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Mythbusting the Call for New Regulation of TPLF

By John Freund |
December 2, 2024

Mythbusting the Call for New Regulation of TPLF

The following is a contributed piece from Rupert Cunningham, Director for Growth and Membership Engagement at the International Legal Finance Association (ILFA).

In their call for more EU regulation last week, AmCham EU, Business Europe and their co-signatories make misleading and inaccurate allegations about third-party litigation funding. These calls have been repeated by the same groups over and over again, pushed by big corporations that simply do not want those harmed by their wrongful behaviour to have recourse in the judicial system. ILFA will continue to counter these claims in the strongest terms. Below we unravel some of the most common misleading statements:

Myth: “Third-party litigation funders currently operate in a regulatory vacuum and without any transparency requirements.”

There is no regulatory vacuum. Litigation funders are regulated under company law in the same way as any other business, for example, the Directive on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices and the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts. Specific to litigation funding, activities are regulated by the Representative Actions Directive and the Collective Redress Directive.

Publicly traded funders are further regulated through legislation on securities and financial instruments and by the relevant stock exchanges and financial authorities. This includes publishing annual reports on financial performance. Examples of other EU rules that apply to listed funders include the Shareholder Rights Directive, Prospectus Regulation, MIFID II.

Lawyers engaged in litigation are bound by professional, regulatory, and fiduciary responsibilities to represent the best interests of their clients where they practise.

Myth: “A civil justice climate that is abundant in abusive claims and mass private third-party funded litigation, creates a chilling effect that deters businesses from innovating, investing, competing, and prospering.”

Supporting meritorious litigation does not deter businesses from innovating and prospering – it deters corporate wrongdoing. As long as companies behave responsibly and comply with the obligations set out in the law, they have nothing to fear from litigation funding.

Myth: “If civil litigation remains funded by unregulated private third parties, we expect a surge in speculative litigation in the EU, which would undermine public confidence in the European justice systems at a time when maintaining faith in our democratic institutions is so critical.”

Far from undermining public confidence in the legal system, a recent independent report from the European Law Institute (ELI) concluded litigation funding plays a ‘functionally vital role in facilitating access to justice in many jurisdictions’.[1]

With public funding (legal aid) increasingly concentrated in the criminal justice sphere, litigation funding offers vital assistance to claimants bringing meritorious civil claims to courts. Greater access to justice, supported by litigation funding, leads to the development of better legal jurisprudence – a benefit to our legal system and to the rule of the law.

Myth: “TPLF is a for-profit business model that allows private financiers, investment firms, and hedge funds, to sign confidential deals with lawyers or qualified entities to invest in lawsuits or arbitration in exchange for a significant portion of any compensation that may be awarded, sometimes as much as 40% of the total compensation but can go even substantially higher.”

Litigation funder’s fees reflect the level of risk undertaken (which will vary) and are assessed case-by-case.

Many funded cases are “David vs. Goliath” in nature with well-resourced defendants. This requires substantial upfront financial investment to level the playing field and for cases to proceed. In the UK sub-postmasters’ recent successful claim against the Post Office, the Post Office spent nearly 250m GBP on its defence.

Myth: “The financial incentives of such practices encourage frivolous and predatory litigation, but they also shortchange genuine claimants and consumers.”

Litigation funding is provided on a non-recourse basis, i.e. if the case is unsuccessful, the funder loses their entire investment. There is no logical financial incentive for litigation funders to fund frivolous legal claims. Funders’ due-diligence checks assist the justice system by weeding out unmeritorious claims that have a poor chance of success when put before a court. The approval rate for funding opportunities is as low as 3-5%.

Myth: “The introduction of a purely profit-motivated third party, often non-EU based, into the traditional lawyer-client relationship, raises serious ethical concerns and presents an economic security threat for Europe.”

The letter presents no substantive evidence that litigation funding is being used by ‘non-EU’ entities to destabilise the European economy or legal systems. ILFA suggests that experienced judges and lawyers operating in EU legal systems are more than capable of identifying threats to the integrity of our legal systems and safeguarding against the misuse or abuse of the court system for geopolitical or other aims.

Myth: “Funders are frequently the initiators of claims and may exercise control over decisions taken on behalf of claimants, and in this context, they prioritise their own financial aims over the interests of claimants. Faced with years of litigation brought by claimants with support from well-resourced funders, expensive legal costs, and reputational risk, defendants are often forced to settle even unmeritorious claims.”

Litigation funders make passive outside investments, meaning that funders do not initiate claims or control the matters in which they invest. A recipient of legal funding, and their legal counsel, maintain full control over the conduct of the case, including strategy and ultimate decision-making.

Myth: “If Europe continues to neglect proper oversight of private TPLF we risk our courts becoming profit facilitators for litigation funders, at the expense of European companies, consumers, and the integrity of our court systems.”

The reference to European companies is a curious one. Litigation funders make no distinction between EU or ‘non-EU’ claimants, basing funding awards on factual criteria such as the legal merits of a case, budget, funding required, and any other award and risks associated with the case.

This latest call from big businesses makes clear they continue to side with corporate wrongdoers, diminishing the legitimate rights of businesses and consumers to access justice and exercise their rights before the courts.

“Misleading and inaccurate claims like these appear around the world as part of a global lobbying effort to encourage unnecessary and burdensome regulation of the legal finance sector,” said Rupert Cunningham, ILFA’s newly appointed Global Director for Growth and Membership Engagement.  “Robustly challenging these persistent myths is critical to improving understanding of the sector amongst policy makers and wider industry stakeholders. That is why it is so important that international organisations like ILFA are able to respond to these claims on behalf of the sector, wherever and whenever they appear.”

