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Managing Duration Risk in Litigation Finance (Pt. 1 of 2)

Managing Duration Risk in Litigation Finance (Pt. 1 of 2)

The following is the first of a two-part series, contributed by Ed Truant, founder of Slingshot Capital, Executive Summary
  • Duration risk is one of the top risks in litigation finance
  • Duration is impossible to determine, even for litigation experts
  • Risk management tools are available and investors should make themselves aware of the tools and their costs prior to making their first investment
  • Diversification is critical in litigation finance
Slingshot Insights:
  • Duration management begins prior to making an investment by determining which areas of litigation finance have attractive duration risks
  • Avoidance can be more powerful than management when it comes to duration in litigation finance
  • There is likely a correlation between duration risk and binary risk (i.e. the longer a case proceeds, the higher the likelihood of binary risk associated with a judicial/arbitral outcome)
When you are speaking to an institutional investor about litigation, it doesn’t take long until the concept of “duration risk” enters the discussion.  Everyone seems to have a story about that one piece of patent litigation or commercial dispute that went on for over a decade that seems to have marked them for life even though they weren’t in any way involved. Yet, it’s a real risk.  Thankfully, it’s not a real risk for a well-constructed portfolio of different case types in different jurisdictions, which is one of the reasons that prompted me to raise a commercial litigation finance fund-of-funds in 2016 – it will ultimately serve as a very good proxy or index for how the industry performs. The whole concept of duration risk is critically important for investors in legal finance to understand, including ways in which duration risk can be managed in this specialized asset class. Private alternative asset classes, such as litigation finance, always need to deal with duration as part of their fundraising pitch to investors as the investments are inherently illiquid investments.  This means that in order for investors to obtain their liquidity, their needs to be a mechanism to allow for that to happen.  Within most private equity sub-classes (venture capital, growth equity, leveraged buy-out, real estate, etc.) the exit is typically a sale of the business.  An argument is often made that there is always a clearing price for any private company and the path to liquidity is generally through an investment bank or intermediary that canvasses the market to search for the best price for that asset at any given point in time.  However, with litigation finance, the pool of capital providers is relatively small, the complexity is very high and the nascency of the market means that beyond the settlement of the case (either through negotiation or a court/arbitral decision) there are not many options. But that is changing… Duration Risk Let’s start by defining duration risk for purposes of litigation finance investing, as the risk that the time horizon of a given investment is different than that which was originally underwritten without a commensurate increase in economics. Most Litigation Funding Agreements (or “LFA”s) have provisions to deal with duration risk such that the negotiated economics increase as time progresses, but often this ultimately gets capped as the claimant is concerned that the funder can end up with the lion’s share of the settlement amount.  Similarly, the funder does not want to put itself in a position where the claimant is not participating in the economic outcome of the claim, otherwise the claimant is wasting their time and effort (and stress). The two opposing forces work to keep each other “in check”. And while the LFA is typically structured to mitigate this risk, there is the potential that the case simply takes much longer than originally thought and investors want to get their money back to redeploy into another, perhaps slightly more liquid, investment.  And this is where many investors, individual and institutional, who poured into the space since 2015 find themselves today. Now, the duration risk inherent in commercial litigation is not to suggest they will rival Myra Clark Gaines (the longest-running civil lawsuit in the US at 57 years), but the difference between 5 years and 10 years can make a meaningful difference to an investor’s return profile if the economic benefits are not commensurate with the timeline extension.  While many funders quote an average hold period of 30+- months, one needs to be careful of the use of averages in litigation finance.  Many of those averages have been derived from the average length of settled cases only, which inherently ignore the duration of the unsettled cases, which is obviously not reflective of reality. Since there are very few fully realized funds in existence globally, it is difficult to determine an actual industry average for litigation finance but I would confidently say that the average will in fact be greater than the 30-month time period often quoted.  The other thing to consider is that any average should be weighted based on dollars invested to ensure that the early settlements, which by definition would likely have fewer invested dollars, do not contribute disproportionately to the average.  The reality is that funders rely on the relatively early case wins to produce strong IRRs (albeit lower MOICs) in order to offset the IRR drag of those cases that are not successful and that exceed the average duration. If we look at a case where the LFA calls for 3X multiple (200% return on investment) during the 3-year period and a 5X multiple (400% return on investment) thereafter, then the IRRs would look as follows for different durations:
Original InvestmentProceeds ReceivedDurationInternal Rate of Return
100300344%
100500538%
100500822%
1005001020%
