Trending Now

Select Ethical Issues Present in Litigation Funding

The following article was contributed by John J. Hanley, Partner at Rimon Law

Litigation financing is on the rise in the United States and provides some claimants a valuable means for paying the costs of pursuing a legal claim. Lawyer involvement in litigation financing transactions raises many ethical issues for a lawyer such as competence, duty of loyalty, the potential waiver of privilege and interference by a third party, to name a few.

Competence

The first rule for lawyers under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (the “NY RPC”) is competence.[1]  Lawyers and law firms should tread carefully when considering undertaking client engagements in a subject area in which they do not have the requisite knowledge and skill to provide competent representation of their clients. Official Comment 1 to Rule 1.1 provides in part that factors relevant to determining whether a lawyer has the requisite knowledge and skill in a matter include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the filed in question, and the preparation the lawyer is able to give the matter.[2]

This does not mean that lawyers cannot deal with matters in which they are initially unfamiliar.  Indeed, the American Bar Association points out in comments to Rule 1.1 that “[a] lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. The analysis of precedent  . . . and legal drafting are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.”[3]

According to the New York City Bar Report to the President by the New York City Bar Association Working Group on Litigation Funding: “[a] lawyer whose client seeks third party funding should determine at the outset whether he or she has the transactional experience and sophistication required to negotiate a beneficial agreement with the funder or whether a specialist in the field should be involved.”[4]

Competence in litigation finance includes familiarity with various litigation financing structures and privileges against disclosure, among others.[5]  For example, the structure may involve different types of collateral, different means of financing legal fees and expenses, the manner in which funding is disbursed and the return structure of the financing.  A lawyer concentrating her or his practice on litigation funding may also be better able to determine “market” terms of the financing.

Duty of Loyalty and the Lawyer’s Financial Interests

Of course, the lawyer is the client’s fiduciary and agent who owes his or her client undivided loyalty and is forbidden from putting her interest above that of the client. The New York State Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics reminds lawyers that their financial interests must not interfere with the representation of the client.[6] Ordinarily, there is nothing adverse to a client about a lawyer getting paid for legal services[7] but in a litigation funding transaction the lawyer could have a personal interest in respect of the transaction. For example, the litigation funding agreement may facilitate payment of a portion of the lawyer’s fees or ensure certain expenses borne by the lawyer will be repaid.[8] The American Bar Association posits that if a lawyer has a relationship with a litigation funder that creates a financial interest for the lawyer . . . it may interfere with the lawyer’s obligation to provide impartial, unbiased advice to the client (the “ABA Report”)[9].

The ABA Report goes on to say that a lawyer with a long-term history of working with a particular funder may have an interest in keeping the funder content which would create a conflict even in the absence of an explicit agreement. The NY RPC, specifically Rule 1.7(a)(2), like the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if “there is significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, property or other interest.” Additionally, Rule 5.4 of the NY RPC, and its analogous provisions in other jurisdictions, requires that a lawyer maintain independence[10].  Consequently, such lawyer, representing a client in a matter for which litigation funding is sought, in general may be able to represent the client with respect to the litigation funding agreement but should disclose the lawyer’s relationship with the funder and receive the client’s informed written consent.

Communication and Confidentiality

Rule 1.4 of the NYRP Conduct requires a lawyer to communicate promptly, and provide complete information, to the client regarding the matter, and to reasonably consult with the client about the means to achieve the client’s objectives.[11]

Reputable litigation funders are usually careful to provide in the litigation finance documents that the funder will not be involved in discussions between the lawyer and client regarding the matter, and that the funder will not direct or control the litigation. In certain circumstances an inexperienced lawyer may consider involving the funder in discussions about case strategy, but caution is in order. If a party other than client and the attorney is involved in communications involving legal issues or the case, the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality of communications is likely breached and the attorney may be guilty of legal malpractice. Indeed, Rule 1.6 of the NYRPC requires that a lawyer not knowingly reveal confidential information, or use that information to the disadvantage of the client or advantage of the lawyer or a third person, subject to certain exceptions.[12]

Conclusion

An attorney who represents a client in a matter that is to be funded pursuant to a litigation funding agreement should consider the ethical implications discussed in this Insight, among others, before representing the client in the funding agreement. Counsel would avoid all of the ethical considerations that may arise by referring the client to an outside attorney experienced in litigation finance.

[1] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.1.  The California Rules of Professional conduct and the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) also make this the number one rule.  Indeed, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted legal ethics rules based at least in part on the MRPC.
[2] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.1, Comment [1].
[3] Available here ABA Comment to Rule 1.1
[4] Report to the President by the New York City Bar Association Working Group on Litigation Funding (February 28, 2020).
[5] Others includes, without limitation champerty, maintenance, barratry, usury and required disclosures.
[6] N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 769 (November 4, 2003).
[7] The State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 2020-204.
[8] Id. At 3.
[9] American Bar Association, Informational Report to the House of Delegates Commission on Ethics 20/20.
[10] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.5.4.
[11] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.4(a).
[12] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.6(a). See also the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 1.6.

Commercial

View All

More Than 100 Companies Sign Letter Urging Third-Party Litigation Funding Disclosure Rule for Federal Courts Ahead of October Judicial Rules Meeting

By Harry Moran |

In the most significant demonstration of concern for secretive third-party litigation funding (TPLF) to date, 124 companies, including industry leaders in healthcare, technology, financial services, insurance, energy, transportation, automotive and other sectors today sent a letter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules urging creation of a new rule that would require a uniform process for the disclosure of TPLF in federal cases nationwide. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules will meet on October 10 and plans to discuss whether to move ahead with the development of a new rule addressing TPLF.

