Portfolio Theory in the Context of Litigation Finance (pt. 2 of 2)

The following article is part of an ongoing column titled ‘Investor Insights.’ 

Brought to you by Ed Truant, founder and content manager of Slingshot Capital, ‘Investor Insights’ will provide thoughtful and engaging perspectives on all aspects of investing in litigation finance. 

In part one of this two part series, which can be found here, I explored a variety of portfolio theories and applied them to the litigation finance asset class. This second article continues the application to commercial litigation finance and discusses implications for portfolio construction.

Executive Summary

  • Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) – a mathematical framework based on the “mean-variance” analysis – argues that it’s possible to construct an “efficient frontier” of optimal portfolios offering the maximum possible expected return for a given level of risk
  • MPT states that assets (such as stocks) face both “systematic risks” – market risks such as interest rates – as well as “unsystematic risks” – mostly uncorrelated exposures that are characteristic to each asset, including management changes or poor sales resulting from unforeseen events
  • Post-modern Portfolio Theory (PMPT) adds a layer of refinement to the definition of risk
  • Diversification of a portfolio can mitigate the impact of unsystematic risks on portfolio performance – although, it depends on its composition of assets
  • Behavioural Finance (BF) introduces a suggestion that psychological influences and biases affect the financial behaviors of investors and financial practitioners, also applicable to litigation finance

Slingshot Insights:

  • Portfolio theory is important to the commercial litigation finance asset class due to its inherently high level of unsystematic risks
  • Slingshot’s Rule of Thumb: a portfolio should contain no less than 20 investments in order to provide the benefits associated with portfolio theory
  • Diversification is critical for every fund manager
  • Specialty fund managers may play a positive role in a comprehensive litigation finance investing strategy by assisting with meeting a particular performance objective when defined in the context of acceptable “mean-variance” targets
  • Diversification provides optionality for an under-performing manager to ‘live to fight another day’ if their first fund achieved sub-par performance
  • Portfolio theory is applicable to consumer litigation finance

How Big is Big Enough?

There are many theories about how large a portfolio should be to meaningfully benefit from the application of portfolio theory, with analysts suggesting anywhere from 20 to over 100 investments (typically in relation to public equities).  While I have yet to conduct a study to determine a more finite range applicable to litigation finance, I will say that there are a few elements that are critical to consider, which are specific to litigation finance.

First, litigation finance is by its very nature uncertain in terms of the amount of commitment the fund manager will ultimately deploy in relation to its financial commitment to a single case (i.e. while a manager may commit $5 million to a case, the legal team may only deploy $2MM by the time the case settles). Capital deployment (both quantum and timing) is an uncontrollable variable that makes portfolio theory difficult to apply, because portfolio theory assumes the dollars deployed in each investment are (i) known and (ii) of equal size (although weightings can be assigned).  Accordingly, in order to ensure that the portfolio is diversified on a dollars deployed basis, the portfolio needs to be sufficiently large to ensure that on a committed basis it is not skewed by a few cases which have deployed 100% or more of their initial commitment relative to those cases that have deployed less than 100%.  It is also not uncommon for managers to deploy nil or very little against their commitment as a result of an early settlement (perhaps brought on by the existence of litigation finance itself, or by virtue of the investment being in the form of adverse costs indemnity protection), which adds another element of complexity as relates to the application of portfolio theory.

Second, diversification in the context of litigation finance is not only a mathematical exercise of ensuring no one case represents a disproportionate amount of the fund, it also covers the types and extent of case exposures in the portfolio.  If one is investing only in a single manager, one wouldn’t necessarily want a fund that invests solely in Intellectual Property cases, as an example, because a Systematic risk that effects that sector (for example, litigation reform such as Inter Partes Reviews in patent litigation, or an important case precedent with broad implications) will likely effect all cases in the portfolio and hence diversification will not aid at all in terms of addressing the Systematic risk. Case types, defendants, jurisdictions, judges, plaintiff counsel, defense counsel, case inter-dependencies (where the outcome of one case has a direct impact on the likely outcome of another case in the same portfolio) are all important variables that a manager should consider when creating their portfolio.

