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Select Ethical Issues Present in Litigation Funding

Select Ethical Issues Present in Litigation Funding

The following article was contributed by John J. Hanley, Partner at Rimon Law Litigation financing is on the rise in the United States and provides some claimants a valuable means for paying the costs of pursuing a legal claim. Lawyer involvement in litigation financing transactions raises many ethical issues for a lawyer such as competence, duty of loyalty, the potential waiver of privilege and interference by a third party, to name a few. Competence The first rule for lawyers under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (the “NY RPC”) is competence.[1]  Lawyers and law firms should tread carefully when considering undertaking client engagements in a subject area in which they do not have the requisite knowledge and skill to provide competent representation of their clients. Official Comment 1 to Rule 1.1 provides in part that factors relevant to determining whether a lawyer has the requisite knowledge and skill in a matter include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the filed in question, and the preparation the lawyer is able to give the matter.[2] This does not mean that lawyers cannot deal with matters in which they are initially unfamiliar.  Indeed, the American Bar Association points out in comments to Rule 1.1 that “[a] lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. The analysis of precedent  . . . and legal drafting are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.”[3] According to the New York City Bar Report to the President by the New York City Bar Association Working Group on Litigation Funding: “[a] lawyer whose client seeks third party funding should determine at the outset whether he or she has the transactional experience and sophistication required to negotiate a beneficial agreement with the funder or whether a specialist in the field should be involved.”[4] Competence in litigation finance includes familiarity with various litigation financing structures and privileges against disclosure, among others.[5]  For example, the structure may involve different types of collateral, different means of financing legal fees and expenses, the manner in which funding is disbursed and the return structure of the financing.  A lawyer concentrating her or his practice on litigation funding may also be better able to determine “market” terms of the financing. Duty of Loyalty and the Lawyer’s Financial Interests Of course, the lawyer is the client’s fiduciary and agent who owes his or her client undivided loyalty and is forbidden from putting her interest above that of the client. The New York State Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics reminds lawyers that their financial interests must not interfere with the representation of the client.[6] Ordinarily, there is nothing adverse to a client about a lawyer getting paid for legal services[7] but in a litigation funding transaction the lawyer could have a personal interest in respect of the transaction. For example, the litigation funding agreement may facilitate payment of a portion of the lawyer’s fees or ensure certain expenses borne by the lawyer will be repaid.[8] The American Bar Association posits that if a lawyer has a relationship with a litigation funder that creates a financial interest for the lawyer . . . it may interfere with the lawyer’s obligation to provide impartial, unbiased advice to the client (the “ABA Report”)[9]. The ABA Report goes on to say that a lawyer with a long-term history of working with a particular funder may have an interest in keeping the funder content which would create a conflict even in the absence of an explicit agreement. The NY RPC, specifically Rule 1.7(a)(2), like the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if “there is significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, property or other interest.” Additionally, Rule 5.4 of the NY RPC, and its analogous provisions in other jurisdictions, requires that a lawyer maintain independence[10].  Consequently, such lawyer, representing a client in a matter for which litigation funding is sought, in general may be able to represent the client with respect to the litigation funding agreement but should disclose the lawyer’s relationship with the funder and receive the client’s informed written consent. Communication and Confidentiality Rule 1.4 of the NYRP Conduct requires a lawyer to communicate promptly, and provide complete information, to the client regarding the matter, and to reasonably consult with the client about the means to achieve the client’s objectives.[11] Reputable litigation funders are usually careful to provide in the litigation finance documents that the funder will not be involved in discussions between the lawyer and client regarding the matter, and that the funder will not direct or control the litigation. In certain circumstances an inexperienced lawyer may consider involving the funder in discussions about case strategy, but caution is in order. If a party other than client and the attorney is involved in communications involving legal issues or the case, the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality of communications is likely breached and the attorney may be guilty of legal malpractice. Indeed, Rule 1.6 of the NYRPC requires that a lawyer not knowingly reveal confidential information, or use that information to the disadvantage of the client or advantage of the lawyer or a third person, subject to certain exceptions.[12] Conclusion An attorney who represents a client in a matter that is to be funded pursuant to a litigation funding agreement should consider the ethical implications discussed in this Insight, among others, before representing the client in the funding agreement. Counsel would avoid all of the ethical considerations that may arise by referring the client to an outside attorney experienced in litigation finance.
[1] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.1.  The California Rules of Professional conduct and the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) also make this the number one rule.  Indeed, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted legal ethics rules based at least in part on the MRPC. [2] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.1, Comment [1]. [3] Available here ABA Comment to Rule 1.1 [4] Report to the President by the New York City Bar Association Working Group on Litigation Funding (February 28, 2020). [5] Others includes, without limitation champerty, maintenance, barratry, usury and required disclosures. [6] N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 769 (November 4, 2003). [7] The State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 2020-204. [8] Id. At 3. [9] American Bar Association, Informational Report to the House of Delegates Commission on Ethics 20/20. [10] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.5.4. [11] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.4(a). [12] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.6(a). See also the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 1.6.