The letter, organized by Lawyers for Civil Justice (LCJ), comes at a time when TPLF has grown into a 15 billion dollar industry and invests funding in an increasing number of cases which, in turn, has triggered a growing number of requests from litigants asking courts to order the disclosure of funding agreements in their cases. The letter contends that courts are responding to these requests with a “variety of approaches and inconsistent practices [that] is creating a fragmented and incoherent procedural landscape in the federal courts.” It states that a rule is “particularly needed to supersede the misplaced reliance on ex parte conversations; ex parte communications are strongly disfavored by the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges because they are both ineffective in educating courts and highly unfair to the parties who are excluded.”

Reflecting the growing concern with undisclosed TPLF and its impact on the justice system, LCJ and the Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) submitted a separate detailed comment letter to the Advisory Committee that also advocates for a “simple and predictable rule for TPLF disclosure.”

Alex Dahl, LCJ’s General Counsel said: “The Advisory Committee should propose a straightforward, uniform rule for TPLF disclosure. Absent such a rule, the continued uncertainty and court-endorsed secrecy of non-party funding will further unfairly skew federal civil litigation. The support from 124 companies reflects both the importance of a uniform disclosure rule and the urgent need for action.”

The corporate letter advances a number of additional reasons why TPLF disclosure is needed in federal courts:

Control: The letter argues that parties “cannot make informed decisions without knowing the stakeholders who control the litigation… and cannot understand the control features of a TPLF agreement without reading the agreement.” While many funding agreements state that the funder does not control the litigation strategy, companies are increasingly concerned that they use their growing financial leverage to exercise improper influence.

Procedural safeguards: The companies maintain that the safeguards embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) cannot work without disclosure of TPLF.  One example is that courts and parties today are largely unaware of and unable to address conflicts between witnesses, the court, and parties on the one hand, and non-parties on the other, when these funding agreements and the financial interests behind them remain largely secret.

Appraisal of the case: Finally, the letter reasons that the FRCP already require the disclosure of corporate insurance policies which the Advisory Committee explained in 1970 “will enable counsel for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and litigation strategy are based on knowledge and not speculation.” The companies maintain that this very same logic should also require the disclosure of TPLF given its growing role and impact on federal civil litigation.

Besides the corporate letter and joint comment, LCJ is intensifying its efforts to rally companies and practitioners to Ask About TPLF in their cases, and to press for a uniform federal rule to require disclosure. LCJ will be launching a new Ask About TPLF website that will serve as a hub for its new campaign later this month.

Read More

Mesh Capital Hires Augusto Delarco to Bolster Litigation Finance Practice

By Harry Moran |

In a post on LinkedIn, Mesh Capital announced the hiring of Augusto Delarco who has joined the Brazilian firm as a Senior Associate, bringing a “solid and distinguished track record in complex litigation and innovative financial solutions” to help develop Mesh Capital’s Litigation Finance and Special Situations practices. 

The announcement highlighted the experience Delarco would bring to the team, noting that throughout his career “he has advised clients, investors, and asset managers on strategic cases and the structuring of investments involving judicial assets.”

Delarco joins Mesh Capital from Padis Mattars Lawyers where he served as an associate lawyer, having previously spent six years at Tepedino, Migliore, Berezowski and Poppa Laywers.

Mesh Capital is based out of São Paulo and specialises in special situations, legal claims and distressed assets. Within litigation finance, Mesh Capital focuses on “the acquisition, sale and structuring of legal claims, covering private, public and court-ordered credit rights.”

Delaware Court Denies Target’s Discovery Request for Funding Documents in Copyright Infringement Case

By Harry Moran |

A recent court opinion in a copyright infringement cases has once again demonstrated that judges are hesitant to force plaintiffs and their funders to hand over information that is not relevant to the claim at hand, as the judge denied the defendant’s discovery request for documents sent by the plaintiff to its litigation funder.

In an article on E-Discovery LLC, Michael Berman analyses a ruling handed down by Judge Stephanos Bibas in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, in the case of Design With Friends, Inc. v. Target Corporation. Design has brought a claim of copyright infringement and breach of contract, and received funding to pursue the case from Validity Finance. As part of its defense, Target had sought documents from the funder relating to its involvement in the case, but Judge Bibas ruled that Target’s request was both “too burdensome to disclose” and was seeking “information that is attorney work product”.

Target’s broad subpoena contained five requests for information including Validity’s valuations of the lawsuit, communications between the funder and plaintiff prior to the funding agreement being signed, and information about the relationship between the two parties.

With regards to the valuations, Judge Bibas wrote that “while those documents informed an investment decision, they did so by evaluating whether a lawsuit had merit and what damages it might recover,” which in the court’s opinion constitutes “legal analysis done for a legal purpose”. He went on to say that “if the work-product doctrine did not protect these records,” then the forced disclosure of these documents “would chill lawyers from discussing a pending case frankly.”

Regarding the requests for information about the relationship between Design and Validity, Judge Bibas was clear in his opinion that these requests were disproportionately burdensome. The opinion lays out clear the clear reasoning that “Target already knows that Validity is funding the suit and that it does not need to approve a settlement”, and with this information already available “Further minutiae about Validity are hardly relevant to whether Target infringed a copyright or breached a contract years before Validity entered the picture.”The full opinion from Judge Bibas can be read here.