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Can defendants avoid or limit their liability through contractual provisions?

March 15, 2022

Can defendants avoid or limit their liability through contractual provisions?

The following article was contributed by Valerie Blacker and Jon Na, of Piper Alderman. Applicants often confront the proposition, which respondents typically use in their defense, that terms in consumer contracts will effectively exclude or restrict the claims that have been brought. The High Court of Australia recently weighed in on this issue, deciding that a mortgage contained an enforceable promise by the borrowers not to raise a statutory limitation defense in relation to a claim by the lenders, which was commenced out of time. Price v Spoor [2021] HCA 20 In a slight twist to the typical scenario, the lenders were the plaintiffs who brought recovery proceedings after the expiry of the period stipulated in Queensland’s Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The borrowers argued no monies were owed because the claim was well and truly statute barred. Proceedings should have been brought by 2011, but the lender did not file a claim until 2017. In reply, the lender relied on this clause in the contract: “The Mortgagor covenants with the Mortgage[e] that the provisions of all statutes now or hereafter in force whereby or in consequence whereof any o[r] all of the powers rights and remedies of the Mortgagee and the obligations of the Mortgagor hereunder may be curtailed, suspended, postponed, defeated or extinguished shall not apply hereto and are expressly excluded insofar as this can lawfully be done.” The effect of which was said to be a promise not to take the limitation point. The lender’s argument failed at first instance (before Dalton J) but was overturned on appeal (by Gotterson JA on behalf of Sofronoff P and Morrison JA) and then ultimately vindicated by the High Court (Kiefel CJ and Edelman J, with whom Gageler, Gordon and Steward JJ agreed). The public policy principle Part of their Honours’ reasoning was that what is conferred by a limitations statute is a right on a defendant to plead as a defense the expiry of a limitation period. A party may contract for consideration not to exercise that right, or to waive it, as a defendant. That is not contrary to public policy. This, in our view, is akin to agreements frequently entered between prospective parties to a litigation to toll a limitation period (suspend time running) for an agreed amount of time. That can be contrasted with a clause in an agreement that imposes a three- year time limit instead of six, for bringing a claim for misleading and deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law.[1] Clauses of that kind are unenforceable based on a well-established principle that such clauses impermissibly seek to restrict a party’s recourse to his or her statutory rights and remedies, contrary to law and public policy. The “public policy principle” was first identified by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 39 FCR 546. Henjo has been referred to and applied in numerous cases since, and cited with approval in the High Court.[2] This is not to say that contractual limitations can never be effective in limited circumstances – this much was shown in Price v Spoor. The question of whether commercial parties to a contract can negotiate and agree on temporal or monetary limits while not completely excluding the statutory remedies for misleading and deceptive conduct claims under section 18 of the ACL remains debatable[3]  – but those specific circumstances do not arise here. About the Authors: Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman Lawyers for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims. She is responsible for a number of high value, multi-party disputes for the firm’s major clients. Jon Na is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Jon is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia. For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Kat Gieras | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  kgieras@piperalderman.com.au — [1] For example in Brighton Australia Pty Ltd v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 246 [2] For example in IOOF Australia Trustees (NSW) Ltd v Tantipech [1998] FCA 924 at 479-80; Scarborough v Klich [2001] NSWCA 436 at [74]; MBF Investments Pty Ltd v Nolan [2011] VSCA 114 at [217]; JJMR Pty Ltd v LG International Corp [2003] QCA 519 at [10]; JM & PM Holdings Pty Ltd v Snap-on Tools (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 347 at [55]; Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 17 at [143]. [3] For example in G&S Engineering Services Pty Ltd v Mach Energy Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] NSWSC 1721.

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Litigation Funding Founder Reflects on Building a New Platform

By John Freund |

A new interview offers a candid look at how litigation funding startups are being shaped by founders with deep experience inside the legal system. Speaking from the perspective of a former practicing litigator, Lauren Harrison, founder of Signal Peak Partners, describes how time spent in BigLaw provided a practical foundation for launching and operating a litigation finance business.

