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Select Ethical Issues Present in Litigation Funding

The following article was contributed by John J. Hanley, Partner at Rimon Law. 

Litigation financing is on the rise in the United States and provides some claimants a valuable means for paying the costs of pursuing a legal claim. Lawyer involvement in litigation financing transactions raises many ethical issues for a lawyer such as competence, duty of loyalty, the potential waiver of privilege and interference by a third party, to name a few.

Competence

The first rule for lawyers under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (the “NY RPC”) is competence.[1]  Lawyers and law firms should tread carefully when considering undertaking client engagements in a subject area in which they do not have the requisite knowledge and skill to provide competent representation of their clients. Official Comment 1 to Rule 1.1 provides in part that factors relevant to determining whether a lawyer has the requisite knowledge and skill in a matter include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the filed in question, and the preparation the lawyer is able to give the matter.[2]

This does not mean that lawyers cannot deal with matters in which they are initially unfamiliar.  Indeed, the American Bar Association points out in comments to Rule 1.1 that “[a] lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. The analysis of precedent  . . . and legal drafting are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.”[3]

According to the New York City Bar Report to the President by the New York City Bar Association Working Group on Litigation Funding: “[a] lawyer whose client seeks third party funding should determine at the outset whether he or she has the transactional experience and sophistication required to negotiate a beneficial agreement with the funder or whether a specialist in the field should be involved.”[4]

Competence in litigation finance includes familiarity with various litigation financing structures and privileges against disclosure, among others.[5]  For example, the structure may involve different types of collateral, different means of financing legal fees and expenses, the manner in which funding is disbursed and the return structure of the financing.  A lawyer concentrating her or his practice on litigation funding may also be better able to determine “market” terms of the financing.

Duty of Loyalty and the Lawyer’s Financial Interests

Of course, the lawyer is the client’s fiduciary and agent who owes his or her client undivided loyalty and is forbidden from putting her interest above that of the client. The New York State Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics reminds lawyers that their financial interests must not interfere with the representation of the client.[6] Ordinarily, there is nothing adverse to a client about a lawyer getting paid for legal services[7] but in a litigation funding transaction the lawyer could have a personal interest in respect of the transaction. For example, the litigation funding agreement may facilitate payment of a portion of the lawyer’s fees or ensure certain expenses borne by the lawyer will be repaid.[8] The American Bar Association posits that if a lawyer has a relationship with a litigation funder that creates a financial interest for the lawyer . . . it may interfere with the lawyer’s obligation to provide impartial, unbiased advice to the client (the “ABA Report”)[9].

The ABA Report goes on to say that a lawyer with a long-term history of working with a particular funder may have an interest in keeping the funder content which would create a conflict even in the absence of an explicit agreement. The NY RPC, specifically Rule 1.7(a)(2), like the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if “there is significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, property or other interest.” Additionally, Rule 5.4 of the NY RPC, and its analogous provisions in other jurisdictions, requires that a lawyer maintain independence[10].  Consequently, such lawyer, representing a client in a matter for which litigation funding is sought, in general may be able to represent the client with respect to the litigation funding agreement but should disclose the lawyer’s relationship with the funder and receive the client’s informed written consent.

Communication and Confidentiality

Rule 1.4 of the NYRP Conduct requires a lawyer to communicate promptly, and provide complete information, to the client regarding the matter, and to reasonably consult with the client about the means to achieve the client’s objectives.[11]

Reputable litigation funders are usually careful to provide in the litigation finance documents that the funder will not be involved in discussions between the lawyer and client regarding the matter, and that the funder will not direct or control the litigation. In certain circumstances an inexperienced lawyer may consider involving the funder in discussions about case strategy, but caution is in order. If a party other than client and the attorney is involved in communications involving legal issues or the case, the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality of communications is likely breached and the attorney may be guilty of legal malpractice. Indeed, Rule 1.6 of the NYRPC requires that a lawyer not knowingly reveal confidential information, or use that information to the disadvantage of the client or advantage of the lawyer or a third person, subject to certain exceptions.[12]

Conclusion

An attorney who represents a client in a matter that is to be funded pursuant to a litigation funding agreement should consider the ethical implications discussed in this Insight, among others, before representing the client in the funding agreement. Counsel would avoid all of the ethical considerations that may arise by referring the client to an outside attorney experienced in litigation finance.

[1] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.1.  The California Rules of Professional conduct and the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) also make this the number one rule.  Indeed, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted legal ethics rules based at least in part on the MRPC.
[2] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.1, Comment [1].
[3] Available here ABA Comment to Rule 1.1
[4] Report to the President by the New York City Bar Association Working Group on Litigation Funding (February 28, 2020).
[5] Others includes, without limitation champerty, maintenance, barratry, usury and required disclosures.
[6] N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 769 (November 4, 2003).
[7] The State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 2020-204.
[8] Id. At 3.
[9] American Bar Association, Informational Report to the House of Delegates Commission on Ethics 20/20.
[10] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.5.4.
[11] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.4(a).
[12] N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.1.6(a). See also the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 1.6.

