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Intellectual Property Private Credit (Part 2 of 2)

September 15, 2021

Intellectual Property Private Credit (Part 2 of 2)

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’  Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance.  Executive Summary
  • Despite its size, the Intellectual property (“IP”) asset class has eluded the attention of most asset managers due to its underlying legal complexities
  • Litigation finance industry understands the opportunity, but it is solely focused on litigation involving IP
  • A void exists in the financing market, which IP-focused Private Credit managers have begun to fill via credit-oriented strategies designed to drive value maximization
Slingshot Insights:
  • Secular shifts in the economy have made IP assume an increasing share of corporate value
  • IP is an emerging asset class that has begun to garner the attention of asset managers and insurers
  • There are various IP-centric investment strategies that do not involve litigation.
  • IP-focused Private Credit funds approach IP in a holistic fashion, leveraging numerous ways that IP creates value
  • Investors need to be aware that investing in IP presents unique risks that warrant input from operational and legal IP specialists
  • IP Credit provides a different risk/reward profile for investors, as compared to commercial litigation finance which tends to have more quasi-binary risk
In the part 1 of this two-part series, the relatively nascent asset class of Intellectual Property Private Credit (“IP Credit”) was introduced.  That article explored the basic premise of the asset class, discussed some of the financiers in the space and reviewed some of the nuances inherent in the asset class.  In part two, we take all of the knowledge gained in part one and apply it to a specific example by exploring a publicly traded company, which used IP Credit on a couple of different occasions with great success. Case Study The details of most IP Private Credit transactions remain private.  An illustrative exception involves two prior financings of the once publicly traded cybersecurity company Finjan Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: FNJN) (“Finjan”), known for its technologies related to proactive cybersecurity.  At the time of the financings in 2016 and 2017, Finjan had focused significant effort on the licensing of its patent portfolio — to significant monetary success — in addition to other aspects of its business.  But because the licensing of intellectual property often requires costly litigation to complement the negotiation process, Finjan, through its bankers, ran a process to identify a strategic capital partner.  Potential proceed uses included litigation and general operating expenses, as well as stock repurchases. Series A Financing (May 20, 2016)
InvestmentSeries A Preferred StockInvestorsHalcyon/Soryn
Amount$10.2 millionTerms
  • Optional and mandatory redemptive provisions
  • Carry participation rights in revenue streams
  • Negative Events – Litigation and Treasury events
  • Consent to declare dividends
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001366340/000136634016000051/0001366340-16-000051-index.htm
Series A1 Financing (June 19, 2017)
InvestmentSeries A Preferred StockInvestorsHalcyon/Soryn
Amount$15.3 millionTerms
  • Optional and mandatory redemptive provisions
  • Carry participation rights in revenue streams
  • Negative Events – Litigation and Treasury events
  • Consent to declare dividends
Redemption RightsCompany option to redeem at lesser of: 1.     2.8 X Original Purchase Price 2.     Purchase prices ranging from 1.2375X to 1.575+ times based on time elapsed from date of issuance 3.     Receipt of share of proceeds from litigation or licensing which varies based on time elapsed from date of issuance
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001366340/000136634017000059/0001366340-17-000059-index.htm
Based on its prior patent licensing success, Finjan likely had numerous traditional, non-recourse litigation financing offers to choose from. But instead of pursuing the litigation finance route, Finjan pursued the IP Credit path.  Finjan secured almost $26mm in financing, via two highly-structured preferred equity transactions.  These transactions featured share redemptions tied to litigation and/or patent licensing revenue events, and also contained “Negative Event” features that entitled the capital partner to recover all of their shares upon the occurrence of certain, pre-agreed negative events.  As illustrated in the chart above, the capital partner’s potential returns were capped at multiples ranging from 1.25 to almost 3x the original purchase price of the shares, with the range depending mainly on the length of time the capital was outstanding. Finjan ultimately exited both deals.  