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Select Ethical Issues Present in Litigation Funding

Select Ethical Issues Present in Litigation Funding

The following article was contributed by John J. Hanley, Partner at Rimon Law Litigation financing is on the rise in the United States and provides some claimants a valuable means for paying the costs of pursuing a legal claim. Lawyer involvement in litigation financing transactions raises many ethical issues for a lawyer such as competence, duty of loyalty, the potential waiver of privilege and interference by a third party, to name a few. Competence The first rule for lawyers under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (the “NY RPC”) is competence.[1]  Lawyers and law firms should tread carefully when considering undertaking client engagements in a subject area in which they do not have the requisite knowledge and skill to provide competent representation of their clients. Official Comment 1 to Rule 1.1 provides in part that factors relevant to determining whether a lawyer has the requisite knowledge and skill in a matter include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the filed in question, and the preparation the lawyer is able to give the matter.[2] This does not mean that lawyers cannot deal with matters in which they are initially unfamiliar.  Indeed, the American Bar Association points out in comments to Rule 1.1 that “[a] lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. The analysis of precedent  . . . and legal drafting are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.”[3] According to the New York City Bar Report to the President by the New York City Bar Association Working Group on Litigation Funding: “[a] lawyer whose client seeks third party funding should determine at the outset whether he or she has the transactional experience and sophistication required to negotiate a beneficial agreement with the funder or whether a specialist in the field should be involved.”[4] Competence in litigation finance includes familiarity with various litigation financing structures and privileges against disclosure, among others.[5]  For example, the structure may involve different types of collateral, different means of financing legal fees and expenses, the manner in which funding is disbursed and the return structure of the financing.  A lawyer concentrating her or his practice on litigation funding may also be better able to determine “market” terms of the financing. Duty of Loyalty and the Lawyer’s Financial Interests Of course, the lawyer is the client’s fiduciary and agent who owes his or her client undivided loyalty and is forbidden from putting her interest above that of the client. The New York State Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics reminds lawyers that their financial interests must not interfere with the representation of the client.[6] Ordinarily, there is nothing adverse to a client about a lawyer getting paid for legal services[7] but in a litigation funding transaction the lawyer could have a personal interest in respect of the transaction. For example, the litigation funding agreement may facilitate payment of a portion of the lawyer’s fees or ensure certain expenses borne by the lawyer will be repaid.[8] The American Bar Association posits that if a lawyer has a relationship with a litigation funder that creates a financial interest for the lawyer . . . it may interfere with the lawyer’s obligation to provide impartial, unbiased advice to the client (the “ABA Report”)[9]. The ABA Report goes on to say that a lawyer with a long-term history of working with a particular funder may have an interest in keeping the funder content which would create a conflict even in the absence of an explicit agreement. The NY RPC, specifically Rule 1.7(a)(2), like the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if “there is significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, property or other interest.” Additionally, Rule 5.4 of the NY RPC, and its analogous provisions in other jurisdictions, requires that a lawyer maintain independence[10].  Consequently, such lawyer, representing a client in a matter for which litigation funding is sought, in general may be able to represent the client with respect to the litigation funding agreement but should disclose the lawyer’s relationship with the funder and receive the client’s informed written consent. Communication and Confidentiality Rule 1.4 of the NYRP Conduct requires a lawyer to communicate promptly, and provide complete information, to the client regarding the matter, and to reasonably consult with the client about the means to achieve the client’s objectives.[11] Reputable litigation funders are usually careful to provide in the litigation finance documents that the funder will not be involved in discussions between the lawyer and client regarding the matter, and that the funder will not direct or control the litigation. In certain circumstances an inexperienced lawyer may consider involving the funder in discussions about case strategy, but caution is in order. If a party other than client and the attorney is involved in communications involving legal issues or the case, the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality of communications is likely breached and the attorney may be guilty of legal malpractice. Indeed, Rule 1.6 of the NYRPC requires that a lawyer not knowingly reveal confidential information, or use that information to the disadvantage of the client or advantage of the lawyer or a third person, subject to certain exceptions.[12] Conclusion An attorney who represents a client in a matter that is to be funded pursuant to a litigation funding agreement should consider the ethical implications discussed in this Insight, among others, before representing the client in the funding agreement. Counsel would avoid all of the ethical considerations that may arise by referring the client to an outside attorney experienced in litigation finance.
[1] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.1.  The California Rules of Professional conduct and the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) also make this the number one rule.  Indeed, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted legal ethics rules based at least in part on the MRPC. [2] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.1, Comment [1]. [3] Available here ABA Comment to Rule 1.1 [4] Report to the President by the New York City Bar Association Working Group on Litigation Funding (February 28, 2020). [5] Others includes, without limitation champerty, maintenance, barratry, usury and required disclosures. [6] N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 769 (November 4, 2003). [7] The State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 2020-204. [8] Id. At 3. [9] American Bar Association, Informational Report to the House of Delegates Commission on Ethics 20/20. [10] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.5.4. [11] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.4(a). [12] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.6(a). See also the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 1.6.