Third, litigation finance portfolio financings (the concept of a funder investing in a portfolio of law firm or corporate cases) are, by their very nature, benefitting from the application of portfolio theory. Therefore, in constructing one’s portfolio, one should consider whether the committed capital is being invested in single case portfolios, cross-collateralized portfolio financings or a combination thereof, each of which having different risk-reward profiles.

When we take all of the above into consideration, especially the uncertainty inherent in capital deployment, my general rule of thumb is for managers to target a minimum of 20 equally sized litigation finance case commitments within a portfolio. From there, I adjust based on a variety of factors including case types, financing sizes, jurisdictions, currencies, etc.  Other investors may have a different perspective.  Of course, the portfolio will never be comprised of 20 equally-sized cases due to deployment uncertainty, so I view this as a baseline. If the portfolio is made up of cases with a higher inherent volatility (class actions, intellectual property, international arbitration or large cases), then a larger portfolio would be more appropriate, such that the higher loss ratio in the portfolio – which is inherent in higher risk portfolios – will not disproportionately contribute to the portfolio’s overall performance.

Applicability to Consumer Litigation Finance

Portfolio theory suggests that diversification is exceptionally good at reducing Unsystematic risk; hence, it comes as no surprise that MPT should be more frequently applicable to the commercial litigation finance asset class given the high level of idiosyncratic case risk.  The consumer litigation finance market also exhibits similar idiosyncratic case risk, but I believe it has more Systematic risks related to defendants (usually, insurance companies with a common approach), regulation, and established case precedent where the damages are much more prescribed.  Accordingly, while portfolio theory may not be as critical in this segment of litigation finance, as an investor in the asset class I believe it remains an important value driver for the consumer litigation finance market, especially since the return profile of a single piece of consumer litigation finance is generally not as strong as those inherent in commercial litigation finance due to risk and regulatory differences.

Fund Managers’ Perspective

As an investor experienced with managing capital, deploying capital and portfolio construction, I offer a few observations for consideration.

First, don’t fall in love with your investments (i.e. don’t get caught with personal biases working into your portfolio construction).  It is easy for a fund manager to be attracted to certain cases thinking the particular case is a ‘no brainer’ (perhaps due to personal experience and/or comfort with the merits of the case) and allocate a disproportionate amount of the portfolio to finance that case. However, in the context of an asset class with binary and idiosyncratic risk, the portfolio manager would be taking on a disproportionate amount of risk in doing so.  Once a manager has determined that the case meets their rigid underwriting criteria, her or she must change their mindset to one of portfolio allocator and take a dispassionate view of the case to ensure the portfolio is optimized.  In fact, I would suggest splitting the functional role of underwriting and portfolio construction to ensure the underwriting doesn’t influence portfolio allocation decisions!

Second, do not insist on exceptions to concentration limits.  I have seen a number of fund documents where the manager has carved out exceptions to concentration limits (many of which are not appropriate for this asset class (10%, 15%, 20%) and have been derived from other PE asset classes with completely different risk profiles). By doing so, the manager is adding a lot of risk (and bias) to the portfolio that is both unnecessary and risky to the longevity of the fund, not to mention investor returns.  In my mind, the equation is quite simple: if one creates a diversified set of investments of relatively equal size, and one maintains a sound underwriting methodology, industry data suggests that one’s investment thesis should work. So why jeopardize a sound strategy?

Third, fund managers will live and die by their portfolio results, so why take unnecessary risk in haphazardly allocating capital?

To illustrate the second and third points, let’s consider four potential portfolio outcomes: (i) non-diversified portfolio with poor performance, (ii) non-diversified portfolio with exceptional performance, (iii) diversified portfolio with good performance and (iv) diversified portfolio with poor performance.

