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Can defendants avoid or limit their liability through contractual provisions?

The following article was contributed by Valerie Blacker and Jon Na, of Piper Alderman.

Applicants often confront the proposition, which respondents typically use in their defense, that terms in consumer contracts will effectively exclude or restrict the claims that have been brought. The High Court of Australia recently weighed in on this issue, deciding that a mortgage contained an enforceable promise by the borrowers not to raise a statutory limitation defense in relation to a claim by the lenders, which was commenced out of time.

Price v Spoor [2021] HCA 20

In a slight twist to the typical scenario, the lenders were the plaintiffs who brought recovery proceedings after the expiry of the period stipulated in Queensland’s Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The borrowers argued no monies were owed because the claim was well and truly statute barred. Proceedings should have been brought by 2011, but the lender did not file a claim until 2017. In reply, the lender relied on this clause in the contract:

“The Mortgagor covenants with the Mortgage[e] that the provisions of all statutes now or hereafter in force whereby or in consequence whereof any o[r] all of the powers rights and remedies of the Mortgagee and the obligations of the Mortgagor hereunder may be curtailed, suspended, postponed, defeated or extinguished shall not apply hereto and are expressly excluded insofar as this can lawfully be done.”

The effect of which was said to be a promise not to take the limitation point. The lender’s argument failed at first instance (before Dalton J) but was overturned on appeal (by Gotterson JA on behalf of Sofronoff P and Morrison JA) and then ultimately vindicated by the High Court (Kiefel CJ and Edelman J, with whom Gageler, Gordon and Steward JJ agreed).

The public policy principle

Part of their Honours’ reasoning was that what is conferred by a limitations statute is a right on a defendant to plead as a defense the expiry of a limitation period. A party may contract for consideration not to exercise that right, or to waive it, as a defendant. That is not contrary to public policy. This, in our view, is akin to agreements frequently entered between prospective parties to a litigation to toll a limitation period (suspend time running) for an agreed amount of time.

That can be contrasted with a clause in an agreement that imposes a three- year time limit instead of six, for bringing a claim for misleading and deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law.[1] Clauses of that kind are unenforceable based on a well-established principle that such clauses impermissibly seek to restrict a party’s recourse to his or her statutory rights and remedies, contrary to law and public policy.

The “public policy principle” was first identified by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 39 FCR 546. Henjo has been referred to and applied in numerous cases since, and cited with approval in the High Court.[2]

This is not to say that contractual limitations can never be effective in limited circumstances – this much was shown in Price v Spoor. The question of whether commercial parties to a contract can negotiate and agree on temporal or monetary limits while not completely excluding the statutory remedies for misleading and deceptive conduct claims under section 18 of the ACL remains debatable[3]  – but those specific circumstances do not arise here.

About the Authors:

Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman Lawyers for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims. She is responsible for a number of high value, multi-party disputes for the firm’s major clients.

Jon Na is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Jon is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia.

For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Kat Gieras | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  kgieras@piperalderman.com.au

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[1] For example in Brighton Australia Pty Ltd v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 246

[2] For example in IOOF Australia Trustees (NSW) Ltd v Tantipech [1998] FCA 924 at 479-80; Scarborough v Klich [2001] NSWCA 436 at [74]; MBF Investments Pty Ltd v Nolan [2011] VSCA 114 at [217]; JJMR Pty Ltd v LG International Corp [2003] QCA 519 at [10]; JM & PM Holdings Pty Ltd v Snap-on Tools (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 347 at [55]; Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 17 at [143].

[3] For example in G&S Engineering Services Pty Ltd v Mach Energy Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] NSWSC 1721.

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Commercial Regulatory Issues

Burford Capital CEO: Government Inaction on PACCAR is Harming London Market

By Harry Moran |

As we approach the beginning of summer, the litigation funding industry is growing impatient in waiting for the outcome of the Civil Justice Council’s (CJC) review of litigation funding, with funders anxious to see the government provide a solution to the uncertainty created by the Supreme Court’s ruling in PACCAR.

An article in The Law Society Gazette provides an overview of an interview with Christopher Bogart, CEO of Burford Capital; who spoke at length about the ongoing impact of the UK government’s failure to introduce legislation to solve issues created by the PACCAR ruling. Bogart highlighted the key correlation between funders’ reluctance to allocate more capital to the London legal market and “the government non-response” to find a quick and effective solution to PACCAR.

