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Can defendants avoid or limit their liability through contractual provisions?

March 15, 2022

Can defendants avoid or limit their liability through contractual provisions?

The following article was contributed by Valerie Blacker and Jon Na, of Piper Alderman. Applicants often confront the proposition, which respondents typically use in their defense, that terms in consumer contracts will effectively exclude or restrict the claims that have been brought. The High Court of Australia recently weighed in on this issue, deciding that a mortgage contained an enforceable promise by the borrowers not to raise a statutory limitation defense in relation to a claim by the lenders, which was commenced out of time. Price v Spoor [2021] HCA 20 In a slight twist to the typical scenario, the lenders were the plaintiffs who brought recovery proceedings after the expiry of the period stipulated in Queensland’s Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The borrowers argued no monies were owed because the claim was well and truly statute barred. Proceedings should have been brought by 2011, but the lender did not file a claim until 2017. In reply, the lender relied on this clause in the contract: “The Mortgagor covenants with the Mortgage[e] that the provisions of all statutes now or hereafter in force whereby or in consequence whereof any o[r] all of the powers rights and remedies of the Mortgagee and the obligations of the Mortgagor hereunder may be curtailed, suspended, postponed, defeated or extinguished shall not apply hereto and are expressly excluded insofar as this can lawfully be done.” The effect of which was said to be a promise not to take the limitation point. The lender’s argument failed at first instance (before Dalton J) but was overturned on appeal (by Gotterson JA on behalf of Sofronoff P and Morrison JA) and then ultimately vindicated by the High Court (Kiefel CJ and Edelman J, with whom Gageler, Gordon and Steward JJ agreed). The public policy principle Part of their Honours’ reasoning was that what is conferred by a limitations statute is a right on a defendant to plead as a defense the expiry of a limitation period. A party may contract for consideration not to exercise that right, or to waive it, as a defendant. That is not contrary to public policy. This, in our view, is akin to agreements frequently entered between prospective parties to a litigation to toll a limitation period (suspend time running) for an agreed amount of time. That can be contrasted with a clause in an agreement that imposes a three- year time limit instead of six, for bringing a claim for misleading and deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law.[1] Clauses of that kind are unenforceable based on a well-established principle that such clauses impermissibly seek to restrict a party’s recourse to his or her statutory rights and remedies, contrary to law and public policy. The “public policy principle” was first identified by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (No 1) (1988) 39 FCR 546. Henjo has been referred to and applied in numerous cases since, and cited with approval in the High Court.[2] This is not to say that contractual limitations can never be effective in limited circumstances – this much was shown in Price v Spoor. The question of whether commercial parties to a contract can negotiate and agree on temporal or monetary limits while not completely excluding the statutory remedies for misleading and deceptive conduct claims under section 18 of the ACL remains debatable[3]  – but those specific circumstances do not arise here. About the Authors: Valerie Blacker is a commercial litigator focusing on funded litigation. Valerie has been with Piper Alderman Lawyers for over 12 years. With a background in class actions, Valerie also prosecutes funded commercial litigation claims. She is responsible for a number of high value, multi-party disputes for the firm’s major clients. Jon Na is a litigation and dispute resolution lawyer at Piper Alderman with a primary focus on corporate and commercial disputes. Jon is involved in a number of large, complex matters in jurisdictions across Australia. For queries or comments in relation to this article please contact Kat Gieras | T: +61 7 3220 7765 | E:  kgieras@piperalderman.com.au — [1] For example in Brighton Australia Pty Ltd v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 246 [2] For example in IOOF Australia Trustees (NSW) Ltd v Tantipech [1998] FCA 924 at 479-80; Scarborough v Klich [2001] NSWCA 436 at [74]; MBF Investments Pty Ltd v Nolan [2011] VSCA 114 at [217]; JJMR Pty Ltd v LG International Corp [2003] QCA 519 at [10]; JM & PM Holdings Pty Ltd v Snap-on Tools (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 347 at [55]; Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 17 at [143]. [3] For example in G&S Engineering Services Pty Ltd v Mach Energy Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] NSWSC 1721.
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Commercial Deals

Yield Bridge Asset Management Launches into Litigation Finance

By John Freund |

The London‑based asset manager Yield Bridge Asset Management (Yield Bridge) has announced its entry into the litigation financing arena, marking a strategic shift into the private‑credit sector of the legal‑funding landscape.

