In a significant development for UK collective actions, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has granted a Collective Proceedings Order (CPO) in the landmark case Spottiswoode v Airwave Solutions & Motorola. The case—brought by Clare Spottiswoode CBE—accuses Motorola of abusing its dominant position in the UK's emergency services network by charging excessive prices through its Airwave network, which the Home Office claims resulted in £1.1 billion in overcharges to UK taxpayers.

According to iclg, the class action is being funded by the UK Home Office itself, which is also the complainant in an associated CMA enforcement action. In its judgment, the CAT concluded that Spottiswoode is an appropriate class representative, and that the claim—which covers a proposed class of over 100,000 public service bodies—is suitable for collective proceedings. The case will proceed on an opt-out basis for UK entities, with opt-in available for overseas claimants.

The Tribunal emphasized that funding by a government department does not compromise the independence of the class representative, and that the Home Office’s funding arrangement complies with legal and procedural requirements. Notably, the judgment paves the way for governmental entities to play a dual role—as both complainant and funder—in future competition-based collective actions.

This case raises fascinating implications for the legal funding industry. It challenges traditional notions of third-party funders and opens the door to more creative and strategic funding models initiated by government entities themselves, particularly in cases with broad public interest and regulatory overlap.

A notable shift is underway in the legal‑services world as institutional investors increasingly direct capital toward law‑firm ownership—particularly via the alternative business structure (ABS) model in Arizona.

According to a recent article in Bloomberg, large asset managers and venture‑capital firms are positioning themselves to participate in legal‑services revenues in a way that diverges from traditional contingent‑fee funding of lawsuits. The piece identifies heavy hitters such as Benefit Street Partners and Crossbeam Venture Partners as recent entrants into the ABS‑enabled law‑firm ownership space. Benefit Street’s application for a new Arizona law‑firm entity lists tort litigation, IP claims and bankruptcy matters as focal areas.

The ABS pathway in Arizona has grown rapidly. In 2021, the state approved 15 ABS licences; by 2024, that number rose to 51, bringing the overall total to approximately 153. The regulatory flexibility in Arizona contrasts with the majority of U.S. jurisdictions, where non‑lawyer ownership of law firms remains prohibited or severely constrained. Meanwhile, states such as California have reacted by imposing restrictions—e.g., California's recent ban on contingency‑fee sharing with out‑of‑state ABS models.

For the legal‑funding and law‑firm investment ecosystem, this development carries multiple implications. First, it signals that investors view law‑firm ownership as a viable risk‑adjusted investment category beyond pure litigation funding. Second, it raises governance and regulatory questions around outside ownership of law firms, especially as the lines blur between funders, back‑office providers and equity owners. Finally, firms, funders and law‑firm owners may need to reassess their strategies and compliance frameworks in light of the shifting landscape of capital entry and structural innovation.

A new California law—Assembly Bill 931, signed by Governor Gavin Newsom—prohibits California‐licensed attorneys and law firms from entering into contingent‐fee sharing arrangements with out‑of‑state “alternative business structures” (ABS) or law firms owned, in whole or in part, by non‑lawyers.

According to Reuters, the law targets a key business model of mass‑tort and personal‑injury practices, where fee revenue is shared with non‑lawyer entities or firms located in jurisdictions that permit non‑lawyer ownership or alternative legal structures (such as Arizona, Utah, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia). The law was narrowed during legislative debate to apply specifically to contingent fees rather than flat‑fee or fixed‑fee arrangements.

Under the statute, contracts beginning on or after January 1, 2026, that violate the prohibition will expose the California lawyer or law firm to minimum fines of $10,000 per infraction. The legislation expressly allows fixed‑fee sharing for specific dollar amounts and non‑lawyer involvement in back‑office or support services, but draws the line at traditional contingency‑fee tying arrangements with ABS entities.

For the litigation finance industry, this legislative shift signals a tightening of rules around fee‑sharing and ownership arrangements, particularly for cross‑jurisdictional structures that rely on non‑lawyer capital. The change may hamper integration between California‑based counsel and out‑of‑state firms that depend on contingency‐driven revenue sharing.

Burford Capital has published a new Burford Quarterly that pitches legal finance as a strategic resource for corporates and law firms confronting increasingly complex, cross-border matters. Vice Chair David Perla frames the theme succinctly: legal finance is no longer merely a tool to pay fees—it’s a way to unlock capital trapped in claims and manage portfolio risk as regulatory scrutiny and multijurisdictional exposure rise.

The issue is built around sector playbooks. A pharma feature addresses how generic and branded drug makers use financing to shoulder costly Hatch-Waxman litigation and development timelines, positioning capital as a buffer where damages are uncertain but speed to market is critical.

A construction-arbitration piece tracks the uptick in global disputes amid supply-chain shocks, decarbonization mandates, and elongated project schedules, with third-party capital smoothing cash flow over multi-year EPC programs and helping parties sustain high-value claims through arbitration.

Two additional components round out the package. A ten-year lookback on the UK’s opt-out competition regime argues funding has been central to the maturing collective-actions market and will remain pivotal as policymakers contemplate broader redress. And a Q&A tied to Burford’s strategic minority investment in Kindleworth explores how alternative capital and law-firm entrepreneurship intersect to seed specialist boutiques and align incentives with client outcomes.

The UK’s fast-evolving funding landscape continues to clarify what works—and what doesn’t—after PACCAR. In July, the Court of Appeal in Sony Interactive v Neill held that LFAs pegging a funder’s return to deployed or committed capital, even when paid from proceeds and subject to a proceeds cap, are not damages-based agreements. That distinction matters: many CAT and other group LFAs were rewritten over the past year to swap percentage-of-recovery models for multiple-based economics, and the ruling indicates those structures remain enforceable when drafted with care.