An article in Above the Law explains that Harrison views litigation funding as a natural extension of legal advocacy, rather than a purely financial exercise. Having worked closely with clients and trial teams, she argues that understanding litigation pressure points, timelines, and decision making dynamics is critical when evaluating cases for investment. This background allows funders to assess risk more realistically and communicate more effectively with law firms and claimholders.

The interview also touches on the operational realities of starting a litigation funding company from the ground up. Harrison discusses early challenges such as building trust in a competitive market, educating lawyers about non-recourse funding structures, and developing underwriting processes that balance speed with diligence. Transparency around pricing and alignment of incentives emerge as recurring themes, with Harrison emphasizing that long-term relationships matter more than short-term returns.

Another key takeaway is the importance of team composition. While legal expertise is essential, Harrison notes that successful platforms also require strong financial, operational, and compliance capabilities. Blending these skill sets, particularly at an early stage, is presented as one of the more difficult but necessary steps in scaling a sustainable funding business.

Commercial Regulatory Issues

Australian High Court Limits Recovery of Litigation Funding Costs

By John Freund |

The High Court of Australia has delivered a significant decision clarifying the limits of recoverable damages in funded litigation, confirming that claimants cannot recover litigation funding commissions or fees as compensable loss, even where those costs materially reduce the net recovery.

Ashurst reports that the High Court rejected arguments that litigation funding costs should be treated as damages flowing from a defendant’s wrongdoing. The ruling arose from a shareholder class action in which claimants sought to recover the funding commission deducted from their settlement proceeds, contending that the costs were a foreseeable consequence of the underlying misconduct. The court disagreed, holding that litigation funding expenses are properly characterised as the price paid to pursue litigation, rather than loss caused by the defendant.

In reaching its decision, the High Court emphasised the distinction between harm suffered as a result of wrongful conduct and the commercial arrangements a claimant enters into to enforce their rights. While acknowledging that litigation funding is now a common and often necessary feature of large-scale litigation, the court concluded that this reality does not convert funding costs into recoverable damages. Allowing such recovery, the court reasoned, would represent an expansion of damages principles beyond established limits.

The decision provides welcome clarity for defendants facing funded claims, while reinforcing long-standing principles of Australian damages law. At the same time, it confirms that litigation funding costs remain a matter to be borne out of recoveries, subject to court approval regimes and regulatory oversight rather than being shifted onto defendants through damages awards.

Case Developments Commercial

Janus Henderson Affiliates Lose Early Bid in Litigation Finance Dispute

By John Freund |

Janus Henderson Group affiliates have suffered an early procedural setback in a closely watched litigation finance dispute that underscores the internal tensions that can arise within funder-backed investment structures and joint ventures.

Bloomberg Law reports that a Delaware Chancery Court judge has refused to dismiss claims brought by Calumet Capital Partners against several entities linked to Janus Henderson. The ruling allows the case to proceed into discovery, rejecting arguments that the complaint failed to state viable claims. Calumet alleges that the defendants engaged in a concerted effort to undermine a litigation finance joint venture in order to force a buyout of Calumet’s interests on unfavorable terms.

According to the complaint, the dispute centers on governance and control issues within a litigation finance vehicle that was designed to deploy capital into funded legal claims. Calumet contends that Janus Henderson affiliated entities systematically blocked proposed funding deals, interfered with relationships, and restricted the venture’s ability to operate as intended. These actions, Calumet claims, were aimed at depressing the value of its stake and pressuring it into an exit at a steep discount.

The defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that their actions were contractually permitted and that Calumet’s allegations were insufficient to support claims such as breach of contract and tortious interference. The court disagreed at this stage, finding that Calumet had plausibly alleged misconduct that warrants further factual development. While the ruling does not determine the merits of the case, it keeps alive serious allegations about how litigation finance partnerships are managed and unwound when commercial interests diverge.