The first two data points illustrate that where the cap on the proceeds move in lock-step with timing, it has little effect on IRRs. However, the last three data points illustrate the punitive impact that duration has on internal rates of return. When duration moves from 5 to 10 years for a fixed outcome the internal rate of return decreases by approximately half. In addition to the duration necessary to get to a decision (after the potential for an appeal), you may then get caught up in additional enforcement and collection timelines which could add years and additional investment to the original investment proposition.  A good example of this is the “Petersen” & “Eton Park” claims that Burford invested in involving a claimant that is fighting Argentina & YPF over the privatization of energy assets without due compensation. The Implications of Time on the Value of Litigation  In a prior article written about the value of litigation, I describe how a piece of pre-settlement litigation starts off at the risky end of the spectrum due to a lack of information about the various parties’ positions, it then starts to de-risk as each side goes through discovery (approaching the optimal zone of resolution) and then the it starts to re-risk as each side becomes entrenched in their positions and pushes on to a third party decision.  This then leads to a bifurcation in value because the more the outcome of a case is dependent on the outcome of a disinterested third party (a judge, jury or arbitral panel) the more binary the outcome becomes as displayed in the chart below. This of course begs the question, if the timeline of a lawsuit extends beyond its original timeline, what does this say about the value of the case itself? Is it that the case is seen as a win by both sides and therefore each side ‘digs in’ to ensure the other side loses (hence a more binary outcome), or is this just a reflection of healthy sparring between parties to delay the inevitable and increase the friction costs to force the claimant to drop its case? Sadly, because every case has its idiosyncrasies and different personalities involved, we will never know the answer.  But what we do know is that any case that does get decided by a third party results in a binary outcome and as an investor “binary” doesn’t make for a good night’s sleep. I have written about this issue in an article about secondary investing, and in that article I make the argument that secondaries, if not valued properly, likely have a higher risk profile then the rest of the portfolio in which they reside because they are moving into the re-risk zone which inherently has a higher level of binary risk attached thereto.  I think this is important for investors to understand because it suggests that if you are concerned about duration in a litigation finance investment, it is probably (although not always) in your best interest to get out earlier than later.  Of course, the counter-argument is that the longer the case has elapsed the more you know about its merits and how the other side has conducted itself during the case and so your case may in fact be less risky than when it started. However, in these cases you are going to be asking the secondary investor for a premium to reflect that fact and that means you need to convince them of the merits, the likely duration and any credit/collection risks, which is a difficult task by any measure. We must also not lose sight of the fact that the longer a case proceeds, depending on the size and financial capacity of the defendant, the risk of collection may increase due to the financial condition of the defendant especially those with multiple lawsuits or those whose fortunes (profits and cashflow) are tied to more cyclical industries.  What looked like a good credit risk five years ago when the case commenced may look very different coming out of a recession or a commodity cycle.  Similarly, if the plaintiff is not of sound financial condition, the risk that the plaintiff runs out of money or interest in pursuing the case is also a risk that you are implicitly assuming. Given that the secondary industry is in its infancy and there is very little in terms of empirical results on secondaries, it remains to be seen how secondary portfolios will perform but if I were an investor in the sector I would go in with ‘eyes wide open’ and a deep value mindset.  The reality of most litigation finance is that the economic benefits tend to be somewhat capped, and so whatever premium is paid on a secondary, it means it reduces the overall economics available to the secondary investor. Dissimilar to private equity where a secondary investor can still benefit from growth in the value of the underlying company it acquires, the same does not generally hold for litigation finance investments and in fact the risk is to the downside with most LFAs. In the second article of this two-part series, we will look at the various ways in which investors can manage duration risk, both before they start investing and after they have invested. Slingshot Insights Duration management in litigation finance is almost as critical as manager selection and case selection.  I believe duration management starts prior to making any investments by pairing your investment strategy and its inherent duration expectations with the duration characteristics of your investments.  From there, you should ensure your portfolio is diversified and you should be actively assessing duration and liquidity throughout your hold period.  You should also assess the various tools available to you both on entry and along the hold period to determine your optimum exit point. As always, I welcome your comments and counterpoints to those raised in this article.  Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.  Slingshot Capital inc. is involved in the origination and design of unique opportunities in legal finance markets, globally, advising and investing with and alongside institutional investors.