While the exact motivations behind the deal cannot be known, it is easily theorized that the highly-structured and downside protected nature of the IP Credit Deal the company ultimately entered into was favorable in a number of respects compared to the higher cost of capital seen in traditional litigation finance arrangements.  Finjan was ultimately acquired by Fortress Investment Group in 2020. Interplay with IP litigation Of note, and particularly with respect to patents, enforcement litigation is often a necessary tool to resolve licensing disputes or negotiations between IP owners and potential licensees.   The reason is that without litigation, a patent owner has no means to force a party that it believes is infringing its IP to the negotiating table. Litigation scenarios thus remain part of the broader IP Private Credit strategy.  But such litigations can take different shapes and risk profiles.  On one end of the risk spectrum are single event litigations, involving a small number of patents, that represent unattractive and binary risk profiles.  On the other end of the spectrum are multi-venue disputes, involving a significant number of patents, brought by entities owning much larger patent portfolios than what is asserted in litigation. These types of situations (shown above to the right of the arrow) resemble business negotiations moreso than binary litigation, and can be modeled to resolve in a more predictable fashion.  By the nature of a credit-oriented investment strategy, an IP-focused Private Credit fund targets the latter opportunity set, whereas the litigation finance market has shown a willingness to fund what we characterize as the riskier, more binary type enforcement situations. Accordingly, while litigation is not necessarily an outcome that results from such an investment, a manager that invests in the sector does need to expect, plan and prepare for litigation as a potential outcome, or at the very least as a means to an end. The idea, as with most litigation, is that ‘saner heads will prevail’ and that a commercially reasonable settlement will be achieved by both parties prior to embarking on expensive litigation.  Of course, this means that the onus is on the investor to understand the merits of the case and the plaintiff’s strategic position, potential defenses, procedural activities that could frustrate or delay litigation, and the costs associated therewith.  The complexities associated with understanding the value of intellectual property assets, and the complexity of the litigation process, make the sector a highly specialized area for investors who are often best served by investing with or alongside specialist managers.  Slingshot Insights Secular shifts in the economy should be forcing investors to think about value in different ways.  It’s indisputable that intellectual property is clearly the basis for technology company valuations, and therefore value must be attributable to IP when considering financing alternatives.  While understanding the value inherent in intellectual property can be difficult, fund managers with specific expertise exist to allow investors to allocate capital in an appropriate risk adjusted manner. The fact that the insurance industry is now providing insurance products geared toward intellectual property is a testament to how far the industry has come and how significant the opportunity is, and perhaps much less risky than one would think, if approached prudently. I believe the IP Credit asset class has a bright future, as existing players have had great success producing consistent returns in a sector that one might otherwise believe to be volatile. As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article.  Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.  Slingshot Capital inc. is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally, investing with and alongside institutional investors. Soryn IP Capital Management LLC (“Soryn”) is an investment management firm focused on providing flexible financing solutions to companies, law firms and universities that own and manage valuable intellectual property (“IP”) assets.  Soryn’s approach employs strategies, including private credit, legal finance, and specialty IP finance, which enable it to invest across a diversity of unique IP-centric opportunities via investments structured as debt, equity, derivatives, and other financial contracts.  The Soryn team is comprised of seasoned IP and investment professionals, allowing the firm to directly source opportunities less travelled by traditional alternative asset managers.