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France Issues Decree Regulating Third-Party Funded Collective Actions

By John Freund |

France has taken a significant step in codifying oversight of third-party financed collective actions with the issuance of Decree No. 2025-1191 on December 10, 2025.

An article in Legifrance outlines the new rules, which establish the procedure for approving entities and associations authorized to lead both domestic and cross-border collective actions—referred to in French as “actions de groupe.” The decree brings long-anticipated regulatory clarity following the April 2025 passage of the DDADUE 5 law, which modernized France’s collective redress framework in line with EU Directive 2020/1828.

The decree grants authority to the Director General of Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF) to process applications for approval. Final approval is issued by ministerial order and is valid for five years, subject to renewal.

Approved organizations must meet specific governance and financial transparency criteria. A central provision of the new rules is a requirement for qualifying entities to publicly disclose any third-party funding arrangements on their websites. This includes naming the financiers and specifying the amounts received, with the goal of safeguarding the independence of collective actions and protecting the rights of represented parties.

Paul de Servigny, Head of litigation funding at French headquartered IVO Capital said: “As part of the transposition of the EU’s Representative Actions Directive, the French government announced a decree that sets out the disclosure requirements for the litigation funding industry, paving the way for greater access to justice for consumers in France by providing much welcomed clarity to litigation funders, claimants and law firms.

"This is good news for French consumers seeking justice and we look forward to working with government, the courts, claimants and their representatives and putting this decree into practice by supporting meritorious cases whilst ensuring that the interests of consumers are protected.”

By codifying these requirements, the French government aims to bolster public trust in group litigation and ensure funders do not exert improper influence on the course or outcome of legal actions.

Privy Council to Hear High-Profile Appeal on Third-Party Funding

By John Freund |

The United Kingdom's Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is set to hear a closely watched appeal that could have wide-ranging implications for third-party litigation funding in international arbitration. The case stems from a dispute between OGD Services Holdings, part of the Essar Group, and Norscot Rig Management over the enforcement of a Mauritius-based arbitral award. The Supreme Court of Mauritius had previously upheld the award in favor of Norscot, prompting OGD to seek review from the Privy Council.

An article in Bar & Bench reports that the appeal is scheduled for next year and will feature two prominent Indian senior advocates: Harish Salve KC, representing Norscot, and Nakul Dewan KC, representing OGD. At issue is whether the use of third-party funding in the underlying arbitration renders the enforcement of the award improper under Mauritius law, where third-party litigation funding remains a legally sensitive area.

The case is drawing significant attention because of its potential to shape the international enforceability of funding agreements, particularly in light of the UK Supreme Court's 2023 PACCAR decision. That ruling dramatically altered the legal landscape by classifying many litigation funding agreements as damages-based agreements, thereby subjecting them to stricter statutory controls. The PACCAR decision has already triggered calls for legislative reform in the UK to preserve the viability of litigation funding, especially in the class action and arbitration contexts.

The Privy Council appeal will test the legal boundaries of funder involvement in arbitration and may help clarify whether such arrangements compromise enforceability when judgments cross borders. The outcome could influence how funders structure deals in jurisdictions with differing attitudes toward third-party involvement in legal claims.

Banks Win UK Supreme Court Victory in $3.6B Forex Lawsuit

By John Freund |

Several major global banks, including JPMorgan, UBS, Citigroup, Barclays, MUFG, and NatWest, have successfully blocked a £2.7 billion ($3.6 billion) opt-out collective action in the UK’s Supreme Court. The proposed lawsuit, led by Phillip Evans, aimed to represent thousands of investors, pension funds, and institutions impacted by alleged foreign exchange (forex) market manipulation.

An article in Yahoo Finance reports that the case stemmed from earlier European Commission findings that fined multiple banks over €1 billion for operating cartels in forex trading. Evans’ action, filed under the UK’s collective proceedings regime, sought to recover damages on behalf of a wide investor class. However, the Supreme Court upheld a lower tribunal’s decision that the claim could not proceed on an opt-out basis, requiring instead that individual claimants opt in.

The judgment emphasized the insufficient participation rate among potential class members and found that an opt-out mechanism was not appropriate given the specifics of the case. Justice Vivien Rose, delivering the court’s opinion, noted that while individual claims might have merit, the representative structure lacked the cohesion and commitment necessary to justify a mass claim. As a result, the banks have succeeded in halting what would have been one of the largest collective actions in the UK to date.