As an investor, I would look at situations (i) and (ii) and say “as a fund manager you are ‘dead in the water’”. Why? Situation (i) is self-explanatory: poor underwriting which impacts fund performance, and is buttressed by the fact that the fund manager isn’t astute enough to diversify the portfolio. Situation (ii) communicates the exact same thing, but in a different way. It tells an investor that the fund manager was ultimately successful, but in a way that was risky (in other words, the manager ‘got lucky’) and not likely repeatable (because fund performance was dependent on too few outcomes), which is not what attracts most investors who are looking for a measure of conservatism and persistence in their managers’ return profiles. I contend that this asset class should exhibit a return profile closer to that of growth or leveraged buy-out private equity (strong returns across the portfolio with a few losers for an overall strong return profile) and not venture capital (mostly losers with some exceptionally strong performers which contribute disproportionately to the overall portfolio return, which may be positive or negative).  Recent shifts toward portfolio financings by Burford and other private fund managers, suggest that there is a consensus as to the benefit of diversification on the volatility of portfolio returns.

On the other hand, situation (iii) is an ideal one, where the manager was prudent and the results illustrate underwriting and portfolio construction acumen, with portfolio returns not being disproportionately impacted by a few cases. Situation (iv) is interesting because it is a scenario where a manager can potentially ‘live to fight another day,’ since he or she was prudent with capital allocation, but perhaps something went awry with underwriting, or the portfolio was negatively impacted by a Systematic risk which was beyond the manager’s control. Every fund manager should ask themselves, “why take the risk” in creating a non-diversified portfolio, because it is a lose-lose scenario?  Diversification will always provide the optionality of raising a subsequent fund, even if returns are sub-par.

As we live in a dynamic world with a myriad of financial innovations being developed daily, managers should remain aware of new approaches to reducing risk in their portfolio (i.e. insurance, co-investing, risk-sharing with law firms), which may allow them to invest a smaller amount without taking on undue case concentration risk.  Of course, any instrument that reduces risk incurs a cost, and so one will need to assess the overall risk-reward equation to determine whether it is appropriate for both the manager and the investor.

Diversification is in the eye of the Investor

Managers should also keep in mind that each investor is different.  A manager may have one investor that has decided to maintain a single exposure to litigation finance through the manager, in which case the investor is likely counting on that manager to ensure application of portfolio theory.  On the other hand, an investor may be looking for specific exposures to complement his or her numerous allocations within the litigation finance sector, and so the investor is expected to apply portfolio theory to the various allocations within their portfolio and are less reliant on the fund manager for doing so in their specific fund.

What is critical for managers is that they deploy capital in a responsible manner and not acquiesce to the demands of a given investor with respect to their perspective on portfolio construction and portfolio theory. We are all here to create sustainable long-term businesses, and a given investor may have different objectives that could derail the manager’s own goals.

Slingshot Insights

Investing in a nascent asset class like litigation finance is mainly about investing in people.  Most managers simply don’t have the track record of a fully realized portfolio on which investors can base their investment decision.  Accordingly, much time and attention is spent on understanding how managers think about building their business and in particular their first portfolio.  In addition to the underwriting process, one of the most important considerations for investors to understand is how managers think about portfolio construction and diversification. Portfolio theory plays an integral role in terms of how managers should be thinking about constructing their portfolios from the perspective of the number of cases in the portfolio, but managers should also ensure their own personal bias is not entering into the portfolio and that they have thought about all of the systematic risks that can affect like cases. My general rule of thumb is that most first time managers should be targeting a portfolio of at least 20 equal sized commitments, appreciating that it is almost impossible to achieve equal sized deployments due to deployment risk. It is also not in the manager’s best long-term interest to take a short-cut on diversification for expediency sake (i.e. to raise the next larger fund) and to do so may be interpreted as poor judgment from an investor’s perspective!

