As third-party litigation finance scales across commercial disputes, courts and policymakers are weighing whether—and how—to require disclosure of funding arrangements.

An article in Bloomberg Law News states that proponents argue that targeted transparency can illuminate potential conflicts, clarify control over litigation decisions, and help judges manage complex dockets without chilling meritorious claims. Opponents warn that blanket disclosure risks revealing strategy, upending privilege, and inviting harassment of funded plaintiffs. The debate, once theoretical, is increasingly practical as capital providers back high-stakes cases, class actions, and MDLs, and as a patchwork of local rules and standing orders nudges the industry toward more consistent practices.

Litigation funding’s growing influence on case dynamics warrants a disclosure rule, emphasizing that transparency can bolster fairness and the integrity of proceedings. The piece notes recurring flashpoints: who controls settlement decisions, whether funders exert improper influence, how agreements intersect with privilege and work product, and what conflicts might arise for counsel or class representatives. It outlines possible frameworks, from limited, court-facing disclosures at filing to in camera review of funding agreements and sworn certifications about control, veto rights, and fee waterfalls. According to the article, calibrated disclosure—rather than broad, party-to-party exposure—could give judges essential visibility while minimizing competitive harm and discouraging fishing expeditions.

If proposals coalesce around narrow, court-directed disclosures, more districts could codify consistent requirements, reducing uncertainty for funders and litigants. Fund managers may respond by standardizing governance, conflict checks, and documentation to support certifications on control and settlement authority.

For complex litigation—especially MDLs and class actions—measured transparency could improve case management and reduce satellite disputes, while preserving confidentiality that enables financing to continue filling access-to-justice gaps.

The Minister for Justice in Ireland has expressed serious reservations about introducing third‑party litigation funding. Speaking at a dispute resolution conference hosted by Mason Hayes & Curran, Jim O’Callaghan emphasized his concern about “commodifying justice” and his reluctance to see lawyers as the principal beneficiaries of funding regimes. He pledged to review the forthcoming report from the Law Reform Commission (LRC) before making any decisions.

An article in Law Society Gazette reports that under current Irish law, third-party litigation funding by parties without a legitimate interest in the dispute is prohibited, though exceptions exist. O’Callaghan acknowledged the potential access‑to‑justice benefits of such funding, but warned that in practice the “big winners” tend to be lawyers. He stated, “I have no interest, in my role as Minister for Justice, in enriching lawyers.”

During the same panel, barrister Emily Egan McGrath SC noted that Irish courts have expressed growing frustration at the absence of legislative reform and have sometimes stretched existing exceptions—for example, in Campbell v O'Doherty, where the High Court rejected a challenge linked to crowdfunding. The panel also discussed evolving developments under EU law—such as the Representative Actions Directive—which may force Ireland’s hand. But speakers cautioned that the high costs of mass actions might discourage parties without funding support.

MHC partner Colin Monaghan observed heightened wariness in the UK about unregulated litigation funders, while Rory Kirrane SC warned of internal conflicts between funders and claimants over litigation proceeds. The panel speculated that any regulatory framework should fall under existing bodies (such as the Central Bank or CCPC) instead of creating a new oversight agency. Former Chief Justice Frank Clarke, president of the LRC, endorsed reform as essential—but insisted it must be accompanied by rigorous regulation.

O’Callaghan’s expressed reluctance signals that any move toward regulated third‑party funding in Ireland will face political and institutional resistance. For the legal funding industry, this cautious posture underscores the importance of demonstrating safeguards, transparency, and proportionality if funding models are to gain traction in conservative jurisdictions.

A litigation funder is driving lawsuits against prediction market platform Kalshi Inc. in six states, using an 18th‑century gambling law in a bid to claw back losses from predictions gone wrong.

An article in Bloomberg Law describes how Veridis Management LLC and its CEO, Maximillian Amster, are behind entities filing suits in Ohio, Kentucky, Illinois, South Carolina, Massachusetts and Georgia. The lawsuits invoke state versions of the anti‑illegal gambling “Statute of Anne,” which allows losing parties to sue winners for losses plus fees.