According to a press release in OpenPR, Yield Bridge has entered into several strategic partnerships in the international arbitration space, granting the firm ongoing access to “vetted, insurance‑wrapped Litigation and Private Credit asset programs.”

In detailing the strategy, Yield Bridge highlights litigation finance as a rapidly growing asset class. The release states that high costs in international arbitration often create an uneven battlefield—where financial strength outweighs merits. Litigation funding, the firm argues, offers a counterbalance. It points to “Litigation Finance Bonds” as their preferred investment vehicle—emphasizing 100% capital protection, attractive yields, and short-duration liquidity windows for accredited investors. The firm claims to target structured portfolios of multiple claims (versus single-case investments) to diversify risk and leverage economies of scale. Cases “displaying pre‑determined characteristics and a potential 8–10× multiple” are cited as typical targets.

Yield Bridge positions itself as a “leading international financial services intermediary … bringing together multi‑asset expertise with targeted investment propositions.” While the announcement is light on detailed track record or specific claim‑portfolios, the firm is formally signalling its ambitions in the litigation finance space.

Yield Bridge’s pivot underscores a broader trend: litigation finance moving deeper into structured, institutional‑grade private‑credit models. By packaging multiple claims and targeting returns familiar in alternative‑credit strategies, firms like Yield Bridge are raising the bar—and potentially the competition—for players in the legal‑funding ecosystem. This development raises questions about how deal flow will scale, how returns will be verified, and how risk will be managed in portfolio‑based litigation funding.

Case Developments Commercial

Home Office-Funded Class Action Against Motorola Gets Green Light

By John Freund |

In a significant development for UK collective actions, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has granted a Collective Proceedings Order (CPO) in the landmark case Spottiswoode v Airwave Solutions & Motorola. The case—brought by Clare Spottiswoode CBE—accuses Motorola of abusing its dominant position in the UK's emergency services network by charging excessive prices through its Airwave network, which the Home Office claims resulted in £1.1 billion in overcharges to UK taxpayers.

According to iclg, the class action is being funded by the UK Home Office itself, which is also the complainant in an associated CMA enforcement action. In its judgment, the CAT concluded that Spottiswoode is an appropriate class representative, and that the claim—which covers a proposed class of over 100,000 public service bodies—is suitable for collective proceedings. The case will proceed on an opt-out basis for UK entities, with opt-in available for overseas claimants.

The Tribunal emphasized that funding by a government department does not compromise the independence of the class representative, and that the Home Office’s funding arrangement complies with legal and procedural requirements. Notably, the judgment paves the way for governmental entities to play a dual role—as both complainant and funder—in future competition-based collective actions.

This case raises fascinating implications for the legal funding industry. It challenges traditional notions of third-party funders and opens the door to more creative and strategic funding models initiated by government entities themselves, particularly in cases with broad public interest and regulatory overlap.

Commercial Deals

Investors Eye Equity Stakes in Law Firms via Arizona ABS Model

By John Freund |

A notable shift is underway in the legal‑services world as institutional investors increasingly direct capital toward law‑firm ownership—particularly via the alternative business structure (ABS) model in Arizona.

According to a recent article in Bloomberg, large asset managers and venture‑capital firms are positioning themselves to participate in legal‑services revenues in a way that diverges from traditional contingent‑fee funding of lawsuits. The piece identifies heavy hitters such as Benefit Street Partners and Crossbeam Venture Partners as recent entrants into the ABS‑enabled law‑firm ownership space. Benefit Street’s application for a new Arizona law‑firm entity lists tort litigation, IP claims and bankruptcy matters as focal areas.

The ABS pathway in Arizona has grown rapidly. In 2021, the state approved 15 ABS licences; by 2024, that number rose to 51, bringing the overall total to approximately 153. The regulatory flexibility in Arizona contrasts with the majority of U.S. jurisdictions, where non‑lawyer ownership of law firms remains prohibited or severely constrained. Meanwhile, states such as California have reacted by imposing restrictions—e.g., California's recent ban on contingency‑fee sharing with out‑of‑state ABS models.

For the legal‑funding and law‑firm investment ecosystem, this development carries multiple implications. First, it signals that investors view law‑firm ownership as a viable risk‑adjusted investment category beyond pure litigation funding. Second, it raises governance and regulatory questions around outside ownership of law firms, especially as the lines blur between funders, back‑office providers and equity owners. Finally, firms, funders and law‑firm owners may need to reassess their strategies and compliance frameworks in light of the shifting landscape of capital entry and structural innovation.