As always, I welcome your comments and counter-points to those raised in this article.

Edward Truant is the founder of Slingshot Capital Inc. and an investor in the consumer and commercial litigation finance industry.

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Community Spotlights

Community Spotlight: Dr. Detlef A. Huber, Managing Director, AURIGON LRC

By John Freund |

Detlef is a German attorney, former executive of a Swiss reinsurance company and as head of former Carpentum Capital Ltd. one of the pioneers of litigation funding in Latin America. Through his activities as executive in the insurance claims area and litigation funder he gained a wealth of experience in arbitrations/litigations in various businesses. He is certified arbitrator of ARIAS US and ARIAS UK (AIDA Reinsurance and Insurance Arbitration Society) and listed on the arbitrators panel of DIS (German Arbitration Institute).

He studied law in Germany and Spain, obtained a Master in European Law (Autónoma Madrid) and doctorate in insurance law (University of Hamburg).

Detlef speaks German, Spanish, English fluently and some Portuguese.

Company Name and Description:  AURIGON LRC (Litigation Risk Consulting) is at home in two worlds: dispute funding and insurance. They set up the first European litigation fund dedicated to Latin America many years ago and operate as consultants in the re/insurance sector since over a decade.

Both worlds are increasingly overlapping with insurers offering ever more litigation risk transfer products and funders recurring to insurance in order to hedge their risks. Complexity is increasing for what is already a complex product.

Aurigon acts as intermediary in the dispute finance sector and offers consultancy on relevant insurance matters.

Company Website: www.aurigon-lrc.ch

Year Founded: 2011, since 2024 offering litigation risk consulting  

Headquarters: Alte Steinhauserstr. 1, 6330 Cham/Zug Switzerland

Area of Focus:  Litigation funding related to Latin America and re/insurance disputes

Member Quote: “It´s the economy, stupid. Not my words but fits our business well. Dont focus on merits, focus on maths.”

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Manolete Partners Releases Half-Year Results for the Six Months Ended 30 September 2024

By Harry Moran |

Manolete (AIM:MANO), the leading UK-listed insolvency litigation financing company, today announces its unaudited results for the six months ended 30 September 2024. 

Steven Cooklin, Chief Executive Officer, commented: 

“These are a strong set of results, particularly in terms of organic cash generation. In this six-month period, gross cash collected rose 63% to a new record at £14.3m. That strong organic cash generation comfortably covered all cash operating costs, as well as all cash costs of financing the ongoing portfolio of 413 live cases, enabling Manolete to reduce net debt by £1.25m to £11.9m as at 30 September 2024. 

As a consequence of Manolete completing a record number of 137 case completions, realised revenues rose by 60% to a further record high of £15m. That is a strong indicator of further, and similarly high levels, of near-term future cash generation. A record pipeline of 437 new case investment opportunities were received in this latest six month trading period, underpinning the further strong growth prospects for the business. 

The record £14.3.m gross cash was collected from 253 separate completed cases, highlighting the highly granular and diversified profile of Manolete’s income stream. 

Manolete has generated a Compound Average Growth Rate of 39% in gross cash receipts over the last five H1 trading periods: from H1 FY20 up to and including the current H1 FY25. The resilience of the Manolete business model, even after the extraordinary pressures presented by the extended Covid period, is now clear to see. 

This generated net cash income of £7.6m in H1 FY25 (after payment of all legal costs and all payments made to the numerous insolvent estates on those completed cases), an increase of 66% over the comparative six-month period for the prior year. Net cash income not only exceeded by £4.5m all the cash overheads required to run the Company, it also exceeded all the costs of running Manolete’s ongoing 413 cases, including the 126 new case investments made in H1 FY25. 

The Company recorded its highest ever realised revenues for H1 FY25 of £15.0m, exceeding H1 FY24 by 60%. On average, Manolete receives all the cash owed to it by the defendants of completed cases within approximately 12 months of the cases being legally completed. This impressive 60% rise in realised revenues therefore provides good near-term visibility for a continuation of Manolete’s strong, and well-established, track record of organic, operational cash generation. 