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Trucking Industry Backs Federal Liability Bill Amid Litigation Funding Concerns

A bicameral bill introduced in Congress would bar liability claims premised on vehicle safety standards stricter than those set by federal regulators, and has drawn support from a trucking and insurance coalition that counts third-party litigation funding among the pressures driving up its costs.

As reported by Transport Topics, the Uniform Vehicle Safety Standards Act was introduced on August 6 by Rep. Mike Flood of Nebraska, joined by Reps. David Rouzer, Jay Obernolte and Jake Ellzey, with a Senate companion from Sens. Deb Fischer and Cynthia Lummis. The measure would amend Title 49 of the U.S. Code to prohibit common law claims alleging that a vehicle should have met standards exceeding those established by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

"In recent years, we've seen a sharp rise in lawsuits awarding damages based on state standards instead of the federal safety standards trucking companies are already required to meet," Flood said. Alex Rosen of the American Trucking Associations argued that where NHTSA has determined a standard strikes the right balance, "that expert determination should carry greater weight than hindsight judgments."

The bill itself contains no litigation funding provisions. Funding enters through the coalition assembled behind it, which includes the American Property Casualty Insurance Association and the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies alongside nine trucking organizations and Werner Enterprises. Research from the American Transportation Research Institute cited in the piece identifies third-party litigation funding and staged accidents as evolving legal threats to carriers, and links excessive litigation to insurance premiums that have climbed 36% over eight years.

For funders, the significance is positional rather than legal. The trucking sector has become one of the more organized constituencies pressing for disclosure and restriction at the state level, and preemption bills of this kind widen the front without naming the industry directly.

Conservative Columnist Argues Litigation Funding Limits Would Disarm the Right

A guest column published this week makes a right-of-center case against pending federal restrictions on third-party litigation funding, arguing that the measures would strip conservative activists and small business owners of the capital they need to litigate against better-resourced opponents.

Writing in The State Journal, Drew Johnson takes aim at the Protecting Our Courts From Foreign Manipulation Act, led by Rep. Ben Cline of Virginia, and at Senator Thom Tillis's proposal to impose a punitive tax on litigation funding proceeds. Johnson is a senior fellow at the National Center for Public Policy Research and the 2026 Republican nominee for Nevada State Treasurer.

His central argument is that the bill's stated purpose, preventing foreign governments from bankrolling harassment suits, is already served by existing mechanisms including CFIUS review and judicial discretion, leaving the new disclosure requirements to do work their sponsors did not intend. Broad disclosure obligations, he contends, would deter funders from backing cases at all, and the resulting shortfall would fall hardest on plaintiffs without institutional balance sheets behind them.

Johnson illustrates the point with Jack Phillips, the Colorado baker who lost an estimated 40% of his income during years of litigation before prevailing at the Supreme Court with backing from Alliance Defending Freedom. Absent outside support, he writes, Phillips "could have easily been forced to surrender."

The column is notable less for its policy analysis than for its author. Litigation funding restrictions have advanced largely on Republican votes, and the industry's defenders have generally come from the plaintiffs' bar. Johnson's framing, that citizens facing wealthy opponents should not be forced to fight alone, is an attempt to contest that ground.

Five Years On, Arizona’s ABS Data Shows No Systemic Ethical Breakdown, Article Argues

An article published in the Arizona State University Corporate and Business Law Journal argues that five years of operating data under Arizona's Alternative Business Structure framework has not produced the ethical failures its opponents predicted, and that the debate is moving from theoretical objections to observable outcomes.

Writing in the ASU Corporate and Business Law Journal, Alex Chucri traces the framework to August 2020, when Arizona became the first state to eliminate ABA Model Rule 5.4 and permit non-lawyer ownership of law firms, with the ABS regime taking effect on January 1, 2021 under Arizona Supreme Court order R-20-0034. The central claim is structural: the state did not remove oversight so much as replace blanket prohibition with licensing, compliance obligations and regulatory accountability. Non-lawyers may hold equity, share profits and participate in management, but only under Supreme Court supervision, with approved compliance counsel, reporting procedures and audit requirements.

The article marshals the program's numbers. Licenses grew from two approvals in 2020 to 15 in 2021 and 25 in each of 2022 and 2023, reaching approximately 150 licensed entities by March 2026, with 114 ABSs actively operating during 2024. No ethics complaints were filed against ABS entities in the program's first three years; the first arrived in 2024, when the State Bar initiated disciplinary action involving two ABS-affiliated attorneys. A preliminary analysis of 2024 disciplinary actions, which the author acknowledges is limited by incomplete ABS staffing data, suggests ABS-affiliated lawyers faced discipline at a rate well below the broader Arizona attorney population.

Readers should weigh the source. Chucri is founder and CEO of Pravati Capital and in 2024 founded 1787 Legal Group, the Scottsdale ABS the article offers as its case in point. The argument nonetheless lands at a moment when several states, Illinois among them this week, are moving in the opposite direction, and Arizona remains the only jurisdiction with a five-year record to argue from.