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A Radical Idea: What if We Restructured the Insurance Industry for the Public Good?

By Reid Zeising |

A Radical Idea: What if We Restructured the Insurance Industry for the Public Good?

The following was contributed by Reid Zeising, CEO & founder of Gain.

Health insurance and third-party liability insurance are public goods, yet the insurance industry is structured on a for-profit model, which focuses on increased profits and shareholder returns, often over the needs and welfare of policyholders and claimants. Today’s largest insurers, especially third-party liability carriers, reap over $100 billion in annual profits, [1] while premiums and costs are on the rise for those depending on the policies that they issue for their financial protection. The insurance industry has a moral responsibility and a duty as a corporate citizen to prioritize its policyholders and claimants. By transitioning to a public utility model, the industry can refocus its priorities without jeopardizing liability carrier’s needs to cover operating costs and pay shareholder returns. By thinking like – and actually being – a public utility, insurers can fulfill their duties as a provider of an essential public good without imperiling their own financial health.

Transitioning to a Public Utility Model

The insurance industry predominantly operates on a for-profit model, emphasizing profit maximization[2] and shareholder returns.[3] This model, however, often neglects the welfare of policyholders and claimants.[4] It also does not reflect the reality that health insurance and third-party liability insurance are public goods. A public good is a benefit or service that should be available to all citizens and that ultimately contributes to the wellbeing of society as a whole.[5] One proven and effective model for delivering public goods is the public utility company, which is privately owned by investors, but committed to the provision of public good. A public utility company oversees essential services, ensuring their accessibility, reliability, and affordability.[6] By restructuring third-party liability carriers along these lines, we can elevate the role of insurance carriers from profit-centric entities to institutions focused on consumer welfare.[7] Similar to utilities, carriers could receive a fixed, reasonable return,[8] enabling investments in increased technology and efficiencies and sustainability while preventing the accumulation of excessive profits at the expense of policyholders.

Benefits of the Public Utility Model

Enhanced Payouts: Transforming the current model would necessitate that carriers pay out all remaining premiums to claimants, after covering operational costs, guaranteed returns and dividends. This fundamental change would translate to increased payouts for claimants, alleviating their financial burden and ensuring adequate compensation. This contrasts with the present situation, where substantial portions of premiums are often reserved for investments and increased profit margins, limiting the resources allocated to claimants. The Affordable Care Act sought to cap profits by mandating that health insurance companies could spend no more than 20 percent of revenue from premiums on administrative costs, marketing, and profits. However, insurers have skirted these rules by increasing overall costs and raising premiums, boosting revenues.[9] Therefore, further reform, along the lines proposed here, is needed.

Industry Shift to Public Good: By orienting the industry towards the welfare of policyholders and the larger community, we can establish a new standard of corporate responsibility within insurance carriers. This alteration fosters a climate where the pursuit of public good[10] becomes inherent, eclipsing the erstwhile emphasis on profit maximization. Under this paradigm, carriers become stewards of societal welfare and financial responsibility, ensuring equitable distribution of resources and safeguarding policyholder interests.[11]

Policyholder Centric: In this reimagined model, policyholders would be the primary beneficiaries, receiving enhanced protections and services. This framework mandates a focus on policyholder needs and aspirations, catalyzing the development of consumer-centric policies and practices. Additionally, the compulsory dividend payouts would ensure that policyholders receive tangible, financial benefits, contributing to economic stability and welfare.

A More Equitable Economy: The proposed transition has profound economic implications, marking a departure from purely capitalistic orientations to a more balanced, equitable economic structure. The substantial increase in payouts would stimulate consumer spending and economic activity, while the emphasis on public good would promote social cohesion and mutual responsibility. Moreover, this shift would mitigate the socioeconomic disparities[12] emanating from the current profit-driven model, fostering a more inclusive and equitable economic environment.

Redefining the Insurance Industry

The transformation of the insurance industry — particularly third-party liability carriers – into a public utility model is a radical yet necessary step towards creating an equitable and consumer-oriented industry. By guaranteeing returns and mandating the allocation of remaining premiums to claimants, we can ensure the industry serves the public good and prioritizes policyholder welfare. This transition is not merely a structural adjustment; it symbolizes a philosophical shift, redefining the purpose and responsibilities of insurance carriers in a way that recognizes that third-party liability insurance carriers are essential public goods. This revolutionary approach promises increased payouts, enhanced policyholder benefits, and a collective pursuit of societal well-being. The pivot from a profit-centric paradigm to a model centered on public welfare, where the interests of consumers are placed above unchecked profit accrual. In the long term, this alteration can be a catalyst for more claims being paid and funds being utilized for the purposes they were intended.  Insurance is in place to reimburse those who have suffered through no fault of their own, and a utility model can assure that more monies are paid to consumers and less goes into the coffers of companies beyond what is needed to service these portfolios.