Commercial

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Case Developments Commercial

Sony and Apple Challenge Enforceability of Litigation Funding Models

By John Freund |

A pivotal UK court case could reshape the future of litigation finance agreements, as Sony and Apple reignite legal challenges to widely used third-party funding models in large-scale commercial disputes.

An article in Law360 reports that the two tech giants are questioning the validity of litigation funding arrangements tied to multibillion-pound cartel claims brought against them. Their core argument: that certain litigation funding agreements may run afoul of UK laws governing damages-based agreements (DBAs), which restrict the share of damages a representative may take as remuneration. A previous Court of Appeal decision in PACCAR Inc. v. Competition Appeal Tribunal held that some funding models might qualify as DBAs, rendering them unenforceable if they fail to comply with statutory rules.

This resurrected dispute centers on claims brought by class representatives against Apple and Sony over alleged anti-competitive behavior. The companies argue that if the funding arrangements breach DBA regulations, the entire claims may be invalidated. For the litigation funding industry, the outcome could severely curtail access to justice mechanisms in the UK—especially for collective actions in competition law, where third-party financing is often essential.

The UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal previously stayed the proceedings pending clarity on the legal standing of such funding arrangements. With the dispute now heading back to court, all eyes will be on whether the judiciary draws a clear line around the enforceability of funder agreements under current law.

The decision could force funders to rework deal structures or risk losing enforceability altogether. As UK courts revisit the DBA implications for litigation finance, the sector faces heightened uncertainty over regulatory compliance, enforceability, and long-term viability in complex group litigation. Will this lead to a redefinition of permissible funding models—or to a call for legislative reform to protect access to collective redress?

Case Developments Commercial

Funder’s Interference in Texas Fee Dispute Rejected by Appeals Court

By Harry Moran |

A Texas appeals court has ruled that a litigation funder cannot block attorneys from pursuing a fee dispute following a remand order, reinforcing the limited standing of funders in fee-shifting battles. In a 2-1 decision, the First Court of Appeals found that the funder’s interest in the outcome, while financial, did not confer the legal authority necessary to participate in the dispute or enforce a side agreement aimed at halting the proceedings.

An article in Law360 details the underlying case, which stems from a contentious attorney fee battle following a remand to state court. The litigation funder, asserting contractual rights tied to a funding agreement, attempted to intervene and stop the fee litigation between plaintiffs' and defense counsel. But the appellate court sided with the trial court’s decision to proceed, emphasizing that only parties directly involved in the underlying legal work—and not third-party financiers—are entitled to challenge or control post-remand fee determinations. The majority opinion concluded that the funder’s contract could not supersede procedural law governing who may participate in such disputes.

In dissent, one justice argued that the funder’s financial interest merited consideration, suggesting that a more expansive view of standing could be warranted. But the majority held firm, stating that expanding standing would invite unwanted complexity and undermine judicial efficiency.

This decision sends a strong signal to funders operating in Texas: fee rights must be contractually precise and procedurally valid. As more funders build fee recovery provisions into their agreements, questions linger about how far those rights can extend—especially in jurisdictions hesitant to allow funders a seat at the litigation table.

Commercial Regulatory Issues

Oklahoma Moves to Restrict Foreign Litigation Funding, Cap Damages

By John Freund |

In a significant policy shift, Oklahoma has enacted legislation targeting foreign influence in its judicial system through third-party litigation funding. Signed into law by Governor Kevin Stitt, the two-pronged legislation not only prohibits foreign entities from funding lawsuits in the state but also imposes a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages in civil cases—excluding exceptions such as wrongful death. The new laws take effect November 1, 2025.

An article in The Journal Record notes that proponents of the legislation, including the Oklahoma Civil Justice Council and key Republican lawmakers, argue these measures are necessary to preserve the integrity of the state's courts and protect domestic businesses from what they view as undue interference. The foreign funding restriction applies to entities from countries identified as foreign adversaries by federal standards, including China and Russia.

Critics, however, contend that the laws may undermine access to justice, especially in complex or high-cost litigation where third-party funding can serve as a vital resource. The cap on non-economic damages, in particular, has drawn concern from trial lawyers who argue it may disproportionately impact vulnerable plaintiffs without sufficient financial means.

Oklahoma’s move aligns with a broader national trend of state-level scrutiny over third-party litigation funding. Lawmakers in several states have introduced or passed legislation to increase transparency, impose registration requirements, or limit funding sources.

For the legal funding industry, the Oklahoma law raises pressing questions about how funders will adapt to an increasingly fragmented regulatory landscape. It also underscores the growing political sensitivity around foreign capital in civil litigation—a trend that could prompt further regulatory action across other jurisdictions.