Quinn Emanuel's Business Litigation Report traces the arc from PACCAR’s treatment of percentage-based LFAs to Sony v Neill’s clarification and the policy response now gathering steam. The analysis underscores that returns keyed to funding outlay—not the quantum of recovery—avoid the DBA regime, reducing the risk that amended post-PACCAR agreements are second-guessed at certification or settlement approval.

The Civil Justice Council’s June Final Report outlines a legislative repair kit: a statutory fix to reverse PACCAR’s impact prospectively and retrospectively; an explicit separation of third-party funding from contingency-fee arrangements; a shift from self-regulation to light-touch statutory oversight; and, in exceptional cases, judicial power to permit recovery of funding costs from losing defendants. The CJC would also keep third-party funding of arbitration outside the formal regime.

For market participants, the immediate implications are contractual. Multiples, proceeds caps, waterfall mechanics, and severability language deserve meticulous treatment; so do disclosure and control provisions, given heightened judicial scrutiny of class representation and adverse costs exposure.

Burford Capital has strengthened its European presence with its first senior hire in Spain, recruiting Teresa Gutiérrez Chacón as Senior Vice President based in Madrid.

According to the press release, Gutiérrez Chacón brings over 16 years of experience in complex dispute resolution, international arbitration, and legal strategy—most recently serving as Chief Legal Counsel for Pavilion Energy’s European trading arm. Her prior roles include positions at Freshfields and Gómez‑Acebo & Pombo, and she has been recognized by Legal 500 as a “Rising Star” in Litigation & Arbitration and named Best Arbitration Lawyer Under 40 by Iberian Lawyer.

In her new role, she will deepen Burford’s relationships with Spanish law firms and corporations, positioning the firm to address the growing demand in Spain for legal finance solutions. Burford emphasized that Spain’s sophisticated legal market presents “significant opportunities,” and that adding on‑the‑ground leadership in Madrid enhances its ability to deliver local insight and cross‑jurisdictional support.

Philipp Leibfried, Burford’s Head of Europe, noted that this hire demonstrates a commitment to expanding in key European jurisdictions and strengthening Burford’s role as a “trusted partner” for law firms and businesses seeking innovative capital solutions.

The UK Supreme Court has declined to hear Apple’s appeal in Apple Inc and others v Gutmann, leaving intact a Court of Appeal decision that significantly strengthens the position of litigation funders in collective proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT).

An article in Law Gazette reports that the Supreme Court refused Apple’s petition on the grounds that it did not raise an arguable point of law, effectively endorsing the lower court’s April 2025 decision. That ruling affirmed that litigation funders can be paid directly from damages recovered in a class action before distributions are made to class members. The decision resolved longstanding ambiguity surrounding Sections 47C(3) and (6) of the Competition Act 1998 and Rule 93 of the CAT Rules 2015.

The Court of Appeal held that the CAT has wide discretionary authority to order payments to class representatives for costs, fees, and disbursements, provided such allocations are deemed fair and reasonable under the tribunal’s supervisory jurisdiction. This was a pivotal victory for claimant-side funders, who have long warned that being last in line for recovery—after damages are disbursed—posed unacceptable risk in UK opt-out cases.

Law firm Charles Lyndon, counsel for class representative Justin Gutmann, welcomed the Supreme Court’s decision not to revisit the matter, stating that it brings “welcome certainty” to the evolving collective proceedings regime and affirms the CAT’s broad discretion in addressing complex, end-of-case allocation scenarios.

This decision is expected to have a profound impact on the UK’s competition class action landscape. Funders now have greater confidence in the recoverability of their investments, potentially spurring more funding activity in CAT proceedings. The ruling may also prompt defendants to reconsider their settlement calculus, knowing that funders now enjoy a more secure repayment pathway.

Elite U.S. universities embroiled in a high-stakes antitrust class action are now targeting the use of third‑party litigation funding by plaintiffs’ counsel in a bid to derail class certification. At issue is whether a lead firm’s reliance on external financing renders it “inadequate” under class action rules — a novel approach that raises fresh procedural and policy questions.

An article in Reuters notes the the suit alleges that Cornell, Penn, MIT, Georgetown, Notre Dame and others favored wealthy applicants over students needing financial aid, plaintiffs’ counsel (led by Gilbert Litigators & Counselors, or GLC) is facing attacks over transparency and risk allocation. The universities contend that GLC mischaracterized its financial exposure by not fully disclosing its funding arrangements. GLC responds that it only uses outside funding for a portion of its fees (covering 40% of its own, and under 16% of the aggregate) and that no court has previously held that use of funding makes class counsel inadequate. A judge has already found the funding documents “potentially relevant” to the certification motion, underscoring the stakes.

Legal commentators call this a new twist in class litigation — rather than questioning the merits or fairness of funding, defendants are now probing its procedural footprint. The case also dovetails with a broader trend: litigation funders are becoming more visible and controversial, particularly when their support is used by class‑action counsel. Reuters Meanwhile, in adjacent news, law firms are consolidating and AI‑driven tools for plaintiffs’ practices are attracting investor capital — further reshaping the economics of litigation.

This challenge could force courts nationwide to reinterpret adequacy standards in class actions, potentially chilling the use of external funding. It may also provoke funders, defense firms, and plaintiffs to recalibrate disclosure rules and risk-sharing norms across major litigation.