[1] “Visualizing the 50 Most Profitable Insurance Companies in the U.S.,” HowMuch.net, https://howmuch.net/articles/top-50-most-profitable-us-insurance-companies-2020. Data is based on Fortune 500 listings.

[2] Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Insurance policy: How an industry shifted from protecting patients to seeking profit,” Stanford Medicine Magazine, May 19, 2017, https://stanmed.stanford.edu/how-health-insurance-changed-from-protecting-patients-to-seeking-profit/.

[3] Nathalia Bellizia, Davide Corradi, and Jürgen Bohrmann, “Profitable Growth Is King: The 2022 Insurance Value Creators Report,” Boston Consulting Group, September 2, 2022, https://www.bcg.com/publications/2022/insurance-total-stakeholder-return-value-creation-report/.

[4] Rosenthal, “Insurance policy.”

[5] National Consumer Law Center, Access to Utility Service, 6th ed. 2018, 1.1.5, www.nclc.org/library; Jason Fernando, “What Are Public Goods? Definition, How They Work, and Example,” Investopedia, March 20, 2022, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/public-good.asp.

[6] David E. McNabb, “Chapter 1: Public utilities: essential services, critical infrastructure,” in Social and Political Science 2016, October 28, 2016, 3-18, Elgar Online, https://www.elgaronline.com/display/9781785365522/chapter01.xhtml.

[7] Jonathan D. Washko, “It’s Time to Resurrect the Public Utility Model Concept–But This Time for Healthcare,” Journal of Emergency Medical Services, October 18, 2017, https://www.jems.com/news/it-s-time-to-resurrect-the-public-utility-model-concept-but-also-for-healthcare-this-time/.

[8] McNabb, “Chapter 1: Public utilities: essential services, critical infrastructure.”

[9] Marshall Allen, “Why Your Health Insurer Doesn’t Care About Your Big Bills,” NPR, May 25, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/05/25/613685732/why-your-health-insurer-doesnt-care-about-your-big-bills.

[10] Samuel S. Flint, “Public Goods, Public Utilities, and the Public’s Health,” Health & Social Work, Volume 36, Issue 1, February 2011, 75–77, https://academic.oup.com/hsw/article-abstract/36/1/75/659133?redirectedFrom=PDF.

[11] Carter Dredge and Stefan Scholtes, “The Health Care Utility Model: A Novel Approach to Doing Business,” NEJM Catalyst, July 8, 2021, https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/CAT.21.0189.

[12] Samuel L. Dickman, David U. Himmelstein, and Steffie Woolhandler, “Inequality and the health-care system in the USA,” America: Equity and Equality in Health 1, The Lancet, April 8, 2017, Volume 389, 1431-1441, https://www.thelancet.com/pb/assets/raw/Lancet/pdfs/US-equity-and-equality-in-health-1491475717627.pdf.

About the author

Reid Zeising

Reid Zeising

Commercial

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Omni Bridgeway Posts Record Q3 FY26 Pipeline as A$391 Million in New Commitments Drives 2.5x Returns

By John Freund |

Omni Bridgeway has reported its Q3 FY26 portfolio update, headlined by an exclusive term sheet pipeline of more than A$600 million — roughly twice the firm's average quarterly pipeline — alongside A$391.8 million in new commitments contracted across 27 investments year-to-date. The Sydney-listed funder, which manages A$5.5 billion in assets across ten funds and operates from more than 20 offices in 15 countries, framed the update as a sign of accelerating deployment and capital formation.

According to GlobeNewswire, the firm has recorded 59 full and partial completions year-to-date, generating A$268.4 million in cash investment proceeds at a 2.5x multiple on invested capital and a 108% fair value conversion ratio. Operating expenses of A$51.2 million remain on track to land below the firm's A$80 million FY26 budget, while management fees of A$27 million are tracking toward an upgraded A$35 million full-year target.