The targeted suits allege that Kalshi—which operates as a platform for trading event contracts—is facilitating illegal, unregulated wagering and violating both state and federal law. The complaint includes examples such as bets on NBA championship scores and whether Gavin Newsom becomes the Democratic nominee in 2028.

The plaintiffs also name Robinhood and Webull, platforms that host Kalshi’s contracts, as defendants. While Kalshi declined to comment, the article notes that Kalshi’s status as a designated contract market under the CFTC is central to the legal conflict: that designation shields it from state gambling regulation, but its boundaries are under scrutiny. A U.S. court has already weighed in, ruling that prediction of a political election does not qualify as “gaming” under the Commodity Exchange Act.

Veridis is portrayed as a specialist in complex litigation and regulatory claims, investing in high‑stakes, nonrecourse cases. Amster, formerly in real estate and private equity, steers this strategic litigation play. The article frames the Kalshi suits as a bold frontier for litigation funders—leveraging obscure statutes to attack financial innovation.

These developments may push litigation funders further into regulatory and doctrinal controversy. How courts and regulators respond to this stretch of archaic statutes could reshape strategic boundaries in the litigation finance industry.

Recent commentary in Law Gazette examines claims that the growth of collective litigation poses a damaging drag on economic performance. The article notes that the pressure group Fair Civil Justice estimates that unchecked mass claims could cost the UK up to £18 billion, erode £11 billion in market value from innovative firms, and slow the country's economic expansion. The article traces the evolution of these arguments, arguing that some of the most dire projections hinge on models that may overstate systemic risk or underplay countervailing benefits.

An article in Law Gazette highlights critics' concerns that the scale, costs, and complexity of aggregating claims impose administrative burdens, encourage excessive fees, and generate uncertainty—especially for firms facing litigation exposure.

Supporters of collective actions stress the role these mechanisms play in providing access to justice—particularly for dispersed or under-resourced claimants. The commentary suggests the debate often pivots on how to balance deterrence, fairness, cost control, and innovation incentives. Law Gazette ultimately questions whether the worst economic forecasts are empirically grounded or rhetorical excess.

The piece does not settle the question definitively but invites policymakers and industry stakeholders to interrogate the assumptions behind £‑billions‑scale estimates, and to examine whether reforms or guardrails might preserve the virtues of collective redress while limiting speculative or obstructive litigation risk.

If the narrative of mass litigation harming growth gains traction, legal funding and litigation finance will be pushed deeper into regulatory debates. Watching how lawmakers, courts, and economic commentators reconcile access to justice with macroeconomic risk will be critical for the future of third‑party funding.

Shares of Litigation Capital Management (LCM) plunged about 60% after the firm disclosed that a string of case losses has triggered “a material uncertainty in relation to our going concern status.”

According to its results for the year to 30 June, LCM won six and lost six cases, with three further cases currently under appeal (worth ~£22 million). The firm also disclosed a High Court defeat in a commercial matter where it had invested £16 million (its own funds plus managed funds). While it posted net gains of £11 million and a 1.8× multiple on concluded investments, overall it recorded a £41 million loss because of the adverse outcomes.

With debt levels rising and cash realizations weakening, LCM now finds itself increasingly reliant on its credit facility. The company acknowledges that further case losses could breach debt covenants, prompting a strategic review and consideration of a leaner, run‑off model. LCM’s share closed at an all‑time low of 10.75p—down from ~100p a year earlier.

CEO Patrick Moloney attributed the underperformance to the inherently binary nature of litigation funding—and to perceived drift from a formerly “hands‑on” model toward a more passive, lawyer‑led investment approach. To recover, LCM is cutting costs, trimming underperforming investments, reinstating rigorous quantitative due diligence, reducing staffing, and revamping its approach to expert evidence.

LCM currently has 53 active cases on its books with a total balance sheet exposure of ~£85 million.

LCM’s collapse is a cautionary tale for the litigation funding sector: the binary risk profile of legal finance, combined with leverage and reputation shocks, can quickly tip even seasoned players into crisis. If more funders follow this trajectory, we may see heightened demands for transparency, stronger regulatory oversight, or a shake‑out in the publicly traded tier of legal funders.