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Life After PACCAR: What’s Next for Litigation Funding?

By John Freund |

In the wake of the UK Supreme Court’s landmark R (on the application of PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal decision, which held that many common litigation funding agreements (LFAs) constituted damages-based agreements (DBAs) and were therefore unenforceable without complying with the Damages-Based Agreements Regulations, the litigation funding market has been in flux.

The ruling upended traditional third-party funding models in England & Wales and sparked a wide range of responses from funders, lawyers and policymakers addressing the uncertainty it created for access to justice and commercial claims. This Life After PACCAR piece brings together leading partners from around the industry to reflect on what has changed and where the market is headed.

An article in Law.com highlights how practitioners are navigating this “post-PACCAR” landscape. Contributors emphasise the significant disruption that followed the decision’s classification of LFAs as DBAs — disruption that forced funders and claimants to rethink pricing structures and contractual frameworks. They also explore recent case law that has begun to restore some stability, including appellate decisions affirming alternative fee structures that avoid the DBA label (such as multiple-of-investment returns) and the ongoing uncertainty pending legislative reform.

Discussion also centres on the UK government’s response: following the Civil Justice Council’s 2025 Final Report, momentum has built behind proposals to reverse the PACCAR effect through legislation and to adopt a light-touch regulatory regime for third-party funders.

Litigation Funding Founder Reflects on Building a New Platform

By John Freund |

A new interview offers a candid look at how litigation funding startups are being shaped by founders with deep experience inside the legal system. Speaking from the perspective of a former practicing litigator, Lauren Harrison, founder of Signal Peak Partners, describes how time spent in BigLaw provided a practical foundation for launching and operating a litigation finance business.

An article in Above the Law explains that Harrison views litigation funding as a natural extension of legal advocacy, rather than a purely financial exercise. Having worked closely with clients and trial teams, she argues that understanding litigation pressure points, timelines, and decision making dynamics is critical when evaluating cases for investment. This background allows funders to assess risk more realistically and communicate more effectively with law firms and claimholders.

The interview also touches on the operational realities of starting a litigation funding company from the ground up. Harrison discusses early challenges such as building trust in a competitive market, educating lawyers about non-recourse funding structures, and developing underwriting processes that balance speed with diligence. Transparency around pricing and alignment of incentives emerge as recurring themes, with Harrison emphasizing that long-term relationships matter more than short-term returns.

Another key takeaway is the importance of team composition. While legal expertise is essential, Harrison notes that successful platforms also require strong financial, operational, and compliance capabilities. Blending these skill sets, particularly at an early stage, is presented as one of the more difficult but necessary steps in scaling a sustainable funding business.

Australian High Court Limits Recovery of Litigation Funding Costs

By John Freund |

The High Court of Australia has delivered a significant decision clarifying the limits of recoverable damages in funded litigation, confirming that claimants cannot recover litigation funding commissions or fees as compensable loss, even where those costs materially reduce the net recovery.

Ashurst reports that the High Court rejected arguments that litigation funding costs should be treated as damages flowing from a defendant’s wrongdoing. The ruling arose from a shareholder class action in which claimants sought to recover the funding commission deducted from their settlement proceeds, contending that the costs were a foreseeable consequence of the underlying misconduct. The court disagreed, holding that litigation funding expenses are properly characterised as the price paid to pursue litigation, rather than loss caused by the defendant.

In reaching its decision, the High Court emphasised the distinction between harm suffered as a result of wrongful conduct and the commercial arrangements a claimant enters into to enforce their rights. While acknowledging that litigation funding is now a common and often necessary feature of large-scale litigation, the court concluded that this reality does not convert funding costs into recoverable damages. Allowing such recovery, the court reasoned, would represent an expansion of damages principles beyond established limits.

The decision provides welcome clarity for defendants facing funded claims, while reinforcing long-standing principles of Australian damages law. At the same time, it confirms that litigation funding costs remain a matter to be borne out of recoveries, subject to court approval regimes and regulatory oversight rather than being shifted onto defendants through damages awards.