New case investment opportunities arise daily from our wide-ranging, proprietary, UK referral network of insolvency practitioner firms and specialist insolvency and restructuring solicitor practices. We are delighted to report that the referrals for H1 FY25 reached a new H1 company record of 437. A 27% higher volume than in H1 FY24, which was itself a new record for the Company this time last year. That points to a very healthy pipeline as we move forward into the second half of the trading year.” 

Financial highlights: 

  • Total revenues increased by 28% to £14.4m from H1 FY24 (£11.2m) as a result of the outstanding delivery of realised revenues generated in the six months to 30th September 2024.
    • Realised revenues achieved a record level of £15.0m in H1 FY25, a notable increase of 60% on H1 FY24 (£9.4m). This provides good visibility of near-term further strong cash generation, as on average Manolete collects all cash on settled cases within approximately 12 months of the legal settlement of those cases
    • Unrealised revenue in H1 FY25 was £(633k) compared to £1.8m for the comparative H1 FY24. This was due to: (1) the record number of 137 case completions in H1 FY25, which resulted in a beneficial movement from Unrealised revenues to Realised revenues; and (2) the current lower average fair value of new case investments made relative to the higher fair value of the completed cases. The latter point also explains the main reason for the marginally lower gross profit reported of £4.4m in this period, H1 FY25, compared to £5.0m in H1 FY24. 
  • EBIT for H1 FY25 was £0.7m compared to H1 FY24 of £1.6m. As well as the reduced Gross profit contribution explained above, staff costs increased by £165k to £2.3m and based on the standard formula used by the Company to calculate Expected Credit Losses, (“ECL”), generated a charge of £140k (H1 3 FY24: £nil) due to trade debtors rising to £26.8m as at 30 September 2024, compared to £21.7m as at 30 September 2023. The trade debtor increase was driven by the outstanding record level of £15.0m Realised revenues achieved in H1 FY25.
  • Loss Before Tax was (£0.2m) compared to a Profit Before Tax of £0.9m in H1 FY24, due to the above factors together with a lower corporation tax charge being largely offset by higher interest costs. 
  • Basic earnings per share (0.5) pence (H1 FY24: 1.4 pence).
  • Gross cash generated from completed cases increased 63% to £14.3m in the 6 months to 30 September 2024 (H1 FY24: £8.7m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 39%.
  • Cash income from completed cases after payments of all legal costs and payments to Insolvent Estates rose by 66% to £7.6m (H1 FY24: £4.6m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 46%.
  • Net cashflow after all operating costs but before new case investments rose by 193% to £4.5m (H1 FY24: £1.5m). 5-year H1 CAGR: 126%.
  • Net assets as at 30 September 2024 were £40.5m (H1 FY24: £39.8m). Net debt was reduced to £11.9m and comprises borrowings of £12.5m, offset by cash balances of £0.6m. (Net debt as 31 March 2024 was £12.3m.)
  • £5m of the £17.5m HSBC Revolving Credit Facility remains available for use, as at 30 September 2024. That figure does not take into account the Company’s available cash balances referred to above.

Operational highlights:

