfully obtain evidence abroad, and that the U.S. court is the appropriate authority to decide the scope and propriety of discovery sought under Section 1782.
  • The Court also highlighted BHP’s significant delay in bringing the ASI application — nearly four months after learning of the U.S. subpoenas — which weighed against granting any injunctive relief.
  • Any concerns about the scope of the subpoenas, alleged misstatements, or burden on the witness are squarely matters for the U.S. District Court, which has already engaged with the issues in detailed hearings.

As a result, BHP cannot use the English courts to derail the ongoing U.S. process. The parties now await the District Court of Arkansas’s decision on whether BHP’s motions to quash the subpoenas will succeed.

Third Party Funding 3.0: Exploring Litigation Funding’s Correlation with the Broader Economy

By Gian Marco Solas |

The following article was contributed by Dr. Avv. Gian Marco Solas[1], founder of Sustainab-Law and author of Third Party Funding, New Technologies and the Interdisciplinary Methodology as Global Competition Litigation Driving Forces (Global Competition Litigation Review, 1/25).  Dr. Solas is also the author of Third Party Funding, Law Economics an Policy (Cambridge Press).

There is an inaccurate and counterproductive belief in the litigation funding market, that the asset class would be uncorrelated from the global economy. That was in fact due to a much bigger scientific legal problem, that the law itself was not considered as physical factor of correlation, as instrument to measure and determine cause and effects of economic events in legal systems.

This problem has been solved, in both theoretical and mathematical terms, and in fact – thanks to technology available to date such as AI and blockchain – it looks much better for litig … ehm … legal third-party funders. 

Third Party Funding 3.0© opens three new lines of opportunities:

  1. AI allows to detect and file claims that would otherwise not have been viable / brought forward, such as unlocked competition law claims[2], which represent the largest chunk of the market for competition claims. See funding proposal.
  2. Human law as factor of correlation allows to calculate the unexpressed value of the global economy. Everything that, in fact, can be unlocked with litigation, allowing then a public-private IPO type of process to optimize legal systems[3].
  3. Physical modeling of the law also allows to transform debt / liabilities into new investments, thus allowing to settle litigation earlier and with less legal costs, leaving more room to creativity to optimize the investments[4].

While it may be true that the outcome of one single judgement does not depend on the fluctuations of the financial economy, legal reality certainly determines the ups and downs of the litigation funding (and any other) market. Otherwise, we could not explain the rise of litigation funding in the post-financial crisis for instance, or the shockwaves propagated by judgements like PACCAR.

The flip side is that understanding and measuring legal reality, as well as leveraging on modern technologies and innovative legal instruments, the market for legal claims and legal assets is much bigger and sizeable than with the standard litigation financial model.

In order to test Litigation Funding 3.0, I am presenting the following proposal:

10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment to cover one test case's litigation costs, tech, book-building and expert costs aimed at targeting three already identified global or multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion dollars, whose details will be provided upon request.

Funder(s) get:

  • Percentage of claims' return as per agreement with parties involved;
  • Property of the AI / blockchain algorithm;
  • License of TPF 3.0.

The funding does not cover: additional legal / litigation / expert / etc. costs.

Below is the full proposal:

THIRD PARTY FUNDING 3.0© & COMPETITION LAW CLAIMS Dr2. Avv. Gian Marco Solas gmsolas@sustainab-law.eu ; gianmarcosolas@gmail.com ; +393400966871 
AI: Artificial Intelligence                  ML: Machine Learning                    TPF: Third Party Funding
GENERAL SCENARIO FOR COMPETITION LAW DAMAGE CLAIMS – IN SHORT
Competition authorities around the globe are rapidly developing AI / ML tools to scan markets / economy and prosecute anti-competitive practices. This suggests a steep increase in competition claims in the coming years, in both volume and scope.  AI also reduces the costs and time of litigation and ML allows to better assess its risks and merit, prompting for a re-modelling of the TPF economic model in competition claims considering empirical evidence of the first wave(s) of funded litigation.
CODIFICATION© IN PHENOGRAPHY© AND TPF 3.0©
New technology and ‘mathematical-legal language’, a combination of digital & quantum where the IT code is the applicable law modelled as - and interrelated with - the law(s) of nature (‘codification©’ in ‘phenography©’). On this basis, an ML / AI legal-tech algorithm has been built in prototype to learn, build and enforce anticompetitive claims in scale, to be guided by lawyers / experts / managers, with a process tracked with and certified in blockchain. New investment thesis (TPF 3.0©) for an asset class correlated to the global real economy, including the mathematical basis for the development of a complex sciences-based / empirical damage calculation to be built by experts. 
LEGAL / LITIGATION TECH INVESTMENT, COMMITMENT AND PROSPECT RETURN
10 MILLION EUR in the form of a series A venture capital type of investment with real assets as collateral for funding to any competition litigation filed with and through this algorithm, that becomes proprietary also of the funder(s). It aims at covering a first test case (already identified), full-time IT engineer, quantum experts and book-building costs. The funder(s) is(are) expected to provide also global litigation management expertise and own the algorithm. Three global or anyway multi-jurisdictional mass anticompetitive claims in the scale of multi-billion in value have already been identified. Details will be provided upon request. Funder(s) also gets license of the TPF 3.0© thesis.

Below is the abstract and table of contents from my research:

Abstract

This article aims at fostering competition litigation and market analysis by integrating concepts borrowed from physics science from an historical legal and evolutionary perspective, taking the third party funding (TPF) market as benchmark. To do so, it first combines historical legal data and trends related to the legal and litigation markets, discussing three macro historical trends or “states”: Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation; enlargement of the legal world; digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession. It then proposes the multidisciplinary methodology to assess the market for TPF: mainstream economic models, historical “cyclical” data and concepts borrowed from physics, particularly from mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics. On this basis, it discusses the potential implication of such methodology on the global competition litigation practice, for instance in market analysis and damage theory, also by considering the impact of modern technologies. The article concludes that physics models and the interdisciplinary methodology seem to add value to market assessment and considers whether there should be a case for a wider adoption in (competition) litigation and asset management practices.  

Table of Contents

Introduction. I. Evolution of the legal services, litigation and third party funding market(s) 1.1. Industrial revolution(s) and globalisation 1.2. Enlargement of the legal world and privatisation of justice 1.3. Digital revolution and liberalisation of the legal profession II. Modelling the market(s) with economics, historical and physics models. Third Party Funding as benchmark 2.1. Economic models for legal services, legal claims and third party funding markets 2.2. Does history repeat itself? Litigation finance cycles 2.3. Mechanics of fluids and thermodynamics to model legal markets? III. Impact on global competition litigation 3.1. Market analysis and damage theory 3.2. Economics of competition litigation and new technologies. Conclusions. Third Party Funding 3.0© and competitiveness.

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1. Italian / EU qualified lawyer and legal scientist. Leading Expert at BRICS Competition Law & Policy Centre (Higher School of Economics, Moscow). Ph.D.2 (Maastricht Law School, Economic Analysis of Law; University of Cagliari, Comparative Law) – LL.M. (College of Europe, EU competition Law). Visiting Fellow at Fordham Law School (US Antitrust), NYU (US Legal finance and civil procedure).

2. G. M. Solas, ‘Third Party Funding, new technologies and the interdisciplinary methodology as global competition litigation driving forces’ (2025) Global Competition Litigation Review, 1.

3. G. M. Solas, ‘Interrelation of Human Laws and Laws of Nature? Codification of Sustainable Legal Systems’ (2025) Journal of Law, Market & Innovation, 2.

4. ‘Law is Love’, at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5694423, par. 3.3.