Capitol Hill is again zeroing in on litigation finance. During a House Judiciary Sub-committee hearing on “foreign abuse of U.S. courts,” Chair Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA) revived his Litigation Transparency Act of 2025, which would mandate public disclosure of any outside funding in federal civil suits, along with the identity of the backer and the terms of the agreement.

An article in Bloomberg Law notes that Issa framed disclosure as a fairness measure—defendants already turn over insurance information—while hinting that opaque funding may enable “legal warfare” by foreign adversaries. The hearing featured witnesses from the insurance lobby and national-security analysts who linked anonymous capital flows to social-inflation pressures and geopolitical risk.

Although prior attempts at federal transparency rules have stalled, Issa’s bill dovetails with a parallel Senate push and a patchwork of state-level disclosure mandates. Funders argue that blanket reporting would chill investment and expose proprietary strategy; critics counter that sunlight would deter foreign influence and forum shopping. Sub-committee members floated amendments ranging from confidential in-camera filings to a PACER-style public registry.

For litigation financiers, the renewed spotlight could herald a regulatory inflection point: a narrowly tailored disclosure regime might boost legitimacy, but broad public filings could drive capital offshore or into other investment types altogether. Either way, today’s hearing signals that Washington’s debate over balancing access-to-justice benefits with transparency and national-security concerns is far from settled.

A new report catalogues how marquee investments in the £58 million Post Office settlement and the still-pending $15 billion Sabah arbitration have delivered thinner-than-advertised returns for Therium Capital. Add in 2023’s PACCAR ruling, which re-classified many funding contracts as damages-based agreements and capped recoveries, and the firm’s prospects look increasingly fragile.

An article in Boracay Island News recounts how Therium has scaled back new underwriting, shifted several legacy portfolios to Fortress Investment Group, and is now fighting to salvage returns in Therium v Bugsby—a test case on whether “DBA-style” clauses can simply be severed from legacy deals.

The piece underscores three structural stresses: concentration risk when outsized single matters dominate a fund; regulatory uncertainty post-PACCAR; and the reputational hit when claimant recoveries prove modest once funder multiples and lawyer fees are paid. Industry observers worry that if “grand-slam” cases continue to disappoint, limited-partner appetite for blind-pool capital could tighten, forcing funders to rely more heavily on secondary markets or bespoke co-invests.

For the wider legal-funding ecosystem the story is a sobering reminder: transparency, portfolio diversification, and realistic pricing will be increasingly important in a world of tougher judicial scrutiny and return caps.

Third-party funders are once again in the cross-hairs—and one of the sector’s elder statesmen is firing back. In a forthright essay published today, Calunius Capital chairman Leslie Perrin argues that Britain’s collective redress regime “cannot survive” if fresh assaults on funder fees succeed.

In an article in Solicitors Journal, Perrin points to two flashpoints: the UK Supreme Court’s 2023 PACCAR ruling, which invalidated percentage-based funding agreements, and a new bid in Neill v Sony to outlaw multiples-based returns as well. At the same time, the Competition Appeal Tribunal is facing a judicial-review challenge from funder Innsworth over its decision to slash the funder’s recovery in the landmark £200 million Merricks v Mastercard settlement—an intervention Perrin calls “dangerously simplistic.”

Perrin’s broader thesis is that without well-capitalised funders prepared to shoulder adverse-costs risk, consumers will be left “stranded” against well-resourced corporate defendants and the CAT’s promise of affordable group litigation will wither. Perrin also takes aim at lobbying by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which he says seeks to “promote opposition to litigation funding” under the guise of economic prudence. In place of curbs, he backs the Civil Justice Council’s recommendation for legislation reversing PACCAR retrospectively and prospectively.

If Westminster heeds those warnings, UK funders could regain certainty and renew their commitment to competition-class actions. But if further fee-caps or invalidations emerge, capital will flee to jurisdictions with clearer rules—leaving an access-to-justice gap just as collective-action appetite is peaking. Whether Innsworth’s challenge succeeds may therefore set the tone for the next chapter of UK litigation finance.

Alarm bells over the economic cost of UK class actions are “simply wrong,” says Anthony Maton, global co-chair of claimant firm Hausfeld, who dismantles a think-tank report suggesting mass litigation could sap £18 billion from the economy.

In The Global Legal Post, Maton traces the deliberate parliamentary design behind the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the CAT’s rigorous gatekeeping of collective proceedings. He argues that funders—often caricatured as “ambulance chasers”—perform an essential market-correction role, underwriting meritorious competition claims that regulators or individual consumers lack resources to pursue. The piece notes that voluntary redress schemes built into the Act “have been used precisely zero times,” reinforcing the need for well-financed private enforcement.

Maton also rebuts suggestions that funders extract disproportionate value, pointing to oversight mechanisms and adverse-costs exposure that align investor and claimant interests. He invites sceptics to consider whether ill-gotten profits are better left with infringing corporates or redistributed to harmed consumers and access-to-justice charities.