Comparing the similarities in effect of the government inaction over funding legislation to the Trump administration’s tariff policy, Bogart said simply, “markets and businesses don’t like such uncertainty.” He went on to describe the London market as “not as healthy as you would like it to be”, pointing to statistics showing a decrease in capital allocation and the examples of major funders like Therium making job cuts.

One particular pain point that Bogart pointed to was Burford’s newfound hesitancy to name London as an arbitral seat and choose English law for international contracts, saying that the company has moved those contracts to jurisdictions including Singapore, Paris or New York. Bogart said that it was “unfortunate because this is one of the major global centres for litigation and arbitration”, but argued that the strategic jurisdictional shift was a result of having “a less predictable dynamic here in this market”.

As for what Bogart would like to see from the upcoming CJC’s review of litigation funding, the Burford CEO emphasised the longstanding view of the funding industry that there is “no need for a big regulatory apparatus here.” Instead, Bogart suggested that an ideal outcome would be for the CJC to encourage Westminster “to restore a degree of predictability and stability into the market.”

Commercial Deals

Insurance CEO Ceases Trading with Firms Linked to Litigation Finance

By Harry Moran |

The tensions between the insurance industry and litigation finance are well established, with insurance industry groups often at the forefront of lobbying efforts calling for tighter regulations of third-party funding. In one of the most significant examples of this tension, the CEO of a speciality insurance company has declared that his company will cease doing business with any firm that is linked to litigation funding activity.

An article in Insurance Business highlights recent comments made by Andrew Robinson, chairman and CEO of Skyward Specialty Insurance Group, where he said that the company would no longer do business with companies who have any ties to litigation finance. Citing the uptick in the use of third-party funding as one of the primary contributors to social inflation, increasing product costs and reduced availability; Robinson declared that Skyward are “not going to trade with anybody who's involved in this”.

According to the article, Robinson’s decision was triggered by the company’s discovery that an asset manager it worked with was involved in litigation funding. Skyward then “shut off” its business relationship with the asset manager and is in the process of redeeming any remaining assets with the firm. Robinson said that the idea of Skyward having ties to firms involved with litigation finance “is wrong at all levels”, saying that he told his executive leadership team that “we can’t have that anywhere near us”.

Aside from the asset manager, Skyward was trading with a company involved in contingent insurance whose work included litigation finance, but Robinson stated that the unnamed company is reducing its already minor presence in the funding space.

Despite targeting his ire primarily at litigation funding, Robinson suggested that the wider issue stems from a “broken” tort system and that “you have to get to the root cause and toward reform”.  

Commercial Regulatory Issues

Bell Gully Report: New Zealand Courts are “Enablers of Litigation Funding”

By Harry Moran |

Following a 2022 report from New Zealand’s Law Commission, there has been a distinct lack of action by successive governments to introduce a Class Actions Act or any forms of oversight for the use of third-party funding in large group claims.

A new report released by Bell Gully looks at the current state of class actions in New Zealand, examining the rise of large group claims  and the role of litigation funding as a key driver. In ‘The Big Picture: Class Actions’, Bell Gully says that “in the past five years class actions have moved from being a threat on the horizon to a regular feature in New Zealand’s courts”. 

The introduction to the report appears to paint litigation funders as the prime moving force behind this trend, saying that the swell in class actions is “being driven by the availability of third-party litigation funding rather than a groundswell of consumer action.” Identifying the most prominent funders at work in New Zealand, Bell Gully points to LPF Group as the dominant local funder, Omni Bridgeway for its strong market reach from Australia, and Harbour for its global strength across litigation and arbitration funding. 

Without any legislative measures regulating funding and with no established industry association like Australia’s AALF, Bell Gully highlights the courts as the main mechanism of control over funding activity. The report goes further and suggests that “funder-friendly court decisions have contributed to the growing influence of litigation funders in New Zealand”, noting the admission of opt-out class actions and courts’ willingness to make common fund orders.

In its review of the need for a Class Actions Act in New Zealand, Bell Gully argues that the current lack of oversight on funding has led to a situation where the courts are acting as “enablers of litigation funding” rather than regulators of the practice.

The full report can be accessed here.