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Commercial

Litigation Financiers Organize on Capitol Hill

By John Freund |

The litigation finance industry is mobilizing its defenses after nearly facing extinction through federal legislation last year. In response to Senator Thom Tillis's surprise attempt to impose a 41% tax on litigation finance profits, two attorneys have launched the American Civil Accountability Alliance—a lobbying group dedicated to fighting back against efforts to restrict third-party funding of lawsuits.

As reported in Bloomberg Law, co-founder Erick Robinson, a Houston patent lawyer, described the industry's collective shock when the Tillis measure came within striking distance of passing as part of a major tax and spending package. The proposal ultimately failed, but the close call exposed the $16 billion industry's vulnerability to legislative ambush tactics. Robinson noted that the measure appeared with only five weeks before the final vote, giving stakeholders little time to respond before the Senate parliamentarian ultimately removed it on procedural grounds.

The new alliance represents a shift toward grassroots advocacy, focusing on bringing forward voices of individuals and small parties whose cases would have been impossible without funding. Robinson emphasized that state-level legislation now poses the greater threat, as these bills receive less media scrutiny than federal proposals while establishing precedents that can spread rapidly across jurisdictions.

The group is still forming its board and hiring lobbyists, but its founders are clear about their mission: ensuring that litigation finance isn't quietly regulated out of existence through misleading rhetoric about foreign influence or frivolous litigation—claims Robinson dismisses as disconnected from how funders actually evaluate cases for investment.

Commercial

ISO’s ‘Litigation Funding Mutual Disclosure’ May Be Unenforceable

By John Freund |

The insurance industry has introduced a new policy condition entitled "Litigation Funding Mutual Disclosure" (ISO Form CG 99 11 01 26) that may be included in liability policies starting this month. The condition allows either party to demand mutual disclosure of third-party litigation funding agreements when disputes arise over whether a claim or suit is covered by the policy. However, the condition faces significant enforceability challenges that make it largely unworkable in practice.

As reported in Omni Bridgeway, the condition is unenforceable for several key reasons. First, when an insurer denies coverage and the policyholder commences coverage litigation, the denial likely relieves the policyholder of compliance with policy conditions. Courts typically hold that insurers must demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice from a policyholder's failure to perform a condition, which would be difficult to establish when coverage has already been denied.

Additionally, the condition's requirement for policyholders to disclose funding agreements would force them to breach confidentiality provisions in those agreements, amounting to intentional interference with contractual relations. The condition is also overly broad, extending to funding agreements between attorneys and funders where the insurer has no privity. Most problematically, the "mutual" disclosure requirement lacks true mutuality since insurers rarely use litigation funding except for subrogation claims, creating a one-sided obligation that borders on bad faith.

The condition appears designed to give insurers a litigation advantage by accessing policyholders' private financial information, despite overwhelming judicial precedent that litigation finance is rarely relevant to case claims and defenses. Policyholders should reject this provision during policy renewals whenever possible.

Commercial Regulatory Issues

Valve Faces Certified UK Class Action Despite Funding Scrutiny

By John Freund |

The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has delivered a closely watched judgment certifying an opt-out collective proceedings order (CPO) against Valve Corporation, clearing the way for a landmark competition claim to proceed on behalf of millions of UK consumers. The decision marks another important moment in the evolution of collective actions—and their funding—in the UK.

In its judgment, the CAT approved the application brought by Vicki Shotbolt as class representative, alleging that Valve abused a dominant position in the PC video games market through its operation of the Steam platform. The claim contends that Valve imposed restrictive pricing and distribution practices that inflated prices paid by UK consumers. Valve opposed certification on multiple grounds, including challenges to the suitability of the class representative, the methodology for assessing aggregate damages, and the adequacy of the litigation funding arrangements supporting the claim.

The Tribunal rejected Valve’s objections, finding that the proposed methodology for estimating class-wide loss met the “realistic prospect” threshold required at the certification stage. While Valve criticised the expert evidence as overly theoretical and insufficiently grounded in data, the CAT reiterated that a CPO hearing is not a mini-trial, and that disputes over economic modelling are better resolved at a later merits stage.

Of particular interest to the legal funding market, the CAT also examined the funding structure underpinning the claim. Valve argued that the arrangements raised concerns around control, proportionality, and potential conflicts. The Tribunal disagreed, concluding that the funding terms were sufficiently transparent and that appropriate safeguards were in place to ensure the independence of the class representative and legal team. In doing so, the CAT reaffirmed its now-familiar approach of scrutinising funding without treating third-party finance as inherently problematic.

With certification granted, the case will now proceed as one of the largest opt-out competition claims yet to advance in the UK. For litigation funders, the ruling underscores the CAT’s continued willingness to accommodate complex funding structures in large consumer actions—while signalling that challenges to funding are unlikely to succeed absent clear evidence of abuse or impropriety.