The commentary offers a timely counter-narrative as Westminster considers PACCAR-related reforms. By reframing funders as pillars of a competitive economy rather than rent-seekers, it may bolster lobbying for statutory clarity on LFAs and head off calls for US-style disclosure mandates. Expect industry groups to amplify this message—and for critics to sharpen economic-impact modeling—in the run-up to any government consultation.

A critical procedural milestone has been set in the high-profile dispute over the $15 billion arbitral award claimed by the heirs of the defunct Sulu sultanate against Malaysia. A Paris court has scheduled a hearing for December 9, where it will decide whether to annul the partial award issued by a Spanish arbitrator—a decision with potentially far-reaching implications for the legitimacy of third-party funded arbitration in sovereign disputes.

As reported by The Malaysian Reserve, the case stems from a 2022 ruling which found Malaysia liable for ceasing annual payments related to a 19th-century lease of territory now part of Sabah. The award has been described as one of the largest in arbitration history and is backed by Therium, a UK-based litigation funder. Malaysia has consistently challenged the legitimacy of the proceedings, resulting in conflicting decisions in courts across Spain, France, and Luxembourg.

The upcoming Paris ruling will not address the full $15 billion award but rather the validity of the partial award that formed the foundation for the final judgment. Malaysia’s legal representatives argue that the arbitration itself is void, citing breaches in due process and the arbitrator's alleged overreach.

The Sulu case has become a lightning rod in debates over state immunity, the enforceability of investor-state arbitration, and the role of third-party funders in politically sensitive disputes. As funders continue to back complex claims against sovereign states, the Paris court’s decision may set a significant precedent for the enforceability—and reversibility—of arbitral awards financed by external capital.

Omni Bridgeway is pushing the boundaries of legal finance with a newly detailed strategy to monetise complex non-performing loan (NPL) portfolios—particularly those stuck in regulatory limbo under IFRS 9. The funder’s latest blog outlines a first-of-its-kind securitisation in Morocco where Omni both bought a bank’s Stage-3 loans and assumed recovery management, creating what it calls a “regulatory-compliant exit” for lenders weighed down by lifetime expected-credit-loss charges.

An article on Omni Bridgeway's website explains that the initiative forms part of the firm’s Distressed Asset Recovery Program, led by Marijn Flinterman. Key features include contingent pricing so banks keep upside, co-investment structures, and cross-border enforcement to chase obligors’ assets. The piece highlights how the model can dovetail with EU prudential back-stops, the UAE’s five-year default rules, and nascent African secondary-debt markets, positioning Omni as both capital provider and workout specialist.

For legal funders, the pivot shows a maturing asset class moving beyond one-off claims into portfolio-level credit solutions that compete with private-equity special-situations desks. If successful, other funders may replicate the strategy, blurring lines between litigation finance, debt-trading and structured credit.

The four-year fight over New Zealand banks’ historic credit-law breaches has taken another twist, with plaintiffs proposing a NZ $306-309 million (US $184m) settlement that ANZ and ASB immediately branded a “stunt.” The offer comes as Wellington lawmakers fast-track amendments to the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act that could retroactively blunt liability for disclosure failures dating back to 2015.

An article in 1News notes that the 150,000-member class is jointly funded by Australia-based CASL and home-grown LPF Group, both entitled to a slice of any recovery. The banks fired back before Parliament’s Finance & Expenditure Committee, warning that the “windfall-driven” funders are exploiting regulatory loopholes while overstating consumer harm. Funders argue the legislative patch would hand banks a “free pass”—and jeopardise redress for borrowers already overcharged NZ $43 million in interest and fees. Officials estimate that failure to close the loophole could expose the industry to NZ $13 billion in follow-on claims.

Whether the proposed deal survives, the episode underscores two global trends: funders stepping into consumer-finance class actions once considered uneconomical, and defendants leveraging political capital to contain funded litigation. For the industry, Wellington is a bell-weather: if lawmakers either eviscerate or enshrine funded collective actions, other small markets may follow.

An opt-out competition settlement in the UK has hit an unusual snag: what to do with almost £10M in unclaimed passenger damages?

An article in Legal Futures recounts that the Competition Appeal Tribunal has invited submissions from claimant firm Charles Lyndon, litigation funder Woodsford, ATE insurers and the Access to Justice Foundation after fewer than one percent of eligible rail travellers filed claims against Stagecoach South West Trains. The 2024 deal ring-fenced £4.75M for costs up-front and allowed the class representative, consumer campaigner Justin Gutmann, to ask the Tribunal to re-allocate any leftover pot.

With the September entitlement hearing looming, Charles Lyndon is urging a £5–6M donation to the justice charity, while Woodsford argues its non-recourse investment entitles it to more of the residue. The CAT signaled it will weigh whether the outcome “predominantly” benefits stakeholders rather than class members—a pointed reminder that third-party funding returns remain subject to public-interest scrutiny even post-settlement.

Although smaller in dollar terms than the mammoth interchange-fee litigation, the dispute underscores funders’ growing role in allocation fights once the merits are resolved. How the CAT balances cost recovery and funder profit could set an influential template for other UK collective actions—especially as new rules and the PACCAR fallout push funders toward multiple-based fee structures with capped upside.