  • Ongoing delivery of record realised returns: 137 case completions in H1 FY25 representing a 18% increase (116 case realisations in H1 FY24), generating gross settlement proceeds receivable of £13.9m for H1 FY25, which is 51% higher than the H1 FY24 figure of £9.2m. This very strong increase in case settlements provides visibility for further high levels of cash income, as it takes the Company, on average, around 12 months to collect in all cash from previously completed cases.
  • The average realised revenue per completed case (“ARRCC”) for H1 FY25 was £109k, compared to the ARRCC of £81k for H1 FY24. That 35% increase in ARRCC is an important and an encouraging Key Performance Indicator for the Company. Before the onset and impact of the Covid pandemic in 2020, the Company was achieving an ARRCC of approximately £200k. Progress back to that ARRCC level, together with the Company maintaining its recent high case acquisition and case completion volumes, would lead to a material transformation of Company profitability.
  • The 137 cases completed in H1 FY25 had an average case duration of 15.7 months. This was higher than the average case duration of 11.5 months for the 118 cases completed in H1 FY24, because in H1 FY25 Manolete was able to complete a relatively higher number of older cases, as evidenced by the Vintages Table below.
  • Average case duration across Manolete’s full lifetime portfolio of 1,064 completed cases, as at 30 September 2024 was 13.3 months (H1 FY24: 12.7 months).
  • Excluding the Barclays Bounce Back Loan (“BBL”) pilot cases, new case investments remained at historically elevated levels of 126 for H1 FY25 (H1 FY24: 146 new case investments).
  • New case enquiries (again excluding just two Barclays BBL pilot cases from the H1 FY24 figure) achieved another new Company record of 437 in H1 FY25, 27% higher than the H1 FY24 figure of 343. This excellent KPI is a strong indicator of future business performance and activity levels.
  • Stable portfolio of live cases: 413 in progress as at 30 September 2024 (417 as at 30 September 2023) which includes 35 live BBLs.
  • Excluding the Truck Cartel cases, all vintages up to and including the 2019 vintage have now been fully, and legally completed. Only one case remains ongoing in the 2020 vintage. 72% of the Company’s live cases have been signed in the last 18 months.
  • The Truck Cartel cases continue to progress well. As previously reported, settlement discussions, to varying degrees of progress, continue with a number of Defendant manufacturers. Further updates will be provided as concrete outcomes emerge.
  • The Company awaits the appointment of the new Labour Government’s Covid Corruption Commissioner and hopes that appointment will set the clear direction of any further potential material involvement for Manolete in the Government’s BBL recovery programme.
  • The Board proposes no interim dividend for H1 FY25 (H1 FY24: £nil).

The full report of Manolete’s half-year results can be read here.

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LegalPay’s CIO Highlights the Opportunities and Challenges for Defense-Side Funding

By Harry Moran |

As the legal funding industry has matured and become a mainstream feature of many jurisdictions’ legal systems, funders are increasingly looking at ways to diversify their activities.

In an article for Insolvency Tracker, Tanya Prasad, CIO of LegalPay, addresses the niche topic of defense-side funding and examines whether there is potential for this type of legal funding to grow in the same way that plaintiff funding has over recent years. Prasad notes that in an environment where “the demand for risk management tools in litigation grows”, large corporations may look to third-party funders to help supplement legal budgets “while potentially achieving favourable outcomes”.

Prasad acknowledges that compared to traditional plaintiff-side funding, defense-side funding “comes with unique challenges”. Whilst claimants may seek to maximise their financial returns in the form of damages and compensation, a defendant will “generally focus on minimizing loss exposure.” As a result of this difference in goals, Prasad suggests that funders would need to not only “employ creative pricing structures”, but would also need to find new metrics to define success.

The latter point is one that Prasad argues is key to creating a viable defense-side funding ecosystem, noting that “establishing a clear definition of success” may have different parameters for different defendants. Examples of this could include structuring funding agreements to incorporate “avoided loss” measures, which would define success based on “achieving a favorable settlement or dismissal at a lower financial cost than anticipated.”

If these difficulties that Prasad highlights can be overcome, she suggests that “defense-side litigation funding has the potential to redefine legal finance, supporting fair representation for both plaintiffs and defendants and expanding access to justice across the board.” Additionally, Prasad points to a handful of examples where defense-side funding has been successfully employed, such as the Gillette v. ShaveLogic case, where Burford Capital provided funding for the defendant to successfully oppose Gillette’s claims of trades secret misappropriation and unfair competition.