On the capital side, Omni Bridgeway said the full and final close of Funds 4/5 Series II remains on track for FY26, and that more than A$150 million in additional sidecar and overflow capital structures are at advanced diligence stages. The combination of an unusually deep pipeline, strong realizations, and disciplined cost performance positions the funder to defend its narrative of platform scale at a moment when listed peers are under pressure on both fundraising and case-realization timelines.

Jonathan Sablone Launches Sablone Advisory LLC, a Boutique Law and Advisory Firm Focused on Litigation Finance

By John Freund |

Jonathan Sablone, a commercial disputes attorney with three decades of cross-border, financial services, and litigation finance experience, has launched Sablone Advisory LLC — a Boston-based boutique positioned to serve claimants, funders, and insurers across the legal finance ecosystem under the tagline "at the intersection of law and finance™."

According to Sablone Advisory LLC, the new firm offers underwriting, diligence, monitoring, and asset management services to litigation funders and to insurers offering contingent risk products. On the claimant side, Sablone Advisory works with plaintiffs and their counsel to position cases for funding, including packaging case portfolios for cross-collateralized funding and insurance wrappers — services that have become increasingly central as funders and insurers structure deals across multiple matters and risk layers.

"I founded Sablone Advisory to assist clients with the most intractable problems and issues facing the legal finance industry," said Sablone in announcing the launch. "'At the intersection of law and finance' is not just a slogan, but a practical, commercial approach to legal problem-solving that I have practiced for decades."

The launch reflects a continuing trend in the litigation finance industry: senior practitioners with capital-markets and complex-litigation backgrounds spinning out of large institutional platforms to offer specialized, independent advisory and underwriting services. As funders increasingly structure portfolio-level deals, layer ATE and contingent risk insurance into capital stacks, and pursue cross-border recoveries, demand for senior independent diligence and asset management — particularly from professionals fluent in both legal strategy and structured finance — has grown.

For claimants and their counsel, the firm's case-positioning services are likely to resonate in a market where funders are increasingly selective about case quality, structure, and counsel pedigree. For funders and insurers, an independent boutique offering monitoring and asset management — separate from origination — represents the kind of service-provider infrastructure that more mature alternative-asset markets typically develop as they scale.

Inquiries can be directed to Jonathan Sablone at jsablone@sabloneadvisory.com or via www.sabloneadvisory.com.

Colorado HB 1421 Targets PE and Non-Attorney Funding of Law Firms in Bipartisan Push

By John Freund |

Colorado lawmakers have introduced HB 1421, a bill that would sharply restrict the ability of state law firms to enter financial or contractual arrangements with alternative business structures (ABS) and any entity in which non-attorneys hold ownership stakes or exert direction over legal practice. The bill is notable both for the reach of its restrictions and for the unusual coalition behind it.

As reported by The Sum and Substance, the legislation is sponsored by Democratic Rep. Javier Mabrey of Denver and Republican House Minority Leader Jarvis Caldwell of Monument, with active support from the Colorado Chamber of Commerce and the Colorado Trial Lawyers Association — typically opposing forces in business-litigation policy debates. The bill was scheduled for its first hearing before the House Judiciary Committee on April 29.

HB 1421 would prohibit Colorado law firms from entering arrangements with ABS-style structures relating to legal services, practicing in professional companies where non-lawyers own interests or direct lawyer judgment, or compensating any party where compensation depends on a percentage of legal fees or case recoveries. The bill would also empower courts to halt offending arrangements, order fee reimbursement to clients, and disgorge ABS profits derived from prohibited activities. The article specifically references Burford Capital's litigation funding presence in framing the bill's broader policy concern with non-lawyer financial stakes in legal outcomes.

The legislation lands at a moment when private equity ownership of legal services is expanding rapidly in jurisdictions that permit it — Arizona, Utah, and the District of Columbia — and where PE-backed national platforms are increasingly partnering with firms in non-ABS jurisdictions to extend their operating reach. The Colorado bill, if enacted, would cut against that expansion model by restricting how Colorado firms can collaborate with out-of-state, non-attorney-owned platforms.

For the litigation finance community, the bill is a meaningful data point. Although disclosure-based reform has dominated state-level TPLF debate in 2025-26, HB 1421 reflects a parallel and somewhat different policy thrust: not transparency about funding, but structural limits on the ownership and economic relationships that surround legal practice. The convergence of plaintiffs' bar and chamber-of-commerce support behind a single bill is itself rare, and may presage similar coalitions in other non-ABS states facing PE-driven consolidation pressure.