By enabling the pursuit of meritorious claims, litigation funding levels the playing field and creates an equality of means between otherwise unequal parties.

[1] https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Publications/ELI_Principles_Governing_the_Third_Party_Funding_of_Litigation.pdf

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John Freund

John Freund

Commercial

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Commercial

ISO’s ‘Litigation Funding Mutual Disclosure’ May Be Unenforceable

By John Freund |

The insurance industry has introduced a new policy condition entitled "Litigation Funding Mutual Disclosure" (ISO Form CG 99 11 01 26) that may be included in liability policies starting this month. The condition allows either party to demand mutual disclosure of third-party litigation funding agreements when disputes arise over whether a claim or suit is covered by the policy. However, the condition faces significant enforceability challenges that make it largely unworkable in practice.

As reported in Omni Bridgeway, the condition is unenforceable for several key reasons. First, when an insurer denies coverage and the policyholder commences coverage litigation, the denial likely relieves the policyholder of compliance with policy conditions. Courts typically hold that insurers must demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice from a policyholder's failure to perform a condition, which would be difficult to establish when coverage has already been denied.

Additionally, the condition's requirement for policyholders to disclose funding agreements would force them to breach confidentiality provisions in those agreements, amounting to intentional interference with contractual relations. The condition is also overly broad, extending to funding agreements between attorneys and funders where the insurer has no privity. Most problematically, the "mutual" disclosure requirement lacks true mutuality since insurers rarely use litigation funding except for subrogation claims, creating a one-sided obligation that borders on bad faith.

The condition appears designed to give insurers a litigation advantage by accessing policyholders' private financial information, despite overwhelming judicial precedent that litigation finance is rarely relevant to case claims and defenses. Policyholders should reject this provision during policy renewals whenever possible.

Commercial Regulatory Issues

Valve Faces Certified UK Class Action Despite Funding Scrutiny

By John Freund |

The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has delivered a closely watched judgment certifying an opt-out collective proceedings order (CPO) against Valve Corporation, clearing the way for a landmark competition claim to proceed on behalf of millions of UK consumers. The decision marks another important moment in the evolution of collective actions—and their funding—in the UK.

In its judgment, the CAT approved the application brought by Vicki Shotbolt as class representative, alleging that Valve abused a dominant position in the PC video games market through its operation of the Steam platform. The claim contends that Valve imposed restrictive pricing and distribution practices that inflated prices paid by UK consumers. Valve opposed certification on multiple grounds, including challenges to the suitability of the class representative, the methodology for assessing aggregate damages, and the adequacy of the litigation funding arrangements supporting the claim.

The Tribunal rejected Valve’s objections, finding that the proposed methodology for estimating class-wide loss met the “realistic prospect” threshold required at the certification stage. While Valve criticised the expert evidence as overly theoretical and insufficiently grounded in data, the CAT reiterated that a CPO hearing is not a mini-trial, and that disputes over economic modelling are better resolved at a later merits stage.

Of particular interest to the legal funding market, the CAT also examined the funding structure underpinning the claim. Valve argued that the arrangements raised concerns around control, proportionality, and potential conflicts. The Tribunal disagreed, concluding that the funding terms were sufficiently transparent and that appropriate safeguards were in place to ensure the independence of the class representative and legal team. In doing so, the CAT reaffirmed its now-familiar approach of scrutinising funding without treating third-party finance as inherently problematic.

With certification granted, the case will now proceed as one of the largest opt-out competition claims yet to advance in the UK. For litigation funders, the ruling underscores the CAT’s continued willingness to accommodate complex funding structures in large consumer actions—while signalling that challenges to funding are unlikely to succeed absent clear evidence of abuse or impropriety.

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Court of Appeal’s First UPC Panel Draws Attention from Litigation Funders

By John Freund |

Litigation insurers and third-party funders across Europe are closely monitoring the first case heard by a newly constituted panel of the Unified Patent Court’s Court of Appeal, as the matter could offer early signals on how appellate judges will approach procedural and cost-related issues in the UPC system. The case, Syntorr v. Arthrex, is the inaugural appeal to be considered by the third Court of Appeal panel, making it an important early data point for stakeholders assessing litigation risk in the young court.

An article in JUVE Patent explains that the appeal arises from a dispute over European patent rights and follows contested proceedings at the Court of First Instance. While the substantive patent issues are central to the case, the appeal has attracted particular interest from insurers and funders because of its potential implications for security for costs and the treatment of insurance arrangements in UPC litigation. These questions are of direct relevance to how litigation risk is underwritten and financed, especially in cross-border patent disputes where exposure can be significant.

The establishment of additional appeal panels is itself a sign of the UPC’s increasing caseload, and early rulings from these panels will play a key role in shaping expectations around procedural consistency and predictability. For funders, clarity on whether and how courts scrutinise insurance coverage, funding structures, and security applications is critical when deciding whether to deploy capital into UPC matters. Insurers, meanwhile, are watching closely to see how appellate judges view policy wording, anti-avoidance provisions, and the extent to which coverage can be relied upon to satisfy cost concerns raised by opposing parties.

Although no substantive appellate guidance has yet emerged from this first hearing, the case underscores how closely financial stakeholders are tracking the UPC’s evolution. Even procedural decisions at the appellate level can have downstream effects on pricing, structuring, and appetite for funding complex patent litigation.

For the legal funding industry, the UPC Court of Appeal’s early jurisprudence may soon become a reference point for risk assessment, influencing both underwriting practices and investment strategies in European IP disputes.